Agent’s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network EUMAS 2013 Toulouse 13 th December, 2013 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi1 Agent´s fear monitors.

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Agent’s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network EUMAS 2013 Toulouse 13 th December, /12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi1 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network Nuno Magessi GUESS/LabMag Universidade Lisboa Luis Antunes GUESS/LabMag Universidade de Lisboa

Summary  Introduction  Social Interaction on tax evasion: review  Fear and greed working on  Greed fear interaction model  Results  Conclusions 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi2 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Introduction  How does fear interacts with greed under imitation in a social network?  What it is more important to monitor greed? Fear impact or greed awareness?  Why not to study this in a tax evasion context? 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi3 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Social Interaction on tax evasion: Review  Imitative behaviour in tax evasion Mittone et al. (2000)  Compliance with social behaviour of agents Davis et al. (2003)  EC* series includes imitation Antunes et al. (2006)  NACS Model Korobow et al. (2007)  TAXSIM Model Szabo et al. (2008)  Ising Model Zaklan et al. (2009) 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi4 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Fear working on 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi5 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network Induced by a threat Causes Individuals retraction Everything is done to omit from other individuals Basic survival mechanism Culture and past experiences affect fear generation Fight or Flight response Fear in human brain The role of amygdala The importance of learning

What is greed? 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi6 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network Inordinate desire Acquire and Possess more than one needs Inability to control the ambition Greed Purpose Deprive others of potential means Defense or counteraction from risk Greed in human brain High complexity mechanism Interfere with brain reward system

Greed-Fear Interaction Model Each node represents a taxpayer Each taxpayer could be: – Susceptible (green); – Greedy (red); – Resistant (gray); Each greedy attempts to persuade neighbours Nuno Trindade Magessi Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network 7 Nuno Trindade Magessi13/12/2013 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Greed-Fear Interaction Model Susceptible taxpayers will imitate according a probability; Resistant have fear and not imitate greedy taxpayer; Greedy taxpayers are not always aware of greed. When a taxpayer is audited, fear is stimulated Nuno Trindade Magessi Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network 8 Nuno Trindade Magessi13/12/2013 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Model Parameters  Greed Spread Chance is probability of imitation by susceptible taxpayers  Risk perception (awareness) frequency is the frequency of each greedy taxpayer become aware of his greed  Fear impact it is the probability of greed disappear in a short period of time  Risk averse chance is the probability of being resistant in new interactions given the fear impact 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi9 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Model Conditions  Conditions to spread greed  Taxpayers must hold greed;  Taxpayers must be linked to non resistants  Greed generated randomly < greed spread chance  Conditions to check greed  Taxpayer must have greed and awareness  Fear impact generated randomly < Fear impact parameter  Risk-averse-chance generated randomly < Risk- averse-chance parameter 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi10 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Nuno Trindade Magessi Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network 11 Nuno Trindade Magessi13/12/2013 Greed is never removed. No risk aversion chance Fear impact is 10%, Greed spread is 5% Risk awareness frequency is 20 Greed is never removed. No risk aversion chance No fear impact No greed spread Risk awareness frequency is 20 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network Output Results

Greed removed No risk aversion chance Fear impact is 10%, Greed spread is 10% Risk awareness frequency is 1 Nuno Trindade Magessi Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network 12 Nuno Trindade Magessi13/12/2013 Greed removed. No risk aversion chance Fear impact is 5%, Greed spread is 10% Risk perception frequency is 1 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Output Results Greed removed. No risk aversion chance Fear impact is 1%, No greed spread Risk awareness frequency is 1 Nuno Trindade Magessi Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network 13 Nuno Trindade Magessi13/12/2013 Greed never removed. Risk aversion chance is 100% No fear impact Greed spread is 10% Risk awareness frequency is 1 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Conclusions  Competition between fear and greed  Greed could remain forever in a social network  Fear is more important to monitor greed than awareness  Audits are important to stimulate fear and consequently minimizing tax evasion  Suggestion to Tax Authority: Pooling taxpayers by their social network 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi14 Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network

Fear and Greed in a Social Network 13/12/2013 Nuno Trindade Magessi15 “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.” Franklin D. Roosevelt “For greed all nature is too little.“ Lucius Annaeus Seneca MANY THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION QUESTIONS - ISSUES - SUGGESTIONS Agent´s fear monitors the spread of greed in a social network