A Study of BGP Origin AS Changes and Partial Connectivity Ratul Mahajan David Wetherall Tom Anderson University of Washington Asta Networks † † ‡ † ‡ ‡

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Presentation transcript:

A Study of BGP Origin AS Changes and Partial Connectivity Ratul Mahajan David Wetherall Tom Anderson University of Washington Asta Networks † † ‡ † ‡ ‡ †

2 Goals Long-Term: What is the extent and impact of configuration errors in BGP? ≫ incorrect origin AS, partial connectivity, pvt. ASN, pvt. address space, looping AS-paths, …… This talk: ≫ Origin AS Changes ≫ Partial Connectivity CSE:

3 Origin AS Changes Why does the origin for a prefix change? ≫ How many changes are short-lived? ≫ How many changes are a result of misconfiguration? ≫ How many changes lead to reachability problems? Easy ways to detect misconfigured origins? ≫ Multiple origins for a prefix misses subset space hijack increasingly common practice ≫ IRR’s are they accurate?

4 IRR: Simple Way to Detect Incorrect Origins? BGP Table Snapshot: Sep 28, 2001 Verified using RADB, RIPE, APNIC, ARIN

5 Origin Changes: Methodology Use BGP snapshots archived by Route Views Identify prefixes that are not announced by the same origin(s) throughout the day ≫ includes prefixes not present in all snapshots Attribute a cause to every origin change Caveat: would miss origin changes that come and go between snapshots

6 Classification of Origin Changes Long-lived: Changes that seem permanent Fluctuating: Short-lived changes with correct origins Conflicting: Short-lived changes with potentially incorrect origins

7 Glossary for Short-Lived Changes

More than 2% of the prefixes experience a change 2. Less than a third of changes are long-lived 3. Weekly pattern in the number of changes seen Weekend

% of long-lived changes persist beyond a week 2. Most action is in more-specifics (added,deleted)

10 9/11, As Seen by Origin Changes 11-Sep

11 Self Deaggregation causes more origin changes than failures

12 Deaggregation in general, and extra last hop in particular, causes most changes

13 Consulting the IRR when you see conflicts does not help

14 Some Examples of Misconfigurations Small AS’s announce /8’s (61.0/8, 62.0/8,...) An AS in Romania originated routes for most of Romania but NO reachability problems AS’s accept their own deaggregated address space adverts, and pass them on Not all origin misconfigurations cause reachability problems. How to figure out which ones do?

15 Reachability Test 1. Download the current BGP table 2. Identify the announcements with new origins 3. Divide the AS’s into two sets ≫ converts: AS’s that believe the new origin ≫ loyals: AS’s that believe the old origin 4. Use public looking glass servers to check if one set can reach the prefix while the other cannot

16 Reachability Test: Possible Results Pass ≫ both sets can reach the prefix, or ≫ both get blocked at the same place in the network Inconclusive ≫ both sets cannot reach the prefix, and get blocked at different places in the network Fail ≫ one set can reach the prefix, while the other cannot

17 Reachability Test: Initial Results

18 Partial Connectivity Advertised address space not reachable from all places in the Internet Causes: ≫ convergence delays ≫ route flap damping ≫ policy filtering (prefix length, commercial relationships) Failures do not lead to partial connectivity

19 Partial Connectivity: Methodology 1. Identify partially connected address space (!= prefix) from the BGP table 2. Consult BGP snapshots 15 minutes before and after to identify partial connectivity due to convergence delays 3. Correlate against partial connectivity across days to differentiate between route flap damping and filtering based partial connectivity 4. Verify using public looking glasses to guard against restrictive export policies and default pointing

20 Partial Connectivity: Results Expressed as %age of advertised address space: ≫ convergence: % ≫ route flap damping: % ≫ filtering: 0.7%

21 Most partially connected prefixes are /24’s Most partially connected address space is due to /16’s

22 Conclusions More than 2% of the prefixes experience an origin change during the day Less than a third of the changes are long-lived Only a small fraction of the changes lead to reachability problems 0.7% of address space is partially connected Feedback: