By Ram Gopal, Alex Audu, Chaoping Wu, Hormuzd Khosravi Forwarding and Control Element Protocol (FACT)

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Presentation transcript:

by Ram Gopal, Alex Audu, Chaoping Wu, Hormuzd Khosravi Forwarding and Control Element Protocol (FACT)

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON FACT Protocol Updates  Protocol draft updated to be compliant with latest Requirements draft v-09  Added Separate Control and Data Channels  Updated Reliability section  Updated Security section  Updated CE Failover section  Cleanup of text in PE State Maintenance section  Other updates to clarify text, meet all requirements

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Separate Control & Data Channels  PE Traffic Maintenance messages will be sent over data channel  All other FACT messages will use the control channel  Provide robustness against Denial of Service (DoS) attacks  Data channel will use same reliable transport as control channel  Priority bits in header can be used to prioritize different traffic on data channel  Used with rate limiting mechanisms on FE to protect against DoS attacks CE FE ControlData

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Reliability  FACT uses reliable transport for control channel to meet requirements  For IP networks, TCP/SCTP is recommended  Simplifies protocol design  Makes protocol easily deployable in single and multi-hop scenarios  Allows use of TLS for security

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Security  Security associations are established before FACT association establishment  3 modes of security  “No security” option for closed box scenario  FACT usage model for IPSec  FACT usage model for TLS  IPSec, TLS are configurable by network admin  TLS is recommended

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON FEPrimary CE Asso Estab (Caps, Topo) Data + Control Data + Control (HBeats only) PRI-CE-DOWN CE Failover (Strong Consistency) Standby CE Data + Control FAILURE Asso Estab (Caps, Topo)  FE sends protocol packets to both CEs  No CE to CE protocol needed for synchronization

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON FEPrimary CE Asso Estab (Caps, Topo) Data + Control Control (HBeats only) PRI-CE-DOWN CE Failover (Weak Consistency) Standby CE Data + Control FAILURE Asso Estab (Caps, Topo)  FE sends protocol packets only to primary CE

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Questions

Compared to Requirements v-09  Meets All Requirements  Configuration/Control/Capability discovery  Security  Scalability  Multi-hop  Message Priority  Reliability  Interconnect independence  CE Failover  Packet Redirection  Topology Exchange  Dynamic Association  Command bundling  Asynchronous event notification  Query Statistics  Protection against DoS attacks

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Back up

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Protocol Overview  Protocol to support communication between CE and FE in a distributed fault-tolerant architecture.  Master/Slave relationship between CE-FE.  Logical separation by means of providing base protocol and service functions.  Service specific functions can be encoded using TLV, OID or XML.  Transport/Interconnect independence  Supports latest ForCES Requirements draft.

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON FACT – NE model ACTIVE CE-1 ACTIVE FE-1 INACTIVE FE-3 ACTIVE FE-2 INACTIVE CE-2 associations CE-SET

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Message Structure Length FE-ID Transaction Sequence Number (TSN) Payload P Message TypeMessage ClassVersion CE-Tag

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Message Class and Messages (1)  Association Establishment  To establish logical connection between CE and FE  Join, Leave message etc  Capabilities Exchange & Configuration  To exchange FE’s capabilities and to configure FE’s functions.  Capability request, Configure FE Blocks, Topology request etc  State Maintenance  To track element states and report state changes.  Heart-beat, PE UP, PE Down, PE Active and Inactive etc

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Message Class and Messages (2)  Traffic Maintenance  To control data and control traffic between CE and FE.  Packet Redirection, Control packet forwarding etc.  Event Notification  Asynchronous status change notification by FE to CE.  Event Register, Deregister, Notification message,etc..  Vendor Specific  To extend the protocol beyond its current capabilities.

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON FECE Join Request Join Response Capability Request Capability Response Topology Request Topology Response PE UP PE UP ack PE (FE) ACTIVE PE ACTIVE ack Association Phase Validation of FE endpoint FE Block addressing, handles and relationship State Maintenance (Element State) Data Channel Estab 11

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON FECE Heart beat request Heart beat response Query Request Query Response Port Event Notification Configure Logical Comps Req Normal Operation Control packet redirect Configure Logical Comps Ack

NOKIA RESEARCH CENTER / BOSTON Element State ACTIVE INACTIVE DOWN CE/FE down CE-FE communication failure CE/FE inactive CE/FE active Alternate CE/FE active CE/FE down CE-FE communication failure CE/FE UP