An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang,

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Presentation transcript:

An Auctioning Reputation System Based on Anomaly Detection Shai Rubin, Mihai Christodorescu Vinod Ganapathy, Jonathon T. Giffin, Louis Kruger, Hao Wang, Nicholas Kidd Computer Sciences Dept. University of Wisconsin Madison

2 Online Auctioning Huge volume: eBay hosted 440,100,000 new listings in Q In this talk: trustworthiness of online auctioning Why do we buy in an online auction? A.to find a rare/collectable item B.to find a bargain; commodity at a “good” price eBay financial report (expected 2005): –Clothing & Accessories --- $3.3 billion (2nd) –Consumer Electronics --- $3.2 billion (3rd) –Computers --- $2.9 billion (4th) Data suggests that most people use eBay to find bargains

3 Finding a Bargain is Tricky Inherently untrustworthy environment: –Pseudonymous sellers –Pseudonymous buyers –Delivery? Warranty? Quality? Reputation system: a tool to establish trust

4 Finding a Bargain is Tricky eBay’s reputation system provides little help –Based on feedback: vulnerable to “poisoning” attack

5 Finding a Bargain is Tricky eBay’s reputation system provides little help –Based on feedback: vulnerable to “poisoning” attack –Does not provide information on price

6 Finding a Bargain is Tricky eBay’s reputation system provides little help –Based on feedback: vulnerable to “poisoning” attack –Does not provide information on price –Does not differentiate among the majority of sellers 90% of sellers: Positive feedback > 97.3% 50% of sellers: Positive feedback > 99.4% % of positive feedback

7 Goals Alice—a buyer, Bob—a seller Develop a trustworthy mechanism that helps Alice: –Achieve her goal: what are the chances that Alice can find a bargain in Bob’s auctions? –Warn her from fraudulent activities: are the prices in Bob’s auctions artificially inflated? –Provide her assurance against poisoning attack: why should Alice trust the mechanism?

8 Contributions A reputation system that helps buyers avoid sellers who seem to be inflating prices –Formulated the “seem to be inflating prices” as an anomaly detection problem –Business level anomaly detection: the basic events are auctions, bidding. –Behavioral system: based on how human behave/act rather than on people feedback. Only a first step, some goals still ahead

9 Outline Motivation: find a bargain and avoid fraud Contributions: anomaly detection system to identify price inflating sellers: –The N model –The M model –The P model Case studies

10 Auctioning 101 Pseudonymous sellers and bidders Auctions end after a predefined time (e.g., 7 days) Highest bid wins Seller sets minimum starting bid Shilling: a group of bidders that place fake bids to inflate the final price

11 Methodology Collect data from eBay –three weeks of data in the category: Laptop Parts & Accessories –127,815 auctions, 12,331 sellers, –604 high-volume sellers: posted more than 14 auctions controls 60% of the market Use statistical model to predict seller behavior –95% of the sellers are “normal” –5% are abnormal, or suspicious

12 Step 1: Average Number of Bids What is an indication that prices are high? –high number of bids Goal: identify sellers with abnormally high number of bids 5% 95% Average bids per auction % of high-volume sellers 95% of high-volume sellers have less than 7 bids per auction Model is insensitive to supply: number of auctions posted by a seller

13 Step 1: The N Model Number of auctions for seller Suspicious: 5% of high-volume sellers Correlation: many auctions implies low number of bids Suspicious seller: one that posts many auctions and still attracts many bids Average bids per auction

14 Outline Motivation: find a bargain and avoid fraud Contributions: anomaly detection system to identify price inflating sellers: –The N model: a seller is suspicious if they post many auctions that attract many bids –The M model –The P model Reputation example

15 Step 2: Average Minimum Starting Bid Legitimate explanation for high number of bids: low minimum starting bid Goal: identify sellers with abnormally high number of bids and high minimum bid Problem: how do you know that the minimum bid is high? Relative minimum bid (RMB) =

16 Step 2: The M Model Average # of bids in seller’s auctions Average relative minimum bid for seller Suspicious: 5% of high-volume sellers Correlation: low minimum starting bid implies many bids M suspicious seller: starts with high minimum bid and attracts many bids M+N suspicious seller: posts many auctions, attracts many bids, starts with high minimum bid

17 Step 3: Bidders’ Profile of a Seller Fraudulent explanation for high number of bids: shilling Goal: identify group of bidders that repeatedly bid and lose in a seller’s auctions Suspicious seller: –N : sellers with abnormally high number of bids and –M : high starting bid and –P : has a group of bidders that repeatedly bid and lose

18 Bidder Presence Curve Bidders % 5% of bidders in this seller’s auctions participated in 80% of the auctions Participated auctions %

19 Bidder Presence/Win Curves Bidders % Participated auctions % the same 5% won only 10% of the auctions Bidders % Participated or won auctions % 5% of bidders in this seller’s auctions participated in 80% of the auctions

20 Bidder Presence/Win Curves (Normal case) Bidders % Participated or won auctions % 10% of the bidders participated in 20% of the auctions and won 20% of the times

21 Outline Motivation: find a bargain and avoid fraud Contributions: anomaly detection system to identify price inflating sellers: –The N model: a seller is suspicious if they post many auctions that attract many bids –The M model: a seller is suspicious if they attract many bids and start with high minimum bid –The P model: a seller is suspicious if they have a group of bidders that repeatedly participate and lose Reputation example

22 Reputation Example: Seller N M P Bidders % Average relative minimum bid for seller Average bids per auction

23 Results Summary 54 sellers classified as abnormal with respect to at least one model 3 sellers classified as abnormal with respect to all three models No confirmed fraud NM P

24 Summary Trust: do we get what we expected? Reputation system as anomaly detection –Attempt to identify price inflation –Work at the business level –Consider poisoning attack (see paper) Thank you. Questions?

Back up

26 Trust to have belief or confidence in the honesty, goodness, skill or safety of a person, organization or thing Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary

27 Finding a Bargain is Tricky Adverse environment: –Pseudonymous sellers –Pseudonymous buyers –Delivery? Warranty? Quality? eBay’s reputation system provides little help –Does not provide information on price –Based on feedback---vulnerable to “poisoning attack” –Does not really differentiates among sellers