Authoritative-only server & TSIG cctld-workshop Nairobi,12-15 october 2005

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Presentation transcript:

Authoritative-only server & TSIG cctld-workshop Nairobi,12-15 october 2005

Different type of servers Several types of name servers  Authoritative servers  master (primary)  slave (secondary)  (Caching) recursive servers  also caching forwarders  Mixture of functionality

Why to seperate functionality ? Authoritative and non-authoritative data are served to different sets of clients  I n order to serve authoritative data to the Internet,the nameserver must be outside any firewalls.  Caching nameservers should generally be placed inside firewalls to protect them from outside abuse. Serving authoritative data is more critical than serving cached data.

Why to seperate functionality ? Caching nameservers are subject to poisoning  if an attacker can trick your caching nameserver into accepting a forged RR with high TTL, invalid data may be used when serving authoritative data. Certain denial-of-service and buffer overrun attacks are more likely to be successful in caching nameservers.

Why to seperate functionality ? Authoritative server may serve authoritative data(constant in size) more efficiently when cached data does not compete for system resources.  Recursing client uses memory (up to 20kb)  Caching server uses memory to cache data  Answering recursive queries needs processing time and system ressources

How to run an Authoritative-only Name server Stop recursion  With bind9 options { recursion no ; }; and restart named Check dns response from server for non “ra” flag # xxxx.cctld.or.ke soa Check if your server is now authoritative-only # noc.cctld.or.ke A You should get referrals to root servers

What is TSIG? ● A mechanism for protecting a message from a resolver to server and vice versa ● A keyed-hash is applied (like a digital signature) so recipient can verify message ● Based on a shared secret - both sender and reciever are configured with it ● RFC2845

TSIG and Message Format DNS Header Question Answer Authority Additional & TSIG data DNS’ Original Message Format

TSIG and Message Format ; > DiG a -k /var/named/keys/Khost1-host key ;; QUESTION SECTION: ; IN A ;; ANSWER SECTION: IN A ;; AUTHORITY SECTION: rfi.fr IN NS ns1.mgn.net. rfi.fr IN NS ns2.mgn.net. rfi.fr IN NS ns3.mgn.net. ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: ns1.mgn.net IN A ns2.mgn.net IN A ns3.mgn.net IN A ;; TSIG PSEUDOSECTION: host1-host2. 0 ANY TSIG hmac-md5.sig-alg.reg.int jfqapw+5tnpqKceNaf5RnQ== NOERROR 0

; > DiG ripe.net a -k /var/named/keys/Khost1-host key +dnssec ;; global options: printcmd ;; Got answer: ;; ->>HEADER<<- opcode: QUERY, status: NOERROR, id: 39 ;; flags: qr rd ra ad; QUERY: 1, ANSWER: 2, AUTHORITY: 0, ADDITIONAL: 7 ;; OPT PSEUDOSECTION: ; EDNS: version: 0, flags: do; udp: 4096 ;; QUESTION SECTION: ;ripe.net. IN A ;; ANSWER SECTION: ripe.net. 592 IN A ripe.net. 592 IN RRSIG A ripe.net. GFWL87C+fcxPkFQ93ifF3SS0eq523Ktv92p0QPGcRs2q4t9pMVy8qjHN oTXEmthamwGdIy90wW5lcUtcfZMTarhx+0Q7zJwO76sXcjjNqMB4nbEb i2D/596k23DghZ/+Wg/zy/u0yRoYm0LfmbKIZE4WHnb7AeSadKjEz+Ts iuS5wdk5F7SkxginC2JfYRmgxQOQ9NaY ;; ADDITIONAL SECTION: ripe.net IN DNSKEY AQOTT7bx7N38sPgDWniKnHnSnTxYxdMpEq7dyrDHDaRQgq7DULPWX6ZY 0U1XKKMuNloHRP7H8r17IBhgXcPZjZhtSGYagtPe22mhAMjZ4e8KGgP9 kJTTcpgzoYulvSiETBxjQ42EZWJG+6bxK+vyrwTbqEScmdZfqQz3ltVw k6Sos0UuSmTeb2C6RSkgHaTpKCu5yIrncVer1gvyvXGv3HOel8jiDGuj 8peNByiaSRD4OIJUxu1jUqLvfDH6Anq6ZeNohxsYVUVajiRl1T+3x5+8 acgwat3V55Z1Nm4O4Z1BKECdPO65EXIEC7/pqs5XvpsiJbafdj03uqLS a3aScpy3 ripe.net IN DNSKEY AQPGmhQPgNllavUXhVoDZZploCWbHr7lqcIGEiR/ct0KCTx4Skp+tBfX qnq8fz8/UpK4B+s6xIk5FPdjNnFXltdSx81bcM+BadLHL5iuBdQdkH8e yJq2Fk1LAUiP2AB8RAFBd4WQMAklw5z/91jw6aMXSfAo6sSxUFSS1WY8 ChesKvwefNcqglSswlFwxjWHo9XNkFsx0u8= ripe.net IN DNSKEY AQPhEMiv80EEjX6gYDc8E7Osfumf4C/pZxBmTRRiOVL3h6lx1CIVCyPl V34WuVUkqqpID2fxGzmUFTG0f61x9lzRapX0lIdlo2AtRCYWpkPY+D3F IrMYukWiC8pyeHF/a/Wk6HZNLVYko2dcLwUpfiDrK7zCFgR9DLcZkOmj N5xB9CBzVrZDkd1lsGCC9hytndbLuZ3VtpE= ripe.net IN RRSIG DNSKEY ripe.net.IF1rvW4DS5t4VhtZ6dQcA7tvcHtU+6qSwM8IoPh7v+2TqS8SLDBHnEeT qsMEE3oNihtXhwxVPZu3K8p1PCch399b/1z1dJCNLDtq4QVu5add0ygU qQkZ028ARUVQ1QVR/FN/zhcAouMpCBG0kdijtGJv3AUS3OJFM/obubQt pZYGTuHS5Sqh54zu/R65veApd0dc3m6CE+bG+udn3XPLO/LAEbbetqcA h4PWHcrkHcugSEv6UEk63c/jXysd23AgmBu2sPrj+DByokJaX7IBFLlj ySvr046CdQrkP0A5jvpVoiUXTwd6P7oNRi1Mz3SeT5PwVHWM+L3wJ8SE krrhtQ== ripe.net IN RRSIG DNSKEY ripe.net.1+p9pI1h7+4EK0eiB91P2RX2Os0zhEkWR7cvgu61UqRVY5ziVP7txDPv eWMBISOgLgtE4L4zjEHpSc28uo33X0k/e3eiH6f8Hqa/IqrSdIrYpOxc ob5eQUylqYbkKSadpOP1oi+1zPXdCgcPxyaBuIG7wMM5cY5pHFwPfLUA cw0hlkJDp8uHTau1K8iytocNGSOE3Ys4 ;; TSIG PSEUDOSECTION: host1-host2. 0 ANY TSIG hmac-md5.sig-alg.reg.int eaDNJtJXavAjVqDZSANllA== 39 NOERROR 0

Names and Secrets ● TSIG name – A name is given to the key, the name is what is transmitted in the message (so receiver knows what key the sender used) ● TSIG secret value – A value determined during key generation – Usually seen in Base64 encoding ● 'Looks' like the rndc key – BIND uses same interface for TSIG and RNDC keys

Using TSIG to protect AXFR ● Deriving a secret – dnssec-keygen -a... -b... -n... name ● Configuring the key – in named.conf file, same syntax as for rndc – key { algorithm...; secret...;} ● Making use of the key – in named.conf file – server x { keys...; } – where 'x' is an IP number of the other server

Configuration Example Primary server key ns1-ns2.zone. { algorithm hmac-md5; secret "APlaceToBe"; }; server { keys {ns1-ns2.zone.;}; }; zone "my.zone.test." { type master; file...; allow-transfer { key ns1-ns2.zone.; key ns1-ns3.zone.;}; }; Secondary server key ns1-ns2.zone. { algorithm hmac-md5; secret "APlaceToBe"; }; server { keys {ns1-ns2.zone.;}; }; zone "my.zone.test." { type slave; file...; masters { ;}; allow-transfer { key ns1-ns2.zone.;}; }; Again, the secret looks okay, but is purposely invalid

TIME!!! ● TSIG is time sensitive - to stop replays – Message protection expires in 5 minutes – Make sure time is synchronized – For testing, set the time – In operations, (secure) NTP is needed

Other uses of TSIG ● TSIG was designed for other purposes – Protecting sensitive stub resolvers ● This has proven hard to accomplish – Dynamic Update ● Discussed later, securing this relies on TSIG