Ritchard Hewitt – September 2010

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Place your chosen image here. The four corners must just cover the arrow tips. For covers, the three pictures should be the same size and in a straight.
Advertisements

Review of NTS entry charge setting arrangements - IA 1 July 2010.
Place your chosen image here. The four corners must just cover the arrow tips. For covers, the three pictures should be the same size and in a straight.
Hybrid Option(s) Ritchard Hewitt – August Fundamentals  Parameters – Cost Reflective, Incentive, Value  Cost – What does it cost the service provider.
Operating Margins UNC Sub Group Tuesday 4 th November 2008.
Place your chosen image here. The four corners must just cover the arrow tips. For covers, the three pictures should be the same size and in a straight.
Linepack ‘Park and Loan’ Quantity - Influencing Factors Review Group 291 – July 2010.
Operating Margins. 2 Competitive Provision of Operating Margins Change to National Grid Gas’s Transporter Licence which:  Introduced Special Condition.
20 September 2015 GAZ DE FRANCE ESS Introduction of Gas Reserve Arrangements Mark Bailey Gaz de France ESS.
SO Incentives from April 2010 John Perkins. 2 Gas System Operator (SO) Incentives National Grid operates the high pressure Gas Transmission System in.
RG0291 – NTS Licence SC27 – Balancing Arrangements Linepack – Commercial Considerations/Options Review Group 291 – 19 th July 2010.
Review of the UNC Post-emergency Arrangements Workshop 1 March 2009.
Review Group 291 – Balancing Arrangements Default Cashout Workshop 3 – 21 st June 2010.
E x p e r i e n c e C o m m i t m e n t SM ERCOT Nodal – Fuel Cost Analysis Verifiable Cost Working Group October 6, 2008.
Place your chosen image here. The four corners must just cover the arrow tips. For covers, the three pictures should be the same size and in a straight.
Revision of the UNC Post-Emergency Arrangements draft proposal July 2009.
Mod 0333: Update of default System Marginal Prices Review Group August 2010 Transmission Workstream 07/10/2010.
Discretionary Release of Non Obligated NTS System Entry Capacity Transmission Workstream 1st May 2008.
UNC (Urgent) Modification Proposal 0044: “Revised Emergency Cash-out & Curtailment Arrangements” UNC Transmission Workstream 11 th August 2005.
Place your chosen image here. The four corners must just cover the arrow tips. For covers, the three pictures should be the same size and in a straight.
10 November 2015 GAZ DE FRANCE ESS Modification Proposal 0086 “Introduction of gas demand management reserve arrangements” 1 st June 2006 Phil Broom and.
Gas Emergency Arrangements Proposal Transmission Workstream 5 th April 2007.
Proposer: Hayley Burden Panel Date: 17th April : Mod Title: Imbalance Charge amendments required to align the UNC with the Network Code on Gas.
Optimisation of Entry Capacity Strawman Transmission Workstream 4 th May 2006.
Place your chosen image here. The four corners must just cover the arrow tips. For covers, the three pictures should be the same size and in a straight.
Emergency Cashout Prices and Emergency Curtailment Quantity (ECQ) Adjustment Ritchard Hewitt Gas Code Development Manager.
Facilitating Release of Non-obligated Entry Capacity Draft – for discussion purposes only 22 November 2007.
Energy Market Issues for Biomethane Projects Workshop - 31 October 2011 RIIO-GD1 Environmental Incentives.
Modification Proposal 0435: Arrangements to better secure firm gas supplies for GB customers Initial Workgroup discussion 1 November 2012.
Ofgem’s decision on UNC modification proposal 044 Sonia Brown.
Development Modification Proposal: Introduction of an Inter-day Linepack Product Review Group August 2010 Transmission Workstream 07/10/2010.
Review of the UNC Post-emergency Claims Arrangements Strawman February 2009.
Place your chosen image here. The four corners must just cover the arrow tips. For covers, the three pictures should be the same size and in a straight.
Gas Transmission Charging Review: Final Capacity Charging Proposal Gas TCMF 14 th December 2006.
Measuring and Increasing Profit
Fuel Cost Components in the Fuel Adder
Congestion Management
Background Current balance of LDZ System and Customer charges
Fuel Cost Components in the Fuel Adder
Fuel Cost Components in the Fuel Adder
Entry Capacity Overrun price calculation
Inter-day Energy Transfer – Opportunity and Risk
Review of System Alerts
Review Group 291- Ofgem Update
Transfer Pricing, Evaluating and Managing Performance
Background and Process
UNC Modifications 061 & 062 – An Overview
NG Strawman – Ofgem Response
Transmission Workstream 4th July 2007
SO Incentives from April 2010
Gas balancing – where next
NG Strawman – Ofgem Response
NG Strawman – Ofgem response
0291 – NTS Licence Special Condition 27 – Balancing Arrangements
Mod 0452 (PARCA) – Further thoughts
User Compensation for NEC Storage Curtailment – Draft Proposal
Mod 621A Supporting analysis
Cashout actions and further considerations
Transmission Workgroup June 7th 2012
Joint Office Presentation for Modification 0678
Mod_38_18 Limitation of Capacity Market Difference Payments to Loss Adjusted Metered Quantity. 12th December 2018.
Development Modification Proposal 0337: Introduction of a Inter-day Linepack Product – User Pays Options Review Group August th November.
Review Group 291- Ofgem Update
DSR Workgroup 10 September
Draft Mod: Update of default System Marginal Prices
EU Balancing Code – Mod 494 Imbalance Charge Amendments
Entry Overrun Calculation
MOD_03_19 Amended application of the Market Back Up Price if an Imbalance Price(s) fail to calculate Energia.
Ofgem presentation to Gas Transmission Workstream
195AV “Future work” – system flexibility
Presentation transcript:

Ritchard Hewitt – September 2010 Hybrid Option(s) Ritchard Hewitt – September 2010

Incentive “Hybrid” option What behaviour do we want to incentivise? Current Cashout incentives seek in part to reduce use of day on day linepack service. NG Incentives directly encourage reduced change in Linepack levels. SMP prices set by Residual Balancer actions reflect the cost of both the energy bought and the cost of replacing “utilised” but unavailable Linepack flexibility service. Above incentives therefore could be viewed as being at odds with an objective of maximising the “efficient release” of available linepack flexibility Incentives are however required to encourage “efficient use” of Linepack flexibility This option seeks to strike a balance between the above

Incentive option …. Should the shipper incentives vary according to system position or overall shipper imbalance position?, i.e. Small linepack change / imbalance = moderate (or no?) incentive Larger linepack change / imbalance = greater incentive NB – if Balancing Actions taken then Marginal SMPs still apply Should incentives be different for those who “helped” the system? Do shipper actions on D-1 affect D balancing actions?. If yes – then should the D-1 shipper that “contributed” to the need to balance incur a proportion of the costs of addressing the imbalance on D? If yes – then should the D-1 shipper attribution be the same or different than the D shippers?

Cost Option National Grid Transmission (NGT) is a monopoly Assessment of its service provisions are therefore generally based on “cost reflectivity”. Linepack flexibility service in its simplest possible form is a function of the cost to put a piece of pipe in the ground divided by the amount of linepack it could generate each day over its useful service life plus the injection and withdrawal costs (compressors) But what happens on the day that you run out of pipe…?

Hybrid Option – “Cost + Incentive” This option seeks to combine part of the Cost Option with the Incentive Option. This option has a number of areas where it could be “developed” to either include or exclude certain aspects. These aspects are identified in red text in the slides that follow. This is a strawman and we are seeking comments on its merits and how it may be developed / improved

Hybrid Option – “Cost + Incentive” On “Non - MBA days” the cashout differentials will be set to reflect Mod 333 i.e. cost of providing the “storage” facility plus the costs of injection or withdrawal On “MBA days” the cashout differentials will be set by the SRMC type cost to the Transporter of having to arrange for “short notice” access to more “storage” plus injection and withdrawal MBA = Market Balancing Action as defined in the UNC

“Non - MBA days” This day is one where no Market Balancing Actions were completed and there was no Market Balancing Action on the following Gas Day either. On this day all the Linepack is provided by the system and therefore the cost proposed is one based on the cost of providing an asset capable of delivering this amount of linepack and the Opex needed to operate this asset. More detail in Mod 333. Lets call this a Standard Flexibility Charge or SFC

“MBA Days” “When use of the service outstrips supply”. The amount of available Linepack varies every day and therefore it is inevitable that on some days demand outstrips supply. On these days the Linepack level is maintained within an acceptable range by taking Market Balancing Actions (MBAs). The “cost” of these actions could be considered to be the cost of sourcing and then providing “short notice” linepack. Lets call this “Dynamic Flexibility” MBAs also includes that day’s cost of energy and this should perhaps be factored out?

Strawman Dynamic Flexibility Charge (DFC) Pseudo - Short run cost of linepack flexibility For Long shippers - Suggest this is the weighted average price of all Market Balancing Actions above eod SAP minus EOD SAP price For Short shippers – Suggest this is SAP minus the weighted average price of all MBAs below SAP DFC will be greater than or equal to the SFC charge

Strawman - example Day 0 and Day 1 shippers maintain supplies and demand within acceptable ranges and system pressures are within acceptable limits. No Market Balancing Actions. Initial cashout for Day 0 and Day 1 Short = SAP plus Standard Flexibility Charge (SFC) Long = SAP minus SFC

Strawman Day 1 through to Day 2 shipper imbalances lead to Market Balancing Actions (MBA) on Day 2. Cashout for D2 Short = SMPbuy set by MBAs plus Dynamic Flexibility Charge Long = SMPsell set by MBAs minus DFC Cashout Marginal prices for D1 reset: Replace previous SFC with Day 2 DFC for those shippers who were in the opposite direction to the Day 2 MBA, or Replace Standard Flexibility Charge with Dynamic Flexibility Charge for all shippers What if MBAs on a Day are in both directions? Note – SAP for D1 is not changed

End of Day one position Day One (no MBA) Day 2 Day 3 Shipper position Short Long SAP+SFC SAP-SFC

First step Day 2 Initial cashout of Day 2 shippers Day One (non MBA) Day 2 (MBA) Buy System Short Day 3 Shipper position Short Long SAP+SFC SAP-SFC SMPb + (DFC) SMPs – (DFC) Initial cashout of Day 2 shippers

Now revisit Day one Cashout Day One (non MBA) Day 2 (MBA) Buy System Short Day 3 Shipper position Short Long SAP+SFC SAP-SFC SMPb + DFC SMPs – DFC SAP+(> SFC or D2 DFC) Day one cashout now changes to reflect short shipper’s contribution to Day 2 balancing action

Day 3 – First step Day One (non MBA) Day 2 (MBA) Buy System Short Day 3 (MBA) Sell System Long Shipper position Short Long SAP+SFC SAP-SFC SMPb + DFC SMPs – DFC SMPb + DFC3 SMPs – DFC3 SAP+(> SFC or D2 DFC)

Now revisit Day 2 Cashout Day One (non MBA) Day 2 (MBA) Buy System Short Day 3 (MBA) Sell System Long Shipper position Short Long SAP+SFC SAP-SFC SMPb + DFC SMPs – DFC SMPb + DFC3 SMPs – DFC3 SAP+(> SFC or D2 DFC) As above SMPs – (> Day 2 DFC or Day 3 DFC)

Strawman All revenues from the additional charges to feed into Capacity Neutrality? or Fed back through Balancing Neutrality (SO activity)

Strawman Advantages: Automatic release of Linepack service avoids “auction” option costs and difficulty of establishing amount to release. Cost reflective and yet dynamic and market based when required Maintains existing Daily Clearing process Disadvantages: Does not facilitate shipper “carrying forward” an imbalance position – System is cleared daily as now. Complex clearing process – New systems and audit trails Lack of within day Cashout price discovery

Views / Comments? ?