Computational social choice

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Presentation transcript:

Computational social choice The easy-to-compute axiom Lirong Xia

Last class: linear programming and computation variables are positive real numbers all constraints are linear, the objective is linear in P (Mixed) Integer programming (Some) All variables are integer NP-hard Basic computation Big O Polynomial-time reduction

Today’s schedule Computational social choice: the easy-to- compute axiom voting rules that can be computed in P satisfies the axiom Kemeny: a full proof of NP-hardness IP formulation of Kemeny

How a reduction works? Polynomial-time reduction: convert an instance of A to an instance of another decision problem B in polynomial-time so that answer to A is “yes” if and only if the answer to B is “yes” If you can do this for all instances of A, then it proves that B is HARDER than A w.r.t. polynomial-time reduction P-time Instance of A Instance of B Yes Yes No No

NP-hard and NP-complete problems NP-hard problems the decision problems “harder” than any problem in NP for any problem A in NP there exits a P-time reduction from A NP-complete problems the decision problems in NP that are NP-hard the “hardest” problems in NP NP-hard NP NP-C P

How to prove a problem is NP-hard How to put an elephant in a fridge Step 1. open the door Step 2. put the elephant in Step 3. close the door To prove a decision problem B is NP-hard Step 1. find a problem A to reduce from Step 2. prove that A is NP-hard Step 3. find a p-time reduction from A to B To prove B is NP-complete prove B is NP-hard prove B is in NP (find a p-time verification for any correct answer)

The first known NP-complete problem 3SAT Input: a logical formula F in conjunction normal form (CNF) where each clause has exactly 3 literals F = (x1∨x2∨x3)∧(¬x1∨¬x3∨x4)∧(¬x2∨x3∨¬x4) Answer: Is F satisfiable? 3SAT is NP-complete (Cook-Levin theorem)

Kemeny’s rule K( b ≻ c ≻ a , a ≻ b ≻ c ) = Kendall tau distance K(R,W)= # {different pairwise comparisons} Kemeny(P)=argminW K(P,W) =argminW ΣV∈P K(V,W) For single winner, choose the top-ranked alternative in Kemeny(P) K( b ≻ c ≻ a , a ≻ b ≻ c ) = 2

Example Profile P WMG K(P,a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d)=0+1+2*3+2*5=17 a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d b ≻ a ≻ c ≻ d d ≻ a ≻ b ≻ c c ≻ d ≻ b ≻ a 1 2 c d a b 2

Computing the Kemeny winner For each linear order W (m! iter) for each vote R in D (n iter) compute K(R,W) Find W* with the smallest total distance W*= argminW K(D,W)=argminW ΣR∈DK(R,W) top-ranked alternative at W* is the winner Takes exponential O(m!n) time!

Kemeny Ranking W → direct acyclic complete graph G(W) Given the WMG G(P) of the input profile P K(P,W) = Σa→b∈G(W) #{ V∈P: b ≻ a in V} =Σa→b∈G(W) (n+w(b→a))/2 = nm(m-1)/4 + Σa→b∈G(W) w(b→a)/2 argminW K(P,W)=argminW Σa→b∈G(W) w(b→a) =argminW Total weight on inconsistent edges in WMG a b a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d c d

Example Total weight on inconsistent edges between W and P is: 20 a b W= a ≻ b ≻ c ≻ d c d a b c d 20 16 14 12 8 6 Profile P: Total weight on inconsistent edges between W and P is: 20

Kemeny is NP-hard to compute Reduction from feedback arc set (FAC) Given a directed graph G and a number k does there exist a way to eliminate no more than k edges to obtain an acyclic graph? a b d c J. Bartholdi III, C. Tovey, M. Trick, Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election, Social Choice Welfare 6 (1989) 157–165.

Instance of KendallDistance Proof The KendallDistance problem: Given a profile P and a number k, Does there exist a ranking W whose total Kendall distance is at most k? P-time Instance of FAC Instance of KendallDistance d a b c c d a b 2 G WMG(P): k k’=2k+nm(m-1)/4-5 Yes Yes No No

Constructing the profile For any edge a→b∈G, define Pa→b= {a ≻ b ≻ others, Reverse(others) ≻ a ≻ b} P = ∪ a→b∈G Pa→b 2 d a b c WMG(Pa→b)=

The easy-to-compute axiom A voting rule satisfies the easy-to- compute axiom if computing the winner can be done in polynomial time P: easy to compute NP-hard: hard to compute assuming P≠NP

The winner determination problem Given: a voting rule r Input: a preference profile P and an alternative c input size: nmlog m Output: is c the winner of r under P?

Computing positional scoring rules If following the description of r the winner can be computed in p-time, then r satisfies the easy-to-compute axiom Positional scoring rule For each alternative (m iter) for each vote in D (n iter) find the position of m, find the score of this position Find the alternative with the largest score (m iter) Total time O(mn+m)=O(mn)

Computing the weighted majority graph For each pair of alternatives c,d (m(m-1) iter) let k = 0 for each vote V∈P if c>d add 1 to the counter k if d>c subtract 1 from k the weight on the edge c→d is k

Satisfiability of easy-to-compute Rule Complexity Positional scoring P Plurality w/ runoff STV Copeland Maximin Ranked pairs Kemeny NP-hard Slater Dodgson

Solving Kemeny in practice For each pair of alternatives a, b there is a binary variable xab xab = 1 if a>b in W xab = 0 if b>a in W max Σa,bw(a→b)xab s.t. for all a, b, xab+xba=1 for all a, b, c, xab+xbc+xca≤2 Do we need to worry about cycles of >3 vertices? Next homework No edges in both directions No cycle of 3 vertices

Advanced computational techniques Approximation Randomization Fixed-parameter analysis