1 Pascal URIEN, IETF 61th, Washington DC, 10th November 2004 “draft-urien-eap-smartcard-type-00.txt” EAP Smart Card Protocol (EAP-SC)

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1 Pascal URIEN, IETF 61th, Washington DC, 10th November 2004 “draft-urien-eap-smartcard-type-00.txt” EAP Smart Card Protocol (EAP-SC)

2 Pascal URIEN, IETF 61th, Washington DC, 10th November 2004 Goals & Model EAP methods working with smartcards may conflict with purely software methods. Proposal: one EAP type (EAP-SC) for all smartcards. EAP messages sent/received to/from smartcard handlers are encapsulated in EAP-SC packets. It’s an EAP in EAP paradigm The EAP-SC model: three layers 1- The EAP-SC handling layer receives and sends EAP packets, selects a Smart Card handler, and passes packets to the Smart Card handler. 2- The EAP Smart Card Handler layer handles the interface to the smart card, as well as any EAP Method specific functions that are not handled in the smart card. 3- The Smart Card executes security sensitive Authentication Method functions in conjunction with the EAP Smart Card Handler.

3 Pascal URIEN, IETF 61th, Washington DC, 10th November 2004 EAP-SC model EAP-SC Handling Method Encapsulated EAP type EAP-TLS Smartcard Handler EAP-SIM Smartcard Handler Other Smartcard Handler Smartcard EAP messages, type=EAP-SC 1 2 3

4 Pascal URIEN, IETF 61th, Washington DC, 10th November 2004 Payload Messages Structures codeIdtLength Vendor-Type = type IdtLength+8 Type = EAP-SC Vendor-Id=0 Payload type code type EAP-SC Message EAP Message received/sent from/to smartcard handler

5 Pascal URIEN, IETF 61th, Washington DC, 10th November 2004 Smart Cards and EAP Security Claims Mutual Authentication Mutual authentication processes are generally based upon the use of random numbers. Smart Cards enhance the security of these processes by providing true random number generation. Confidentiality Smart Cards improve the robustness of EAP messages encryption, by providing tamper resistant storage for the encryption keys and secure execution of the encryption algorithms. Key Derivation Smart Cards improve the confidentiality of the key derivation process by providing tamper resistant storage for the master keys and secure execution of the key derivation algorithms. Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Smart Cards improve security against Trojan Horse attacks by providing a logically tamper resistant environment for the full implementation of EAP methods and secure execution of the encryption algorithms. Dictionary Attacks Smart Cards access is commonly protected via pin codes with a limited number of retries; permanent blocking of the device is enforced when the number of retries is exceeded. This mechanism provides enhanced protection against dictionary attacks aiming at discovering passwords. Cryptographic Binding Smart Cards provides tamper resistant storage for cryptographic keys and secure execution of the tunnel creation algorithms thus enhancing the cryptographic binding process. Channel Binding Smart Cards can be used as a secure out of band distribution method for channel parameters and therefore enhance the channel binding process. Protection Against Rogue Networks Smart Cards facilitate the provisioning and secure storage of information about trusted parties, such as the root certificates of trusted networks. This protects the end user against rogue networks and enables the enforcement of network roaming policies.