Web Server Design Week 13 Old Dominion University Department of Computer Science CS 495/595 Spring 2006 Michael L. Nelson <mln@cs.odu.edu> 4/3/06

Problems with Basic Authentication Password sent in clear Cannot authenticate the server to the client e.g. “phishing” attacks uid/passwd may be used at other sites too

Digest Authentication Does: securely transmit the password bi-directional authentication But does not protect the session!!! “https” uses 1 of: Transport Layer Security http://www.ietf.org/html.charters/tls-charter.html Secure Socket Layer http://wp.netscape.com/eng/ssl3/

Replay Attacks Eavesdrop on the unencrypted c/s conversation With basic, the bad guy has access to all URIs protected with that u/p With digest: replay is limited to the resource the bad guy already overheard the vulnerability “window” is determined by the nonce value PUT/POST methods need stronger nonce values

Multiple Authentication Schemes According to section 14.47 of RFC 2616 (and section 4.6 of RFC 2617), a single “WWW-Authenticate” header can provide more than 1 challenge it is up to the client to choose the strongest challenge it understands (n.b., I’m not sure how to do this with Apache; we will not issue multiple challenges in our project)

Dictionary Attacks Digest authentication offers no real protection against poorly chosen passwords grabbing the nonce/response pair(s), eavesdropper can quickly run through a dictionary of common passwords trying to recreate the response

Man in the Middle A corrupted proxy (or a “phishing” server) could request your credentials: basic: now it has your passwd (good for all URIs) digest: it has authentication for a single URI The very existence of “basic” is a problem client s/w & users have to be smart

Chosen Plaintext Attack MITM attacks (or phishing server) have control of generating the nonce values knowing the original input makes cryptoanalysis a little bit easier: http://web.archive.org/web/19970607055704/http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/pubs/cryptobytes/spring95/md5.htm “Cribs” http://www.cs.miami.edu/~harald/enigma/enigma.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis_of_the_Enigma client can counter w/ cnonce, since MITM will not know what the original input was for the cnonce value

Batch Bruce Force Attacks Variation on the plaintext attack: MITM/phisher collects multiple responses from multiple users for the same nonce Time to find first passwd decreases by the factor of the known nonce/response pairs

Precomputed Dictionary Attack Combination of dictionary + plaintext Compute a dictionary of (response,passwd) pairs for the known nonce value(s) Computation can be done in parallel on zombie machines

Password Files Even though the server stores passwords in the form of: user:md5(user:realm:passwd) if the passwd file is compromised (e.g., filesystem access), then the URIs in that realm are compromised password does not need to be guessed treat this passwd file as if the passwds are in the clear (unlike standard unix passwd file)