FRAppE: Detecting Malicious Facebook Applications

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Presentation transcript:

FRAppE: Detecting Malicious Facebook Applications Md Sazzadur Rahman, Ting-Kai Huang, Harsha Madhyastha, Michalis Faloutsos University of California, Riverside In this presentation, we show malicious facebook apps are rampant and Some machine learning technique with appropriate features are very effective identifying malicious apps

Problem Statement Social malware is rampant on Facebook The motivation of our work stem from the fact that social malware is rampant

Problem Statement MyPageKeeper can detect social malware* Facebook app, launched June, 2011 20,000 user installed, monitors 3M wall Crawls user’s wall post and news feed continuously Identify malicious posts and notify infected user Major enabling factor – malicious Facebook app *Appeared in USENIX Security, 2012

Problem Statement Malicious Post Benign Malicious App ID Benign MyPageKeeper Post Malicious Benign ? App ID Malicious Benign How to identify malicious Facebook apps given an app ID? No commercial service or tool available to identify malicious apps

How malicious Facebook apps operate Malicious hackers make posts into compromised user’s wall. Their friends see the post, click the link which leads to the malicious app installation page Once installed, they redirect users to different pages for collecting victims personal information and Make her complete surveys so that they can earn money Once the app is installed, hackers get permission to post any time on the victims wall. So, they make the same post and appears victims friends news feed and thus the cycle repeats and the app spreads in facebook

Malicious Facebook apps affect a large no of users Motivation Malicious Facebook apps affect a large no of users 40% of malicious apps have a median of at least 1K MAU! 60% malicious apps get at least 100K clicks on the posted URLs! 3,800 malicious apps posted 5700 bit.ly URLs Using We query bit.ly using API for click through of these URLs

Contributions Malicious Facebook apps are prevalent 13% of the observed apps are malicious Highlight differences between malicious & benign apps Malicious apps require fewer permissions than benign Developed FRAppE to detect malicious apps Achieves 99% accuracy with low FP and FN rates Identify the emergence of AppNets Malicious apps collude at massive scale

Roadmap Profiling malicious and benign apps FRAppE: Detecting malicious apps Emergence of AppNets Conclusion

Data Collection Data collected from MyPageKeeper From June 2011 to March 2012 Apps with known ground truth 6,273 malicious apps 6,273 benign apps Collected different stats App summary App permissions Posts in app profile We collect data from MyPageKeeper, a security app in Facebook we developed and deployed 2011. MyPageKeeper primarily detects malicious posts in Facebook and notify victims. Our dataset contains 111K Facebook apps. D-Sample dataset contains apps for which we know the ground truth, either they are malicious or not. For collecting sample malicious apps, we use a hurestic: if a post is flagged by MyPageKeeper as malicious which is posted by an app, they app is malicious. For collect same amount of benign apps to make the comparison fair. Benign apps are those apps who are not part of malicious apps and also vetted by socialbaker.com, a website collects app statictics. D-Summary dataset contains the summary of apps which we collect using graph api. Summary includes app description, company name, category etc. D-Inst dataset contains the permission set required by an app. D-ProfiledFeed dataset contains the number of posts in apps timeline in facebook

Malicious apps have incomplete summary A popular app, FarmVille contains different information such as category, description, company etc. A malicious app “Profile_viewer” contains no such information

Malicious apps require fewer permissions 97% of malicious apps require only one permission from users https://www.facebook.com/dialog/oauth?client_id=242780702516269& redirect_uri=http://apps.facebook.com/gfhyfte/& scope=publish_stream,offline_access App installation URL contains the list of permission it requires. For example, “Profile viewez” malicious apps two permissions, “publish stream” which is the ability to post any time in users wall And “offline access” which gives the ability to access users data any time.

Malicious apps often share app names 6,273 malicious apps have 1,019 unique names 627 app IDs have ‘The App’ name 470 app IDs have ‘Pr0file Watcher’ name 6,273 benign apps have 6,019 unique names We computed similarity threshold by using normalized Damerau-Levenshtein edit distance

Malicious apps post external links often 80% benign apps do not post any external link 40% malicious apps have one external link per post Some post may contain multiple URLs, that why the ration is > 1 for some case

Roadmap Profiling malicious and benign apps FRAppE: Detecting malicious apps Emergence of AppNets Conclusion

FRAppE – Facebook’s Rigorous App Evaluator FRAppE Lite Based on Support Vector Machine Use features crawled on-demand No. of permissions required by an app Domain reputation of redirect URI Can be used user side FRAppE Addition of two aggregation based features: Similarity of app names Whether posted links are external Can be used only OSN side FRAppE Lite App ID Malicious Benign FRAppE App ID Malicious Benign Features are obtained either opengraph API or instrumented browser

FRAppE Lite and FRAppE are accurate Used cross-validation on known ground truth dataset Accuracy False Positives False Negatives FRAppE Lite 99% 0.1% 4.4% FRAppE 99.5% 0% 4.1%

Detecting more malicious apps with FRAppE 100K more apps for which we lack of ground truth Train FRAppE with 12K apps and test on 100K apps 8,144 apps flagged by FRAppE 98.5% validated using complementary techniques Criteria # of apps validated Cumulative Deleted from Facebook graph 81% App name similarity 74% 97% Post similarity 20% Typo squatting of popular apps 0.1% Manual validation 1.8% 98.5% We applied FRAppE on 100K apps for which we don’t know the ground truth.

FRAppE is Robust Some features are not robust Robust features App summary (description, category, company etc) No. of posts in profile Robust features No. of permissions required by app Reputation of domain app redirects FRAppE is accurate even with only robust features 98.2% accuracy with 0.4% FP and 3.2% FN

Roadmap Profiling malicious and benign apps FRAppE: Detecting malicious apps Emergence of AppNets Conclusion

Cross promotion is rampant for malicious apps Direct cross promotion App cross-promotion is forbidden according to Facebook platform policy; however, it is rampant malicious apps “Which cartoon character are you” malicious app post links in victims wall; When the link is clicked it redirects to the installation page of another malicious app

Highly sophisticated fast-flux like cross promotion External website with redirector Javascript We identified 103 URLs pointing to such redirectors When the malicious URL is clicked in the post, it redirects user to an javascript redirector controlled by the malicious hacker Which randomly takes users to different malicious app installation pages

AppNets form large and dense groups Promoter Promotee Collaborative graph High connectivity 70% of apps collude with more than 10 other apps High density 25% of apps have local clustering coefficient more than 0.74 44 connected components Size of the largest connected component 3,484 Real snapshot of 770 highly collaborating apps We call the colaborative graph as AppNet. It shows high collusion: And high density

Malicious post by the app Malicious link in the post App Piggybacking Popular apps abused for spreading malicious posts Popular App Malicious post by the app Malicious link in the post Farm Ville WOW I just got 5000 Facebook Credits for Free http://offers5000credit.blogspot.com Facebook for iPhone NFL Playoffs Are Coming! Show Your Team Support! http://SportsJerseyFever.com/NFL Mobile WOW! I Just Got a Recharge of Rs 500. http://ffreerechargeindia.blogspot.com/ In our dataset, we found popular apps have posted malicious links.. How?

Facebook API Exploitation https://www.facebook.com/dialog/feed?app_id=175473612514557& link=https://developers.facebook.com/docs/reference/dialogs/&picture=http://fbrell.com/f8.jpg&name=Facebook%20Dialogs&caption=Reference%20Documentation& description=Using%20Dialogs%20to%20interact%20with%20users.&redirect_uri=http://www.example.com/response Facebook Dialog API being exploited: When user click share, the post appears as if it is posted by the app “Mobile”. So, if Facebook maintains a whitelist of app (any post made by these apps are beingn), this malicious post will evade their system

Conclusion Malicious Facebook apps are rampant 40% of malicious apps have at least median 1000 MAU Highlight differences between malicious and benign apps Malicious apps require fewer permissions than benign FRAppE can detect malicious apps accurately 99% accuracy with low FP and FN AppNets form large and densely connected groups 70% apps collude with more than 10 other apps

Thank you! Questions? http://mypagekeeper.org