“The Path Not Taken …yet” Transforming Defense “The Path Not Taken …yet” The Role of Defense in National Security The Management of Defense The Force Arthur K. Cebrowski Director, Force Transformation 23 July 2003 Vision: Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage

Connecting the Present to Our Future Expanding Competition Power and Principle Strategic Posture Shrinking the Dysfunctional, Disconnected Gap of Globalization Operational Maneuver Creating a one-two punch Mapping Future Challenges Risk Issues: How to make near-term actions robust across alternative futures? How to create on-ramps for capabilities?

Trends in Security Competition Short Cycle Time New Competencies Adaptive Planning Integrated Joint Interdependent Information Age Developed Rules Mature Markets Narrowing Customer Base Security=Defense Globalization II Emerging Rules Market Opportunities New Customer Base Emerging Security=All Else+Defense Globalization III Long Cycle Time Well Developed Tools/Processes Deliberate Planning Deconflicted Joint Tortured Interoperability Industrial Age

Expanding Competition Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests} Decisively Defeat Duration Assure, Dissuade, Deter Intensity U.S. power is unmatched Therefore, U.S. policy will be attacked through its moral principles (legitimacy, international law, etc.) If the frontiers of National Security can be everywhere and are not territorial borders but fault lines within societies, then … The nexus of foreign and domestic security policy is intelligence We must be able to look and operate deeply within societies Assured Access includes the domains of political victory Speed of modern warfare creates a continuum, not a succession of phases

Security System Balance? … Major Movements Strategic Maneuver/Balance Forces forward Strategic deploy from home Allies Operational Maneuver From forward garrison From the sea From strategic distances Deter Forward 2d derivative force Sustaining force Constabulary/Nation-building force

Strategic Posture … Exporting security The Red Zone … … Our Response

Global Trends … Military Response The Emerging American Military: More expeditionary (including lighter, more lethal) More networked (more interoperability at the JTF level) Designed to leverage the exterior positions (precision from distance as sensors move in) Leverages increasingly persistent ISR Tighter sensor-shooter timelines (sensing, C2, fly-out) Values Information Superiority (information operations) Expanded unmanned capabilities (UAV, UCAV, UUV, robotics) Information Age Iraq 2 Globalization II Globalization III Iraq 1 Industrial Age

Global Trends…Threats …Strategic Response Strategic Capabilities: More Preventative - Less Punitive Achieve unambiguous warning earlier More SOF-Like characteristics A Deter Forward Force An Intel/Surveillance-based force Coping with system perturbations Information Age Globalization II Globalization III -----[Great Power War?]----- Political Ideology Hated Dictator Hated Dictator w/Nukes Nuclear Nationalists Narco-terrorists Regional Terrorists International Terrorists SEI w/Bugs System State Individual Industrial Age

Top Level Issues …Culture: Values, Beliefs, Attitudes Citizen Soldier Volunteer (Recruited) Force Professional Warrior + Enforcer + “Systems Administrator” Projecting Power Exporting Security Event Focused Continuous Punitive Preventative Access to Battlespace Access to Political Victory Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests}

Candidates for Action Now …Identify issues of regret Warfare Elements Fire - Non-lethals, Directed Energy, Redirected Energy Maneuver - Sea basing, vertical battlefield, lift for operational maneuver Protection - Urban Operations, “Bug-to-Drug” Cycle Time C2&C – Joint Interdependency vs. Interoperability ISR - Demand-centered Intel, Tactically Responsive Space Logistics - Joint demand-centered logistics Risk Management Areas (creating on-ramps) Joint S&T Joint Experimentation Modern Warfare Modeling Tools People: cost or resource Precision Deterrence Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests} Warfare Elements – modify sub-bullets Multi-nodal lift? Replace “bug-to-drug” with “biomedical countermeasures” Add “Cognitive Interoperability” but does not fit under C2, the context is Joint and Combined Risk Management – add sub-bullet Expanded alliances with industry and academia

System Perturbations and Consequences Transforming Defense Global Homeland Interests Security MAD Containment Surrogate Wars => 1990 2000 Global Homeland Interests Security Precision Deterrence? System Perturbations and Consequences =>

Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against fixed targets B-17 240 Tons 1960s F-4D 200 Tons 1970s F-4D LGB 12.5 Tons 1990s F-117 LGB 4 Tons 2000s All weather B-1 JDAM 4 Tons 250 200 150 100 50 Tons Required Then & Now: One-sixtieth the tonnage required to drop a bridge span Slide Source: AF/XPXT 20 Sep 2001 Transformation Briefing The difference between the F-117 and an LGB and a B-1 with a JDAM is the all-weather capability the JDAM brings to the fight. OIF, the F-117 used EGBU-27s, LGBs with a GPS/INS backup which gave the F-117 an all-weather capability. Several types of LGBs are being modified to provide this capability for other platforms. Tons of bombs required to drop a bridge span (90% confidence)

Evolution of Precision Strike: … Effectiveness against mobile targets Then & Now: Sorties required to neutralize 10 mobile armored battalions * Unguided Unitary Bombs 1940s Sorties required 1960s Cluster Weapons 1970s Maverick 1990s SFW 2000s WCMD/SFW/P3I Slide Source: AF/XPXT 20 Sep 2001 Transformation Briefing Sensor Fuzed Weapon (SFW) is an anti-armor sub-munition which is delivered in a tactical munitions dispenser (TMD) that holds 40 “skeet.” Each skeet has a sensor and a shaped metal slug. When SFW detects the thermal signature, it fires the shaped metal slug at the object. Wind Corrected Munitions Dispenser (WCMD) is a tail kit that goes on a TMD that enables the pilot to direct where the TMD goes. Guidance is provided by an INS. Prior to release, WCMD communicates with the aircraft through the 1760 data bus, similar to GPS weapons. SFW PrePlanned Product Improvement (P3I) adds a microwave sensor to the skeet as well as rods to be fired with the shaped slug. The additional sensor makes SFW resistant to countermeasures and the rods increase the number of soft target kills an individual skeet can achieve. Soft targets include things such as APCs, trucks, TELS and humans. * Damage 15 out of 30 armored vehicles per battalion

Evolution of Precision Strike: … Quantity of bombs assigned for 90% Probability of Kill Then & Now: Over Three Orders of Magnitude reduction in weapons required to destroy a fixed target 9,000 Bombs 1,500 B-17 Sorties 3,300' CEP 176 Bombs 88 F-4 Sorties 400' CEP 2 Bombs 1 F-16 Sortie 10' CEP 1 Bomb 1 B-2 Sortie < 10' CEP Data Source: AF/XPXT and NDU 1996 Strategic Assessment 1940s 1970s 1990s 2000s Advanced weapons systems armed with precision munitions are extremely accurate but are highly dependent on quality information

Paradigm Changes … To Enable Precision Deterrence Precision Deterrence = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests} Ours & Ours & Ours & Theirs Theirs Theirs Weapons of Mass Destruction (Nukes) Weapons of Precision Deterrence Large Area Affected Makes up for Lack of Precise Weapon and Target Location Non-Linear Political Consequences Self Deterring Precise Weapon and Target Location Allows Focused Effects Militarily Relevant Operationally Useful

û  Deterrence is … Context Dependent An Effects Based Operation Highly reliant on intelligence A state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction relevant to those we wish to deter An Effects Based Operation Precision Deterrence: creating a precise local effect in the cognitive domain Ways can be military, financial, economic or diplomatic The Duality of Means … û Context Dependent Highly reliant on intelligence A state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction relevant to those we wish to deter The ability to deter one opponent does not imply the ability to deter others To deter is to reduce/eliminate the motivation to commit a proscribed act so that “nothing bad happens” An Effects Based Operation Precision Deterrence: creating a precise effect in the cognitive domain Ways can be military, financial, economic or diplomatic The Duality of Means … In the eyes of our adversaries, the means we use to deter must be disproportionate to the effects they seek to achieve against us In the eyes of the world, the means we use to deter must be proportionate to the effects we seek to prevent Policy Outcome = f {Power, Moral Principle, Strategic Interests} Viewed as Viewed as Disproportionate Proportionate by the Target by the World Precision Effect  Precision Deterrence must have a local effect – it can have a global impact

Military Options … for Precision Deterrence Directed Energy Weapons Lasers Covert engagement at a safe distance All aspect engagement and re-targeting capability Ultra precise targeting and aimpoint Adjustable delivered energy High Powered Microwaves Deter belligerents Deny an area to personnel Control crowds Operational Commonality? Non-Lethal Weapons Counter-Personnel Counter-Material Counter-Capability Need for decision space and time Ability to act while discriminating intent Increase engagement time and range Need to satisfy policy and operational constraints Target Non-combatants Own force - Military options for precision deterrence must be able to hold at risk that which our adversaries hold dear -- Directed Energy Weapons --- -- Non-Lethal Weapons Weapons that are explicitly designed and primarily employed so as to incapacitate personnel or material, while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and undesired damage to property and the environment Unlike conventional lethal weapons that destroy their targets through blast, penetration, and fragmentation, non-lethal weapons employ means other than gross physical destruction to prevent the target from functioning Non-lethal weapons are intended to have one, or both, of the following characteristics: They have relatively reversible effects on personnel or materiel They affect objects differently within their area of influence

Precision Deterrence … Issues and Choices How do we balance local (tactical) deterrence and global (strategic) deterrence? What kind of JWAC-like process is required to create cognitive effects? Can our intelligence community identify that which our adversaries hold most dear? What are the new tools of deterrence that support our moral principles and strategic interests and how do they interact? What are the new concepts for deterrence?