Address Settlement by Peer to Peer (ASP) Jonathan Rosenberg Cullen Jennings Eric Rescorla.

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Presentation transcript:

Address Settlement by Peer to Peer (ASP) Jonathan Rosenberg Cullen Jennings Eric Rescorla

Key Ideas Security Framework NAT Traversal Extensibility Usage Models Pluggable DHT Forwarding Layer Multiple P2P Networks

Security Framework Two types of threats –Storage Attackers discard, modify, or alter data Attackers fill up the network with data Attackers overwrite data from other users –Routing Attackers discard messages Attackers misroute messages

Storage Security Authorization –Each locus/type pair is bound to a set of certificates valid for writing to that pair –Binding is defined by the usage Distributed Quota –Defined by usage Correctness –Integrity protection via signature –Timestamps for replay attacks

Routing Security Central Enrollment Server –Peer ID selected by enrollment server Help mitigate Eclipse –Rate limiting at enrollment server Help mitigate Sybil –Public/Private keys selected by UA, only public key disclosed to server All direct connections Mutual TLS authed

NAT Traversal CONNECT method used to establish transport layer connections for –ASP itself –SIP –Other things CONNECT and its response implement ICE –ICE usage defined in some detail Peers can act as STUN and TURN servers –Central STUN server used during bootstap –Users use central stun to guess at whether they are natted or not –If they can act as STUN or TURN, write into one of N different seeds, defined by size of DHT and density of STUN/TURN servers

Extensibility New attributes and commands –BGP-style treatment fields (mustUnderstand, mustReflect) for attributes Upgrading DHT entirely –Run parallel rings –Synchronize complete switchover through enrollment server over period of months

Usage Model Each usage defines a set of types –Each type defines Data structure (single value, set, dictionary, etc.) Access controls Size limits How to form seed Merging rules SIP Usage (AOR to contact mappin) Certificate Usage STUN Usage TURN Usage

Forwarding Layer Binary protocol Requests can be forward based on routing header only Label stacks –For responses: Via stack containing list of locally meaningful connection identifiers –For requests: Anonymity

Label Stacks: Responses PeerID: 5 Dst: Src: 1b 2c 1a 2a 2b 3c3a 3b 4c4a 4b 5a 5b PeerID: 5 Cxn: 2a PeerID: 5 Cxn: 3a Cxn: 2a PeerID: 5 Cxn: 3a Cxn: 2a Cxn: 4a Cxn: 3a Cxn: 2a Cxn: 4a Dst: Src: Request Response Cxn: 3a Cxn: 2a PeerID: 1