.uk DNSSEC Status update

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Presentation transcript:

.uk DNSSEC Status update 02/05/2011 Brett Carr

Introduction .uk DNSSEC September 2010 Issues SLD DNSSEC DNSSEC Signing Service.

.uk DNSSEC .uk Signed March 2010 Uses: Opendnssec Centos Oracle HSM’s Three sets of identical hardware/software NSEC3 not needed but deployed. ZSK rolled every 6 months automatically KSK rolled every 3 years Low TTL on DNSKEYS to ensure rapid recovery from *issues*

What did we change/learn September 2010 Issue HSM Hardware failure caused OS crash HSM Locked on reboot System designed with no urgency to fix so wait Failover to backup system Opendnssec key db/config file inconsistency 2 Day TTL on DNSKEY caused slow recovery What did we change/learn Don’t lock HSM’s on reboot add’s extra security but more complexity. Improved checking procedures for failover Reduce TTL on dnskey to 1 hour so recovery is quicker

SLD DNSSEC Signing of: me.uk co.uk ltd.uk plc.uk org.uk net.uk sch.uk Zones are very large and dynamically updated every minute. BIND 9.7.3 Continuous signing: Create the keys then add this to your configuration: auto-dnssec maintain; sig-validity-interval 35 28; Single Key (no KSK and ZSK) as we are the parent No scheduled rollover DS’s accepted from capable registrars 18 May

DNSSEC Signing Service Encourage deployment of DNSSEC further. Registrar gives us unsigned zone (via notify and axfr) Nominet signing systems create a signed zone. Notify sent to customer DNS system for AXFR. For *.uk zones Nominet signing system inserts DS record into parent.

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