Managing Supply Chains: Concepts, Tools, Applications Chapter 5: Coordination These powerpoints are a companion to the book: Managing Supply Chains:

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Managing Supply Chains: Concepts, Tools, Applications Chapter 5: Coordination These powerpoints are a companion to the book: Managing Supply Chains: Concepts, Tools and Applications by Ananth. V . Iyer, Hercher Publishing Inc., ISBN 978-1-939297-01-3

Outline Coordination – definition and examples A model of coordination and impact Take-or-pay contracts Capacity Reservation contracts Advance Order Quantity Summary

Coordination - definitions ([80]) “bring together the different elements (of a complex activity or organization) into a harmonious or efficient relationship.” “negotiate with others in order to work effectively” “match or harmonize” the needs of multiple constituents. Coordination is a key when parts of a supply chain are controlled or owned by different entities

Coordination – US Coast Guard (Section 5.1) Aircraft Repair and Service Center Central repair facility for all 26 airstations Engineering Division (ACMS) – tracks parts by serial number, monitors part age, repair or overhaul Inventory Division (AMMIS) – maintains inventory of repaired parts, trigger part repair

Coordination – US Coast Guard Use part age to link to demand over lead time Intuition – if demands not observed, then parts on aircraft are ageing, thus increasing the probability of impending demand Each period, identify a count of parts whose age exceeds an age threshold Empirically estimate the correlation between part age threshold related counts and observed demand (see next page)

Correlation between demand and part age signals for different age thresholds Optimal Age Threshold Age Threshold

Coordination – US Coast Guard Set the optimal age threshold as shown in the earlier page Adjust the repaired product inventory synchronized with the projected demand Thus the time that repaired parts remain in the system before use decreases This reduces the cost of part repair while matching supply and demand – achieving coordination between the engineering and inventory systems

Coordination - Revenue Sharing Agreements Lucas Aerospace and Rolls Royce – Lucas invests in fuel control systems and gets revenue from use of Rolls Royce engines Movie studios and Blockbuster Rental– provide videos for $8 and a share of customer rental income Wind Turbine installer and Lorian County – land leases provided by county for 20% of energy revenue sharing

Coordination By aligning incentives, decisions made reflect joint objectives to maximize supply chain profit The agreement enables risk sharing thus optimal responses to uncertainty Coordination incents manufacturers to make products more durable, retailers to carry the optimal level of inventory etc Models discussed later

Coordination – A Model Single Manufacturer – cost “ck” to reserve capacity, cost per unit “c” to manufacture Wholesale price “w” Retail price “r” Demand is uncertain, mean μ, standard deviation σ Manufacturer chooses capacity “K” Retailer orders “L” periods later, after observing demand Orders satisfied up to capacity “K”

Supply Chain Optimal Decisions Kc – optimal capacity to maximize supply chain profit F(Kc) = (r-c-ck)/(r-c) (Set Cs = r-c-ck and Ce = ck and Cs/(Cs+Ce) is the optimal critical fractile)

Manufacturer Optimal Capacity If the manufacturer chooses capacity F(K) = (w-c-ck)/(w-c)

Example – Supply Chain Decisions See Table 5.1 for demands r=4,w=2,c=0.6,ck=0.5 F(Kc) = (4-0.6-0.5)/(4-0.6) = 0.852 Kc = 20 (from Table 5.1) Associated expected profit = 40.32 (Table 5.2)

Manufacturer Chooses Capacity – Supply Chain Impact Wholesale price contract Manufacturer chooses capacity independently to maximize his profit F(Kw) = (2-0.6-0.5)/(2-0.6) = 0.643 Kw = 17 Manufacturer expected profit = 11.1 Retailer expected profit = 28 Associated Supply Chain Profit = 39.1 (< 40.32) Why ? Double marginalization – each entity looks out for their portion of the profit thus makes suboptimal decisions for the supply chain

Expected Profits with a wholesale price agreement K=20 maximizes supply chain profits K=17 maximizes manufacturer profits The wholesale price agreement does not coordinate the supply chain

Take or pay contract Retailer pays “w” per unit taken and “τ” per unit of leftover capacity Thus the manufacturer critical fractile is (w-c-ck)/(w-c-τ) Set it equal to (r-c-ck)/(r-c) to get τ=(r-w)ck/(r-c-ck) So if w=1.95, calculate τ=0.35

Take or pay contract r=4,w=1.95,c=0.6,ck=0.5, τ=0.35 Manufacturer service level = (1.95-0.6-0.5)/(1.95-0.6-0.35)= 0.85 Manufacturer chosen K = 20 Manufacturer expected profit = 11.82 Retailer expected profit = 28.5 Supply Chain profit = 40.32 Coordinated Supply Chain with a coordinating take-or-pay agreement – generates a win-win agreement

Pie Chart View Uncoordinated Supply Chain Wholesale Price Agreement Manufacturer chooses Capacity Supply Chain Profit = 39.1 Coordinated Supply Chain Take or pay contract for capacity Manufacturer chooses Capacity Supply Chain Profit = 40.32

Expected Profits and Coordination – take-or-pay contract Note that the supply chain and manufacturer profits are now maximized at the same capacity level of K=20

Capacity Reservation Contract (Section 5.9) The retailer pays a cost “p” per unit to reserve capacity and “w1” per unit to use capacity Note that this contract is the same as setting p = τ and setting w1 = w-τ = 1.95-0.35 = 1.60 in the take-or-pay contract Thus the capacity reservation contract with appropriate p and w1 also coordinates the supply chain

Advance Order Quantity Advance Order Quantities are another coordinating agreement The retailer commits to an order ahead of demand by paying wa (<= w) per unit The retailer orders later (after demand is revealed) and pays w per unit Even if wa is chosen to get the retailer to order “K”, the supply chain is not coordinated Advance order quantities are not guaranteed to coordinate the supply chain

Summary In the absence of coordinating agreements, the supply chain profit is not maximized Coordinating agreements enable independent decisions by participants in the supply chain while attaining the supply chain maximum profit These coordinating agreements can be structured to generate win-win outcomes Coordination agreements offer a tool to enable both supply chain profit increases as well as win-win outcomes across supply chain participants