Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: The Hospital and Community Perspective Grand Rapids, MI May 10, 2007 Stephen V. Cantrill, MD Associate Director Department.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Hospital Pandemic Influenza Planning by Ed Lydon, CVPH.
Advertisements

PANDEMIC PLANNING AT EPHRATA COMMUNITY HOSPITAL
Lesson 3 Responding to Emergency Events. For additional information or questions please contact Toledo-Lucas County Health Department APC:
ED Disaster Preparedness: Tertiary Medical Center Perspective Alisa Murchek, RN, MS, CEN Associate Director of Nursing, Critical Care and Emergency Services.
Hospital Emergency Management
Part A: Module A5 Session 2
Hospital Surge Capability Program Neighborhood Emergency Acute Care Center Ned Wright Lisa Gibney Linn County, Iowa Medical Reserve Corps Coordinators.
Washington State: A Focus on Preparedness Nancy J. Auer, MD WSHA Disaster Readiness Conference Wenatchee, WA May 30, 2013.
Readiness Guideline for Epidemic Respiratory Infection in Long Term Care Facilities Rachel N. Plotinsky MD Epidemic Intelligence Service Officer, NH Centers.
1 Antivirals in the Draft CDC Pandemic Plan David K. Shay Influenza Branch National Center for Infectious Diseases Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
Capability Cliff Notes Series PHEP Capability 8—Medical Dispensing and Countermeasures What Is It And How Will We Measure It?
Capital RAC NC RACs: An EM Partner in Disaster Response Dale Hill, EMT-P CapRAC Coordinator Manager, Emergency Services Institute WakeMed Health & Hospitals.
1 Allocation of Ventilators in an Influenza Pandemic Statewide Videoconference March 16, 2007 Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Planning Guthrie Birkhead,
Pandemic Influenza: Role and Responsibility of Local Public Health Richard M. Tooker, MD Chief Medical Officer Kalamazoo County Health and Community Services.
Higher Education Pandemic Symposium November 2, 2007 University of Vermont Lessons from Operation Panflu.
Pandemic Influenza Planning Seattle & King County, Washington, USA Jeffrey S. Duchin, M.D. Chief, Communicable Disease Control, Epidemiology & Immunization.
Emergency Preparedness and Response: The Big Picture
Emergency Management Working Group 10 November 2014 Please remember to silence your cell phone.
Jay Hamm, RN, FACHE, COO/Acute Care Executive Steve Shelton, MD, Medical Director EM Eric Brown, MD, Physician Executive.
Health System Response to Pandemic Influenza: A Clinician's Perspective Mary M. Klote, MD Walter Reed Army Medical Center.
Session 6 Volunteer Coordination. The tool Volunteer Coordination will help response leaders:  enhance existing plans for recruiting community volunteers.
Pandemic Influenza Response Planning on College Campuses Felix Sarubbi, MD Division of Infectious Diseases James H. Quillen College of Medicine.
Volunteers Strengthening Our Community’s Emergency Preparedness and Response.
No Vacancy: Healthcare Surge Capacity in Disasters John L. Hick, MD MDH/HCMC July 22, 2004.
Public Health Emergency Preparedness: Surge Capacity Issues Sally Phillips, RN, PhD.
Pandemic Preparedness: It’s not if…. but when An educational session prepared by the Pandemic Preparedness Response Team of the Kidney Community Emergency.
Legal Issues in Hospital Preparations for Disaster Response – “Operational Considerations” Knox Andress, RN, FAEN Designated Regional Coordinator Louisiana.
POD PLANNING GUIDE. INTRODUCTION This guide is intended to be a simplified step-by- step guide through the process of planning a Point of Dispensing (POD)
U.S. Hospital Support for Major Emergencies Megan R. Angelini Senior Fellow American College of Healthcare Executives.
Community Preparedness & Disaster Planning. Why Disasters occur ?
Pan American Health Organization.. Protecting the Health of Health Care Workers: Experience from the Americas Marie-Claude Lavoie Decision Making for Using.
Module 3 Develop the Plan Planning for Emergencies – For Small Business –
Part VI—Influenza and EMTALA & Part VII– Planning Considerations A “Just-in-Time” Primer on H1N1 Influenza A and Pandemic Influenza provided by the National.
PAR CONFERENCE Homeland Defense A Provider’s Perspective Lessons from TMI Dennis Felty November 15, 2001.
Association of Health Care Journalists Preparing Communities For Pandemics Houston, Texas March 18, 2006 Georges C. Benjamin, MD, FACP Executive Director.
NOVA CHIEFS Pandemic Summery NVRC April 11,2006. Preparing for a pandemic requires the leveraging of all instruments of national power, and coordinated.
New Jersey Preparedness Training Consortium Continuing Education for health care professionals “moduleNewJerseyv1” NJ Statewide Response to Health Threats.
1 Draft for discussion only. This document is not for general distribution and has not been approved by any agency or entity. No further / external distribution.
Stanislaus County It’s Not Flu as Usual It’s Not Flu as Usual Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Renee Cartier Emergency Preparedness Manager Health Services.
Local Emergency Response to Biohazardous Incidents Dr. Elizabeth Whalen, MD Medical Director Albany County Health Department April 8, 2005 Northeast Biological.
Emergency Management Strategies for Identifying and Integrating Community Resources to Expand Medical Surge Capacity: Alternate Care Facilities Washington,
Hot Topic Meeting by: Royal College of Physicians of Edinburgh & The Scottish Executive Health Department Pandemic Flu Planning Scotland’s Health Response.
BIOTERRORISM: SOUTH CAROLINA RESPONDS. OBJECTIVES l To understand the response to a bioterrorist act through use of the unified incident command system.
Guidance on Antiviral Drug Use and Stockpiling of Antiviral Drugs and Respirators and Facemasks National antiviral drug use guidance Ben Schwartz, HHS.
OSHA Training Institute 1 Regional Planning and Assistance OSHA Training Institute – Region IX University of California, San Diego (UCSD) - Extension.
CONNECTICUT PANDEMIC PLANNING Meg Hooper, MPA Connecticut Department of Public Health 9 Oct 2008.
Public Health Issues Associated with Biological and Chemical Terrorism Scott Lillibridge, MD Director Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Activity National.
Governor’s Taskforce for Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Issue Paper Credible and Effective Decision-making Workgroup Members Robert Rolfs, State Epidemiologist,
PHEP Capabilities John Erickson, Special Assistant Washington State Department of Health
Unified Government of Wyandotte County Public Health Department Pandemic Illness Planning.
2007 San Diego Wildfires: Lessons Learned Wilma J. Wooten, M.D., M.P.H. Public Health Officer County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency.
Stephen P. Pickard MD Career Epidemiology Field Officer Assigned to North Dakota Department of Health Science and Public Health Practice Office Coordinating.
Group 2 Summary. Objective 1: Need for strengthening comprehensive national influenza surveillance systems 1) How have surveillance strategies changed?
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Preparedness for Biological Emergencies 27 April 2004 Jeffrey S. Duchin, M.D. Chief, Communicable Disease.
Bioterrorism and Emergency Preparedness November 16, 2005 Jon Huss Director, Community Preparedness Section.
© 2014 The Litaker Group LLC All Rights Reserved Draft Document Not for Release or Distribution Texas Department of State Health Services Disaster Behavioral.
Large numbers of ill people seek care; EDs, clinics, and medical offices are crowded; there’s a surge on medical facilities; Delays in seeing a provider;
Alternative Care Sites Stephen V. Cantrill, M.D., FACEP Associate Director Department of Emergency Medicine Denver Health Medical Center.
Objectives Identify different types of health care facilities. Describe a typical hospital organizational structure. Identify hospital departments and.
Volunteer Emergency Response Training.  What it is and who it serves  Identify major components  Recognize authorities and assigned personnel.
The Status of the Nation’s Emergency Management System Gail L. Warden Chair, Committee on The Future of Emergency Care in the United States Health System.
Pandemic Flu Tabletop Exercise (TTX) [insert date of exercise] Public Health – Seattle & King County [insert your agency logo]
PHYSICIAN ROLES AT THE HOSPITAL IN A DISASTER. (Insert Facility Name) PHYSICIAN ROLES IN THE HOSPITAL IN A DISASTER OBJECTIVES: 1.Discuss the physician.
Randall (Randy) Snyder, PT, MBA Division Director January 27, 2016
[Exercise Name] [Date]
Emergency Operations Plan
Planning for Health Systems
Infection Control Fundamentals Unit 2.
Public Health Preparedness
Presentation transcript:

Preparing for Pandemic Influenza: The Hospital and Community Perspective Grand Rapids, MI May 10, 2007 Stephen V. Cantrill, MD Associate Director Department of Emergency Medicine Denver Health Medical Center 2007 Great Lakes Homeland Security Training Conference & Expo

Cantrill 2 US, State, Local Estimates of Moderate (1958/68-like) or Severe (1918) Pandemic US Gerberding J, CDC Colorado Calonge N, CDPHE Denver Price C, DHHA 1958/ / / Illness90M 1.3M 166K Output Care 45M 645K 83,000 Hospital865K9.9M12,398142K1,57718,305 ICU128,7501.5M1,84521, ,746 Ventilator64,875743K93010, ,373 Deaths2,99626,2762,99626, ,390

Cantrill 3 Assumptions for Healthcare  1 st wave should last 6-8 weeks  Specific vaccine will not be available for 1 st wave  Organizations need plans to deal with estimated workforce absenteeism rates around 25%  Health-care workers and first responders will be at high risk of illness  Staffing issues due to illness  Fear issues due to transmission risk  Will need to depend on local/institutional plans and resources  May have prolonged cyclic duration which will stress resources and personnel

Cantrill 4 DHMC Emerging Infectious Diseases (EID) Task Force  Administration  Legal  Infection Control  ED/Disaster Club  Engineering  Nursing Leadership  Medical Executive Staff  Critical Care  Laboratory  Respiratory Therapy  Chaplain/Social Work  Environmental  Public Relations  Security  Materials Management  Occupational Health  Radiology  Pharmacy  Information Technology  Public Health  Medical Education  Infectious Diseases

Cantrill 5 Surveillance  Formal process of reviewing public health alerts  Information Technology to track patients  Inpatient fever surveillance  Syndromic surveillance in the ED

Cantrill 6 Communications  Staff  Call down system  / intranet  Patients  Signage  Phone Info Hotlines  Educational brochures  Media  PR list of Key Contacts  Designated Spokesperson  Public Health + other institutions

Cantrill 7 Education and Training  Current healthcare provider web based training allows for rapid training and tracking compliance  Library of educational materials and website  H(E)ICS training  Administration  Clinical providers  Support personnel  Public health  Just-in-time training in respiratory care

Cantrill 8 Supplies/Equipment  Additional PPE  N95 masks  Gowns  Gloves, etc  2 months supply  Ventilators –  2 additional full units  5 smaller units for $29,000  Many “Disposable” Units  Drugs -  Minimal stockpile of oseltamivir at this time

Cantrill 9 Patient Triage  Alternative triage locations  Institutional lockdown for walk-in patients  Decompress ED  Prevent disease spread  Ideal location depends on specific EID transmission and volume of patients affected

Cantrill 10 Patient Triage and Admission  Use of automobiles as a social distancing mechanism  Nurse Advice Line to avoid hospital visits  Specific criteria for admission  Inpatient fever surveillance

Cantrill 11 Inpatient isolation cohorting by floor  Isolation ward w/ negative airflow capability  Can be completed within 4 hours  Plastic sheeting and 2x4’s  Can accommodate ventilated patients  Expandable to 2 floors if needed: ~50-60 beds

Cantrill 12 Facility Access  Plan for limiting visitors  Main entrance and ED entrance only access points during epidemic; other entrances closed  Restricted access procedures rehearsed  Threshold for Passive Screening (i.e. signs)  Threshold for Active Screening  Patient transport pathways

Cantrill 13 Occupational Health  A system for rapidly delivering vaccine/prophylaxis to HCWs developed and tested  Mass Vax clinics in 2004, 2005  Used incident command system  HCWs have been prioritized  Degree of exposure to infectious droplets  Respiratory fit testing/ PAPR training  Furlough of contagious staff  Detection of symptomatic staff  Altering work for high risk staff

Cantrill 14 Surge Capacity Plan: Surging with Limited Staff  Database of retired healthcare personnel and former trainees  Legal issues (e.g. licensing) being reviewed  Limit non-essential patient care  Use of phone triage to free up providers  Restructuring/reassigning HCW tasks daily through incident command  Just-in Time training, LEAN  Use of family members (bathing, bathroom, vital signs, meals)  Maximize protection of current personnel: vaccines, prophylaxis, infection control  Day care center for employee families?

Cantrill 15 Psychosocial Support Plan  Identify rest and recuperation sites for responders  Telephone support lines  Establish links with community organizations  Train HCWs in basic psychosocial support services  Create educational brochures

Cantrill 16 Infection Control Basics: Hand Hygiene and Respiratory Etiquette

Cantrill 17 Facility Based Surge Capacity  Expedited discharges  Adaptation of existing capacity  Single rooms become doubles  Take over areas of the hospital for acute care (Internal “Alternative Care Sites”)  Classrooms  Offices  Lobbies  Hallways

Cantrill 18 Surge Capacity Issues  Physical space  Organizational structure  Medical staff  Ancillary staff  Support (nutrition, mental health, etc)  Supply  Pharmaceuticals  Other resources

Cantrill 19 Part of the Problem:  ED overcrowding  Inpatient bed loss: 38,000 (4.4%) between 1996 and 2000  ICU capacity loss: 20% between 1995 and 2001  Most health care is in the private sector not under governmental or municipal authority

Cantrill 20 DHMC Disaster Contingency Discharge Drill – 1/05  Services participating: Internal Medicine, Surgery, Pediatrics  26% of patients could be transferred off-site to lower care facility (alternative care site)  28% of patients could be discharged home  14% could be transferred from ICU to ward  Patients transferred with Problem List and Kardex

Cantrill 21 Community Based Surge Capacity: Alternative Care Sites  Requires close planning and cooperation amongst diverse groups who have traditionally not played together  Hospitals  Offices of Emergency Management  Regional planners  State Department of Health  MMRS may be a good organizing force

Cantrill 22 Where Have We Been?

Cantrill 23 Hospital Reserve Disaster Inventory  Developed in 1950’s-1960’s  Designed to deal with trauma/nuclear victims  Developed by US Dept of HEW  Hospital-based storage  Included rotated pharmacy stock items

Cantrill 24 Packaged Disaster Hospitals  Developed in 1950’s-1960’s  Designed to deal with trauma/nuclear victims  Developed by US Civil Defense Agency & Dept of HEW  2500 deployed  Modularized for 50, 100, 200 bed units  45,000 pounds; 7500 cubic feet

Cantrill 25 Packaged Disaster Hospitals  Last one assembled in 1962  Adapted from Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH)  Community or hospital-based storage

Cantrill 26 Packaged Disaster Hospital: Multiple Units  Pharmacy  Hospital supplies / equipment  Surgical supplies / equipment  IV solutions / supplies  Dental supplies  X-ray  Records/office supplies  Water supplies  Electrical supplies/equipment  Maintenance / housekeeping supplies  Limited oxygen support

Cantrill 27 Packaged Disaster Hospital

Cantrill 28 Packaged Disaster Hospitals  Congress refused to supply funds needed to maintain them in 1972  Declared surplus in 1973  Dismantled over the 1970’s-1980’s  Many sold for $1

Cantrill 29 The Re-Emergence of a Concept  Medical Armory (Medical Cache)  Think of the National Guard Armory  Driving Forces:  Loss of institutional flexibility  “Just-In-Time” Everything  Loss of physical surge capacity  Denver has 1000 fewer physical beds that it did 10 years ago

Cantrill 30 The Re-Emergence of a Concept: The Medical Cache  Issues:  Augmentation vs Alternative Site?  Inclusion of actual structure?  Cost?  Storage?  Ownership?  Pharmaceuticals?  Level of care provided?

Cantrill 31 Level I Cache: Hospital Augmentation  Bare-bones approach  Physical increase of 50 beds: may be an “Internal Alternative Care Site”  Would rely heavily on hospital supplies  Stored in a single trailer  About $20,000  Within the realm of institutional ownership  Readily mobile - but needs vehicle

Cantrill 32 Level I Cache: Hospital Augmentation  Trailer  Cots  Linens  IV polls  Glove, gowns, masks  BP cuffs  Stethoscopes

Cantrill 33 Used During Katrina Evacuee Relief

Cantrill 34

Cantrill 35 Level II Cache: Regional Alternative Site  Significantly more robust in terms of supplies  Designed by one of our partners, Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

Cantrill 36 Level II Cache: Regional Alternative Site  Designed for initial support of 500 patients  Per HRSA recommendations of 500 patient surge per 1,000,000 population  Modular packaging for units of pts  Regionally located and stored  Trailer-based for mobility  Has been implemented  Approximate price less than $100,000 per copy

Cantrill 37 Level III Cache: Comprehensive Alternative Care Site  Adapted from work done by US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command  50 Patient modules  Most robust model  Closest to supporting non-disaster level of care, but still limited  More extensive equipment support

Cantrill 38 Work at the Federal Level  DHHS: Public Health System Contingency Station  Specified and demonstrated  250 beds in 50 bed units  Quarantine or lower level of care  For use in existing structures  Multiple copies to be strategically placed  Owned and operated by the federal government

Cantrill 39 Basic Concept: HHS Public Health Service Contingency Stations (Federal Medical Stations)

Cantrill 40 Demo Scenario  Denver (notionally) experiences an event that demands 100 beds of surge relief.  OPHEP initiates set up of a PHS Contingency Station  The Denver Convention Center serves as the building of opportunity  Denver Health Medical Center decides which patients transfer to the Station, and then makes these transfers  Federal manpower operates the Station  PHS and/or Medical Reserve Corps provide professional services  Federal Logistics Manager operates Station logistics  Colorado and Denver PH/EMS provide service support (notionally)—food, water, utilities, etc

Cantrill 41

Cantrill 42

Cantrill 43 Station Layout Hall A

Cantrill 44

Cantrill 45

Cantrill 46

Cantrill 47

Cantrill 48

Cantrill 49

Cantrill 50 Work at the Federal Level  DHS: Critical care unit  Specified, not yet implemented  ICU level of care  Specialty care units

Cantrill 51 Problem Disaster event overwhelms current hospital capacity An “Alternative Care Site” must be opened to treat victims What is the best existing infrastructure/site in the region for delivering care?

Cantrill 52 Concept of Alternative Care Site It is not a miniature hospital Level of care will decrease Need to decide in advance: What types of patients will be treated at the site? Disaster victims? Low-level of care patients from overwhelmed hospitals?

Cantrill 53 Possible Alternative Care Sites Hotel Recreation Center Church Stadium School

Cantrill 54 Potential Non-Hospital Sites Aircraft hangers Churches Community/recreation centers Convalescent care facilities Fairgrounds Government buildings Hotels/motels Meeting Halls Military facilities National Guard armories Same day surgical centers/clinics Schools Sports Facilities/stadiums Trailers/tents (military/other) Shuttered Hospitals Detention Facilities

Cantrill 55 Some Issues:  Private sites vs Public sites  Who can grant permission to use?  Need for decontamination after use to restore to original function

Cantrill 56 Infrastructure Requirements Infrastructure factors listed on axis of a matrix. Additional relevant factors can be added/deleted based on your area or the type of event. Relative weight scale created on 5-point scale comparing factor to that of a hospital

Cantrill 57 Factors to Weigh in Selection an Alternative Care Site Ability to lock down facility Adequate building security personnel Adequate lighting Air conditioning Area for equipment storage Biohazard & other waste disposal Communications Door sizes Electrical power (backup) Family Areas Floor & walls Food supply/prep area Heating Lab/specimen handling area Laundry Loading Dock Mortuary holding area Oxygen delivery capability Parking for staff/visitors Patient decon areas Pharmacy areas Toilet facilities/showers (#) Two-way radio capability Water Wired for IT and Internet Access

Cantrill 58 Weighted Scale 5 = Equal to or same as a hospital. 4 = Similar to that of a hospital, but has SOME limitations (i.e. quantity/condition). 3 = Similar to that of a hospital, but has some MAJOR limitations (i.e. quantity/condition). 2 = Not similar to that of a hospital, would take modifications to provide. 1 = Not similar to that of a hospital, would take MAJOR modifications to provide. 0 = Does not exist in this facility or is not applicable to this event.

Cantrill 59

Cantrill 60 Customizing the Site Selection Matrix A facility and/or factor can be easily added as a new row to excel spreadsheet.

Cantrill 61 Issues to Consider Is each factor of equal weight? What if another use is already stated for the building in a disaster situation? (i.e. a church may have a valuable community role) Are missing, critical elements able to be brought in easily to site?

Cantrill 62 WHO needs this tool? Incident commanders Regional planners Planning teams including: fire, law, Red Cross, security, emergency managers, hospital personnel Public works / hospital engineering should be involved to know what modifications are needed.

Cantrill 63 WHEN should you use this tool? Before an actual event. Choose best site for different scenarios so have a site in mind for each “type”.

Cantrill 64 The Supplemental Oxygen Dilemma  Supplemental oxygen need highly likely in a pan flu / bioterrorism incident  Has been carefully researched by the Armed Forces  Most options are quite expensive  Most require training/maintenance  All present logistical challenges  Remains an unresolved issue  Most have high cost/patient  Many have very high power requirements

Cantrill 65 EMERGENCY OXYGEN GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM O 2 Generation System O 2 Storage System Patient rooms or O 2 Distribution System Patient rooms

Cantrill 66 EMERGENCY OXYGEN GENERATION AND DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM LOX Storage / Filling Tank Patient rooms LOX Storage System NPTLOX O 2 Distribution System 6 patients per LOX

Cantrill 67 Oxygen Concentrator  Up to 10 liters per 7 psi  110V AC  57 lbs  Approx $1,400

Cantrill 68 Staffing Classes  Physician  Physician extenders (PA/NP)  RNs or RNs/LPNs  Health technicians  Unit secretaries  Respiratory Therapists  Case Manager  Social Worker  Housekeepers  Lab  Medical Asst/Phlebotomy  Food Service  Chaplain/Pastoral  Day care/Pet care  Volunteers  Engineering / Maintenance  Biomed-to set up equipment  Security  Patient transporters

Cantrill 69 Per 12 Hour Shift: 33  Physician[1]  Physician extenders (PA/NP)[1]  RNs or RNs/LPNs [6]  Health technicians [4]  Unit secretaries[2]  Respiratory Therapists [1]  Case Manager[1]  Social Worker[1]  Housekeepers[2]  Lab [1]  Medical Asst/Phlebotomy [1]  Food Service[2]  Chaplain/Pastoral[1]  Day care/Pet care  Volunteers[4]  Engineering/Maintenance [.25]  Biomed[.25]  Security[2]  Patient transporters[2]

Cantrill 70 Staffing Considerations  Requires significant pre-planning  State {S}  Local {L}  Institutional {I}  Unclear who would volunteer  Contained vs Population-based Surge event

Cantrill 71 Facilitation of Emergency Staffing  Establish legal authority to utilize out-of-state licensed personnel{S}  Establish supervision criteria for volunteer and out-of-state licensed personnel{S}  Establish/maintain list of retired individuals who could be called upon to staff {S L I}  Availability of prophylaxis for employees and volunteers (? and their families) to guarantee workforce availability {S L I}

Cantrill 72 Facilitation of Emergency Staffing  Communication of institutional workforce plan in advance to employees{I}  Develop, test and maintain emergency call-in protocol{L I}  Expectation and capacity for flexibility in roles {S L I}  Establish linkages with community resources (ie. hotel housekeeping){L I}

Cantrill 73 Facilitation of Emergency Staffing  Address specific needs of employees (transportation, single mother, pets) {I}  Implement a reverse 911 or notification system for all employees{S L I}  Establishment of institutional policies for credentialing of non-employees {S L I}

Cantrill 74 Emergency System for Advanced Registration of Volunteer Health Professionals: ESAR-VHP  State-based registration, verification and credentialing of medical volunteers  Should allow easier sharing of volunteers across states  Still missing:  Liability coverage  Command and control

Cantrill 75 Medical Reserve Corps  Local medical volunteers  No corps unit uniform structure  330 units of 55,000 volunteers  Deployments do not qualify for FEMA reimbursement  Liability concerns are still an issue  ESAR-VHP may help with credentialing

Cantrill 76 Development of Gubernatorial Draft Executive Orders  Developed by the Colorado Governor’s Expert Emergency Epidemic Response Committee (GEEERC)  Multi-disciplinary  20 different specialties/fields (from attorney general to vets)  To address pandemics or BT incidents  Work started in 2000

Cantrill 77 Development of Gubernatorial Draft Executive Orders  Declaration of Bioterrorism Disaster  Suspension of Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA)  Allowing seizure of specific drugs from private sources  Suspension of certain Board of Pharmacy regulations regarding dispensing of medication

Cantrill 78 Development of Gubernatorial Draft Executive Orders  Suspension of certain physician and nurse licensure statutes  Allows out-of-state or inactive license holders to provide care under proper supervision  Allowing physician assistants and EMTs to provide care under the supervision of any licensed physician  Allowing isolation and quarantine  Suspension of certain death and burial statutes

Cantrill 79 Other Issues and Decision Points  “Ownership”, command and control  HICS is a good starting structure  Who decides to open an ACS?  Scope of care to be delivered?  Offloaded hospital patients  Primary victim care  Nursing home replacement  Ambulatory chronic care / shelter

Cantrill 80 Other Issues and Decision Points  Operational support  Meals  Sanitary needs  Infrastructure  Documentation of care  Security

Cantrill 81 Other Issues and Decision Points  Communications  Relations with EMS  Rules/policies for operation  Exit strategy  Exercising the plan

Cantrill 82 Available from AHRQ:

Cantrill 83 Also Available: Altered Standards of Care in Mass Casualty Events: Bioterrorism and Other Public Health Emergencies. AHRQ Publication No , April Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, Rockville, MD.

Cantrill 84 Katrina: ACS Issues  Importance of regional planning  Importance of security  Advantages of manpower proximity  Segregating special needs populations  Organized facility layout  Importance of ICS

Cantrill 85 Katrina: ACS Issues  The need for “House Rules”  Importance of public health issues  Safe food  Clean water  Latrine resources  Sanitation supplies

Cantrill 86 Tiered Response Plan: Based on Epidemiology  Category 0: No cases of EID at DHMC  EID elsewhere in the world  EID transmission in the region  Passive/active surveillance; Just-in-time training  Category 1: A few cases at DHMC but all cases are imported  Cohort patients; limit visitors to infectious patients; institute patient transport routes

Cantrill 87 Tiered Response Plan: Based on Epidemiology  Category 2: A larger number of EID cases at DHMC (e.g. more than 5-10) OR nosocomial transmission has occurred, but source clear.  Limit visitors to all patients; limit elective procedures; fever screen at entry; fever surveillance on wards  Category 3: Nosocomial transmission has occurred and the nosocomial cases have NO clear source  No visitors; facility closed to elective or non-life/limb threat admits

Cantrill 88 Summary  Institutional preparedness is a challenge  We are rediscovering some old concepts  Supplemental oxygen and respiratory support remain problems for an ACS  Surge staffing facilitation requires advance planning at multiple levels and may still fail

Cantrill 89 Be Prepared