Mutual Fund Performance and Governance Structure: The Role of Portfolio Managers and Boards of Directors Bill Ding Russ Wermers Discussion by Mathijs van.

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Sandy Lai SMU 1 The Role of Equity Funds in the Financial Crisis Propagation Harald Hau INSEAD
Advertisements

Sandy Lai SMU 1 The Role of Equity Funds in the Financial Crisis Propagation Harald Hau INSEAD Chong Tze Chua SMU.
1 Does banks corporate control benefit firms? Evidence from US banks control over firms voting rights by Joao A. C. Santos and Kristin E. Wilson Comments.
Capital Structure Theory
Taking Firms and Markets Seriously: A Study on Bank Behavior, Market Discipline, and Regulatory Policy Thomas Bernauer and Vally Koubi.
Hathaiwan Vongsuwan – Hengmin Zhang
Sandy Lai SMU 1 The Role of Equity Funds in the Financial Crisis Propagation Harald Hau University of Geneva and SFI
2005 CUHK International Conference on Corporate Governance in China and Asia Discussion of: Tycoons Turned Leaders: Market Value of Political Connections.
Sandy Lai SMU 1 The Role of Equity Funds in the Financial Crisis Propagation Harald Hau University of Geneva and SFI
Corporate Governance: A Review of Current Research Alexander Settles.
Corporate Governance and Financial Distress: Evidence from Taiwan Tsun-Siou Lee and Yin-Hua Yeh 2002 NTU International Conference On Finance.
The effect of ownership on the prudential behavior of banks: the case of China Discussed by Jun YAO The Hong Kong Polytechnic University.
1 7 th ERES Conference Milano The Real Estate Investment of Insurance Companies in Polish Conditions Rafał Wolski, PhD Department of Industry.
1 Why Demand Uncertainty Curbs Investment: Evidence from a Panel of Italian Manufacturing Firms Maria Elena Bontempi (University of Ferrara) Roberto Golinelli.
Microcaps Teleconference 21 October  Melbourne based boutique investment manager established in 1998  First investment manager to exclusively.
STEPS TO ANALYZE STOCK Think through the "story" in detail Why is this a potentially better stock to own than others? e.g. – Medco Health Systems – leader.
11-1© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited. Corporate Governance Chapter Eleven.
REIt S : REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS Ray Henderson Janie Penfield Karen Peterson.
11-1© 2006 by Nelson, a division of Thomson Canada Limited. Corporate Governance Chapter Eleven.
More Simple Linear Regression 1. Variation 2 Remember to calculate the standard deviation of a variable we take each value and subtract off the mean and.
Real Estate Investment Trusts REITs Cody Draper Valiant Evans Ryan Weight.
CHAPTER SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL STOCK ANALYSIS A 1 3 © 2001 South-Western College Publishing.
Private Equity Fund Structure - Best Practices June 24 th, 2014.
ERES 2011 The Performance Gap in UK Property Returns Stephen Lee
 Title: The Effect of Asymmetric Information on Dividend Policy  Theory used by the article / research: › Pecking order theory, in the presence of asymmetric.
Independent Dealer Survey Data Analysis. Survey Findings: Summary Independent Dealer readers are primarily CEOs or Owners of dealerships and sell a combination.
Power Income Portfolio For more information call:
Efficient Market Hypothesis by Indrani Pramanick (44)
[ 1 ] MIGRATION AND PRODUCTIVITY. LESSONS FROM THE UK-SPAIN EXPERIENCES This project is funded by the European Commission, Research Directorate General.
Version: 2.0 © University of Tasmania All rights reserved. CRICOS Provider Code: 00586B Accounting & Financial Decision Making BFA103BFA103.
Learning Objectives Explain the purpose and importance of financial analysis. Calculate and use a comprehensive set of measurements to evaluate a company’s.
1 Are East Asian companies benefiting from Western board practices? John Nowland Discussed by Joseph P.H. Fan Centre of Economics & Finance Chinese University.
Venture Capital and the Finance of Innovation [Course number] Professor [Name ] [School Name] Chapter 4 The Cost of Capital for VC.
Thinking about Risk Presented on April 18, 2006 AllianzGI.
State Charter Schools Commission of Georgia SCSC Academic Accountability Update State Charter School Performance
Performance Attribution These characteristics of returns are well known. Known “styles” of returns. –don’t give credit to a passive value manager for beating.
Chapter 10 Capital Markets and the Pricing of Risk
1 Mutual Fund Performance and Manager Style. J.L. Davis, FAJ, Jan/Feb 01, Various studies examined the evidence of persistence in mutual fund performance.
Copyright © 2009 Pearson Prentice Hall. All rights reserved. Chapter 1 The Role and Environment of Managerial Finance.
1 Chapter 12 Simple Linear Regression. 2 Chapter Outline  Simple Linear Regression Model  Least Squares Method  Coefficient of Determination  Model.
Nokia Executive Compensation. Nokia on Executive Compensation Nokia operates in the extremely competitive, complex and rapidly evolving mobile communications.
Mutual Fund Performance and Governance Structure: The Role of Portfolio Managers and Boards of Directors Bill Ding, SUNY at Albany Russ Wermers, University.
CHAPTER SEVEN FUNDAMENTAL STOCK ANALYSIS Practical Investment Management Robert A. Strong.
Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment: Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan Yueh-hsiang Lin Shing-yang Hu Ming-shen Chen Department of Finance National.
LECTURE 10 : APPLICATION OF LINEAR FACTOR MODELS (Asset Pricing and Portfolio Theory)
8/9/ AAA Annual Meeting1 Fair Value Measurement and Accounting Restatements James Fornaro (SUNY at Old Westbury) Solomon Huang (National Cheng.
Peer Effects on Corporate Cash Holdings Yiwen Chen Yuanchen Chang Department of Finance National Chengchi University.
9/11/02Prof. Bentz1 Session 2 AGENDA  Answer questions  Compare and contrast financial and managerial accounting.
Financial Management Economics and Management School Lanzhou University of Technology Yan Fu-hai CPA, FPNA,Professor.
The Case For Passive Investing: Active investor track records Aswath Damodaran.
International Trade in Used Vehicles. Three Great Things About the Paper.
Alternative Risk Financing Vehicles. Began development in 2010 Launched first captive in 2011 Current Active Captive Portfolio ‒ Legacy health – Heterogeneous.
Anna von Reibnitz (ANU)
1 Does the Reputation of Independent Non-executive Directors Matter: Evidence from Hong Kong King & Peng Discussed by Joseph P.H. Fan Chinese University.
CHAPTER 1 An overview of Managerial Finance. What is Financial Management Is the ability to adapt to change, raise funds, invest in assets, and manage.
EQUITY-PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT
Discussion of the paper: The peer performance ratios of hedge funds
Promoting Accounting as Leaving Certificate Subject
Competition, financial innovation and commercial
STRATEGY IMPLEMENTATION
The Return Expectations of Institutional Investors
Revisiting the Bright and Dark Sides of Capital Flows in Business Groups Written by:Joseph P. H. Fan,Li Jin & Guojian Zheng 王锦
Show Me the Money Nature of Accounting.
Who Controls Our Business?
Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 刘铭锋
©2003 South-Western Publishing Company
YES SEMINAR Dubrovnik , June 4, 2017
CHAPTER 10 Corporate Governance
The Subsidy to Infrastructure as an Asset Class
Board Structure, Antitakeover Provisions, and Stockholder Wealth
Presentation transcript:

Mutual Fund Performance and Governance Structure: The Role of Portfolio Managers and Boards of Directors Bill Ding Russ Wermers Discussion by Mathijs van Dijk

What this paper does Study of the relation between mutual fund performance and mutual fund governance Strengths: –Fascinating topic, underexplored, relevant for regulators –Great data on fund manager careers –Great data on mutual fund boards (independence) –Careful analysis, new results –Nuanced story

Main analyses 1.Regressions of fund performance on fund size + lead- manager experience / track record + interactions –Result: “higher managerial experience positively predicts future (…) performance of larger funds” –Interpretation: Good governance: “experienced managers who are promoted to larger funds outperform their peers” –Result: “more experienced managers of smaller funds underperform their benchmarks” –Interpretation: Bad governance: “they have become entrenched by an ineffective governance system”

Main analyses – continued 2.Regressions of manager replacement on board characteristics + past fund flows –Result: for “negative alpha managers with at least ten year of experience,” only independent directors (not flows) matter –Interpretation: Bad governance: “flows are an ineffective disciplinary force when managers are experienced – indicating that entrenchment is present among portfolio managers with a lot of experience” 3.Regressions of fund performance on board characteristics –Result: “additional [independent] director increases pre- expense performance by (…) 14 basis points per year” –Interpretation: “strong role for outside directors in improving fund performance and minimizing manager entrenchment”

Comment 1: What is good governance? What do you mean by “effective governance” in the mutual fund industry? This paper: perspective of investors in mutual funds: –Investment performance of fund is taken as key indicator of good governance –But investors are not the principals! The principals are the owners of mutual fund companies –Fund owners are interested in cash flows / valuation, which may be more related to fund size than fund performance We know flows are related to performance, but not 1-on-1 Can you look at listed mutual fund companies? Do directors care about fund flows or performance? –Interact directors with flows / performance in analysis 2.

Comment 2: Trust in skill measures? Measuring managerial skill based on the track record of the manager is notoriously difficult –Still academic debate about aggregate level –Very noisy point estimates at manager level So should boards really be expected to act based on point estimates of performance measures? Suggestions: –Can you measure persistence at the manager level? –Take variability in performance track record into account –Use t-statistics of performance measures Plus: track record may be partly driven by inheritance from previous managers –Entrenchment conclusion seems premature to me

Comment 3: Too much going on! Paper presents a plethora of different analyses based on various performance measures, (in)dependent variables, (non-linear) interactions, subsamples Overall, I view the current paper as too meandering –Variety of conclusions based on different analyses –Some require leap of faith –No real punchline

Other comments Do staggered boards matter? Can you measure other aspects of fund governance besides board characteristics (e.g., ownership structure, compensation, market for corporate control, competition)? Can good managers be hired to manage funds in distress – and hence in part inherit poor performance? Is difference between 14 and 7bp per year on p. 5 significant? (statistically/economically) Since you do not use actual data on demotions/promotions, I find your language sometimes quite loose (e.g., on p. 20) –Can you examine actual demotions/promotions to smaller/larger funds within the same company? Should track record be based on entire career? The stated implication of Hypothesis 1 not obvious to me (p. 26) Shouldn’t you have fund fixed effects in Table VIII?

Final thoughts Very interesting and relevant paper Some room for improvement in: –Defining good governance –Acknowledging challenge of measuring skill –Streamlining analyses and results