Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 1 Thomas Porathe Information Design Dep. of Innovation, Design and Product Development Mälardalen.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Thomas Porathe, Information Design Course Track Networks 1 Dr Thomas Porathe Information Design Dep. of Innovation, Design and Product Development Mälardalen.
Advertisements

Department of Transportation USCG/ District 9 Waterways Department of Transportation USCG/ District 9 Waterways WEATHER INFORMATION NEEDS / REQUIREMENTS.
9.2 Maneuverability Important when: – Station keeping – UNREP – Docking – “Dodging incoming...” Predicted by: – Equations of Motion – Tank Models Verified.
Click to edit Master title style Click to edit Master text styles – Second level Third level – Fourth level » Fifth level 1 Anglo-Eastern Maritime Academy.
(Rules 2) Responsibility
Done By: Benjamin Lee Liu Wei Wei Li Bailin Rowell Tan
Alaska Regional Response Team Places of Refuge By John Bauer Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation.
S elçuk N as SELÇUK NAS TURNING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE VESSEL This presentation is required office XP Prepared by Selçuk NAS.
Office of Marine Safety Actions of the Pilot and the Master Captain R. A. Jones.
Chapter I. Introduction. Naval Architecture: the science and engineering of designing ships and other kinds of waterborne crafts. Kinds of ships Sub systems.
WP 6 Exchange of dynamic predictor Two ships operation, Tug and ship Peter Grundevik, SSPA Sweden AB.
CHAPTER VIII Standards Regarding Watch-keeping
Chapter 9: Why you need maneuverability!. MANEUVERABILITY Introduction (9.1) Important when: – Station keeping – UNREP – Docking – “Dodging incoming...”
Question: What will happen if you pour oil into water? Why?
Copyright Coast Guard Auxiliary Association, Inc.
1 Public Release Authorized National Academy of Engineering / National Research Council National Academy of Engineering / National Research Council Captain.
- the boating arm of Nautical Edventures AUTICAL EDVENTURES
Direct way, through poison by ingestion, destruction of habitat and direct contact with the oil. Many kind of fish die from oil spill like whales and.
Periodic checks of navigational equipment
W w w. b a l t i c m a s t e r. o r g WORK PACKAGE 2- FINAL RESULTS WP2 Seminar / Baltic Master II Partner Search The 19th of Dec., 2007 Prepared by Jakub.
US Army Corps of Engineers Engineer Research & Development Center Navigation Channel Design Using Real-Time Marine Simulation Don Wilson Chief – Navigation.
TITLE of the Slide UNITAS ISM Code Module IV Training Material.
Seminar K M A 12 – 13 June 2007 Christer Bergquist – Kalmar Maritime Academy1 SAFE TRANSPORTATION AT SEA A Baltic Sea perspective – Requirements on vessels.
Ice Navigation & Seamanship A tanker master’s experience
Simona Petroska IV1. What is crisis management? Crisis is defined as any emergency situation which disturbs the employees as well as leads to instability.
Master / Pilot exchange
Underkeel Clearance (UKC) Project
Shiphandling. Bridge Watch Team Bridge Equipment Radio hand Sets/speakers Status Boards Chart Table Gyro repeaters Magnetic compass Radar repeaters Alarms/light.
To Share & To Absorb The Lessons Vessel Collision Incident Vessel Collision Incident Lecturer – Capt Cao jihui Aoxing Ship Management (Shanghai) Ltd.
Pilot Navigation System
Office of Marine Safety M/V ETHAN ALLEN Rob Henry.
Exxon Valdez Oil Spill of 1989
Captain Stephen Thomas Maritime Administration Department.
Shipping and Logistics. Port Authorities  8 major ports as follows:  Durban  Cape Town  East London  Saldanha  Port Elizabeth  Coega  Richards.
MONALISA HMI design Thomas Porathe Chalmers.
MARILYN HEIMAN, US ARCTIC PROGRAM DIRECTOR. Exxon Valdez Tanker Spill – March
Drew Brandy, Senior Vice President Inmarsat Maritime Smarter Operations for the Future INMARSAT > SmartOps Copenhagen.
Thomas Porathe, Information Design, Mälardalen University, Sweden 3D chart visualization 1 Real-Time 3D Nautical Navigational Visualisation Thomas Porathe.
The Manoeuvrability of Very Large and Ultra Large Container Ship
MS Basel Australia. At about 0937 [ on 1 November 2010, the Liberian container ship MSC Basel grounded in Moreton Bay, while departing the port of Brisbane.
Heavy Weather And Boat Handling Seattle Safety at Sea Seminar 25 Feb 2012 Paul H. Miller, D.Eng. P.E. Professor of Naval Architecture United States Naval.
10 pt 15 pt 20 pt 25 pt 5 pt 10 pt 15 pt 20 pt 25 pt 5 pt 10 pt 15 pt 20 pt 25 pt 5 pt 10 pt 15 pt 20 pt 25 pt 5 pt 10 pt 15 pt 20 pt 25 pt 5 pt Boat Parts.
Office of Marine Safety M/V Crown Princess Heeling Accident Accident Overview Board Meeting, January 10, 2008.
AIS Replay Training - Japan April 2014 Capt. Toshiki MORIGUCHI Japan Federation of Pilots’ Associations.
Bridge Resource Management
Office of Marine Safety The Decision to Cross the Bar.
Environmental Tragedy.  Prince William Sound was known as Alaska’s “Emerald Jewel” because of its crystal clear waters.  The Sound was home to more.
TOPIC 5 SHIPPING TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT. VOYAGE PLANNING & MANAGEMENT.
Office of Marine Safety M/V Crown Princess Engineering Factors.
Case study: Grounding of CSL Thames in the Sound of Mull, UK, on 9 August 2011 TAIEX Workshop on Marine Casualty Investigation 5-6 September 2012 David.
Rating as defined on STCW Code, means a member of the ship's crew
Hull Damage and List in Stability
Lesson 4 Manning of Vessels.
Ship’s structure safety - a necessary condition for safe shipping
Charta Software – Karsten Uil
The exxon valdes environmental disaster
Ship Disaster Investigation
Shiphandling.
Ship Disaster Investigation
Comprehensive Review of the STCW Convention
The Role of Maritime Education and Training in Navigational Competence
Comprehensive Review of the STCW Convention
INLAND WATERWAY NAVIGATION
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT
Navigation and Maritime Regulations
Handling Over and Taking Over the Navigational Watch
SMM SHIP PERFORMANCE (SMM-SP)
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT
Unit 3 Test Focus Pronouns Antecedents (ante, cedere, pro)
Monday March 24, 2014 Morning Work.
Presentation transcript:

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 1 Thomas Porathe Information Design Dep. of Innovation, Design and Product Development Mälardalen University Eskilstuna, Sweden September 2004 Visualizing the Decision Space of a Ship’s Maneuverability in a Real-Time 3-D Nautical Chart

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 2

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 3

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 4

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 5 The grounding of Exxon Valdez in Price William Sound, Alaska on March 24, 1989

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 6 Port Valdez

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 7

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 8 Ships departing from the TSS because of ice on March 24, (National Transportation Safety Board (1990) Marine Accident Report. Grounding of the U.S. Tankship Exxon Valdez on Blight Reef, Prince William Sound Near Valdez, Alaska Marsh 24, 1989, p. 48)

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 9

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 10 The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable cause of the grounding of the EXXON VALDEZ was the failure of the third mate to properly maneuver the vessel because of fatigue and excessive work load; the failure of the master to provide a proper navigation watch because of impairment from alcohol; the failure of Exxon Shipping Company to provide a fit master and a and a rested and sufficient crew; the lack of an effective Vessel Traffic Service because of inadequate equipment and manning levels, inadequate personnel training, and deficient management oversight; and the lack of effective pilotage services. (National Transportation Safety Board (1990) Marine Accident Report. Grounding of the U.S. Tankship Exxon Valdez on Blight Reef, Prince William Sound Near Valdez, Alaska Marsh 24, 1989, p. 170)

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 11 Ships Maneuverability

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 12 Some factors influencing a ships turn rate Onboard factors: Static: Shape and length of hull Type of rudder Type of propulsion Dynamic: Draught and trim (Speed) External factors: Wind Current Waves Local depth

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 13 Motions of a turning ship. Stenhag, Ned Stanley, Seamanship, Ships Maneuvering, Gothenburg Maritime Achademy

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 14 Turning motions of a midsize ship with a clockwise revolving propeller, advancing at full speed with hard (35 deg.) left and right rudder. Stenhag, Ned Stanley, Seamanship, Ships Maneuvering, Gothenburg Maritime Academy

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 15 The effect of water depth on a turning ship. Exxon (1979) Maneuvering Trials of the 278,000 DWT ESSO OSAKA in Shallow and Deep Waters, Report number E11.4TM.79

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 16 Predicting future position and course of a conventional product carrier in SSPA Seaman software in four time steps and for seven rudder angles from 40 degrees left rudder to 40 degrees right rudder. Wilske, Erland (2004) A new method for evaluation of ship manoeuvring margin, SSPA Research Report No. 127, p. 14

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 17 Dynamic maximum turn area. Non-red areas are free decision space. 3D chart prototype of the Aland archipelago in the Baltic sea.

Thomas Porathe, Information Design Visualizing Decision Space 18 Vessel Traffic Centers, Command and Control Centers, control of unmanned vessels