Claudia Lindner and Jörg Rothe Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf Modelling Interaction, Dialog, Social Choice, and Vagueness Amsterdam, March 2010.

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Presentation transcript:

Claudia Lindner and Jörg Rothe Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf Modelling Interaction, Dialog, Social Choice, and Vagueness Amsterdam, March 2010 *C. Lindner and J. Rothe: Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols (WINE 2009) Not Everyone Likes Mushrooms: Fair Division and Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness*

Overview Motivation Preliminaries and Notation Degree of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness (DGEF) DGEF-Survey: Finite Bounded Proportional Protocols DGEF-Enhancement: A New Proportional Protocol Summary 2Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

Motivation Fair allocation of one infinitely divisible resource Fairness? Envy-freeness Cake-cutting protocols: continuous vs. finite finite bounded vs. unbounded Envy-Freeness & Finite Boundedness & n>3 ? Approximating fairness Minimum-envy measured by value difference [LMMS04] Approximately fair pieces [EP06] Minimum-envy defined by most-envious player [BJK07] … 3Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness Degree of guaranteed envy-freeness

Preliminaries and Notation I Resource Players with Pieces : ;, Portions : ;, and Player s valuation function Normalization Positivity Additivity Divisibility 4Fair Division and Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

Fairness criteria Simple fair (proportional): Strong fair: Envy-free: Envy-free-relation (EFR) Binary relation from player to player for,, such that: Case-enforced EFRs EFRs of a given case Guaranteed EFRs EFRs of the worst case 5 proportional Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness Preliminaries and Notation II

Given: Heterogeneous resource, Players and Rules: Halve in size. chooses and gets. G-EFR: 1 Worst case: identical valuation functions Player : and Best case: complementing valuation functions Player : and 6Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness 1 CE-EFR 2 CE-EFR Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness Example

Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness Definition 7Fair Division and Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness Degree of guaranteed envy-freeness (DGEF) Number of guaranteed envy-free-relations Maximum number of EFRs in every division

Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness Upper and Lower Bound : proportionality envy-freeness : Everyone with everyone else Everyone hates someones piece and for all and with Proposition Let d(n) be the degree of guaranteed envy-freeness of a proportional cake-cutting protocol for n 2 players. It holds that n d(n) n(n1). 8Fair Division and Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

DGEF-Survey of Finite Bounded Proportional Cake-Cutting Protocols Proof Omitted, see [LR09]. 9 Table 1: DGEF of selected finite bounded cake-cutting protocols [LR09] Theorem For n 3 players, the proportional cake-cutting protocols listed in Table 1 have a DGEF as shown in the same table. Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

Enhancing the DGEF: A New Proportional Protocol I Significant DGEF-differences of existing finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocols Old focus: proportionality & finite boundedness New focus: proportionality & finite boundedness & maximized degree of guaranteed envy-freeness Based on Last Diminisher: piece of minimal size valued 1/n + Parallelization Properties (n 3 ): enhanced DGEF, finite bounded, proportional, strategy-proof & strong fair-adjustable 10Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

Enhancing the DGEF: A New Proportional Protocol II Proof Omitted, see [LR09]. Improvement over Last Diminisher: 11Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness Proposition For n 5, the protocol has a DGEF of.

Enhancing the DGEF: A New Proportional Protocol II Seven players A, B, …, G and one pizza Everybody is happy! Well, lets say somebody… 12 A D C B E G F A F C B E D G D C B E F F C B E D D D F D B C E C BBFC ADGEBCF 1 Selfridge– Conway [Str80] 0 Fair Division and Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness …

Summary and Perspectives Problem: Envy-Freeness & Finite Boundedness & n>3 DGEF: Compromise between envy-freeness and finite boundedness – in design stage State of affairs: survey of existing finite bounded proportional cake-cutting protocols Enhancing DGEF: A new finite-bounded proportional cake-cutting protocol Improvement: Scope: Increasing the DGEF while ensuring finite boundedness; balancing the DGEF 13Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

Third International Workshop on Computational Social Choice Düsseldorf, Germany, September 13–16, 2010 Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness14 Important Dates Paper submission deadline: May 15, 2010 Notification of authors: June 20, 2010 Camera-ready copies due: July 15, 2010 Early registration deadline: July 15, 2010 Tutorial day: September 13, 2010 Workshop dates: September 14–16, 2010

Questions??? 15 THANK YOU Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

References I [LR09] C. Lindner and J. Rothe. Degrees of Guaranteed Envy- Freeness in Finite Bounded Cake-Cutting Protocols. In Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Internet & Network Economics (WINE 2009), pages , December [BJK07] S. Brams, M. Jones, and C. Klamler. Divide-and- Conquer: A proportional, minimal-envy cake-cutting procedure. In S. Brams, K. Pruhs, and G. Woeginger, editors, Dagstuhl Seminar 07261: Fair Division. Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings, November [BT96] S. Brams and A. Taylor. Fair Division: From Cake-Cutting to Dispute Resolution. Cambridge University Press, [EP84] S. Even and A. Paz. A note on cake cutting. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 7:285–296, Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

References II [EP06] J. Edmonds and K. Pruhs. Cake cutting really is not a piece of cake. In Proceedings of the 17 th Annual ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms, pages 271–278. ACM, [Fin64] A. Fink. A note on the fair division problem. Mathematics Magazine, 37(5):341–342, [Kuh67] H. Kuhn. On games of fair division. In M. Shubik, editor, Essays in Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern. Princeton University Press, [LMMS04] R. Lipton, E. Markakis, E. Mossel, and A. Saberi. On approximately fair allocations of indivisible goods. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 125–131. ACM, Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness

References III [RW98] J. Robertson and W. Webb. Cake-Cutting Algorithms: Be Fair If You Can. A K Peters, [Ste48] H. Steinhaus. The problem of fair division. Econometrica, 16:101–104, [Ste69] H. Steinhaus. Mathematical Snapshots. Oxford University Press, New York, 3rd edition, [Str80] W. Stromquist. How to cut a cake fairly. The American Mathematical Monthly, 87(8):640–644, [Tas03] A. Tasnádi. A new proportional procedure for the n- person cake-cutting problem. Economics Bulletin, 4(33):1–3, Fair Division and the Degrees of Guaranteed Envy-Freeness