ROA Content Proposal November 2006 Geoff Huston.

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Presentation transcript:

ROA Content Proposal November 2006 Geoff Huston

EE Resource Certificates End Entity (no-CA) Certificates used as one-off ROA signing certificates EE cert can be used for a single-use ROA signing Private key is destroyed after a single use EE Cert SIA is a pointer to the object that has been signed with the corresponding private key ROA validity and resource attributes are controlled by the associated EE certificate(s)

What Information is required for a ROA? Originating AS IP Address Set Period of the Authority (Start & End Times) Information to allow a relying party to validate that: The address set is valid The ROA was generated by the address holder The ROA has not been altered The ROA is valid

What Information is required for a ROA? Originating AS In the ROA IP Address Set In the EE Cert (or in the ROA?) Period of the Authority (Start & End Times) In the EE Cert Information to allow a relying party to validate that: The address set is valid The ROA was generated by the address holder The ROA has not been altered The ROA is valid In the EE Cert, plus a Trust Anchor set

ROA Template (1) ROA Contents: AS Number Address Resource Set Signature(s) across the join of items 1 + 2 Pointers to EE Cert(s)

Alternate ROA Template (2) ROA Contents: AS Number Pointers (URLs) of EE Cert(s) Signature(s) across the join of items 1 + 2

Alternate ROA Template (3) ROA Contents: AS Number EE Cert(s) Signature(s) across the join of items 1 + 2

Alternate ROA Template (4) ROA Contents: AS Number Hash(es) of EE Cert(s) Signature(s) across the join of items 1 + 2