animalism

Locke and Neo-Lockeanism ’The history of the topic of personal identity has been a series of footnotes to Locke

Locke’s Human/Person Distinction Sortal: + count nouns that convey criteria of identity ‘identity is suited to the idea ‘man’ (human animal) and ‘person’ convey different identity criteria, so different persistence conditions. Human Animal (‘Man’): a structurally complex material object whose functional organization is conducive to continued life. Person: A thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does by that consciousness, which is inseparable from thinking.

The Problem of Personal Persistence Normative aspect of personhood ‘Person functions as a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit…in personal identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and punishment’ In this life… And the Resurrection World NOTE: Olson’s diagnosis of what went wrong with traditional personal identity discussion is starting with the question of persistence rather than what it was to be a person in the first place and with the misuse of puzzle cases pumping intuitions about persistence.

Summary of Locke Our capacities for self-consciousness and rationality are tied not to our being human animals, but to our being persons (and something need not be a human animal in order to be a person. The locus of moral responsibility is not the human animal , but the person Persons, but not human animals, persist just in case their psychological states are linked in the appropriate ways During the course of its life, a human animal may coincide with zero, one, or more than one person

Animalism Olsen’s alternative to Neo-Lockeanism

What is Animalism? Each of us (ordinary persons) is numerically identical with an animal. Identical with--not merely constituted by or other relation I and my animal have the same persistence conditions Not all human animals are persons Fetus, infants, humans in a vegitative state aren’t There might be persons who weren’t human animals E.g. non-human animals, supernatural beings that aren’t animals at all But highly unlikely that there are And WE aren’t such things: we are animals

We are essentially and fundamentally animals Essentially: we who are animals couldn’t exist without being animals Fundamentally: our identity conditions derive from our being animals We persist as long and only as long as the animals we are persist Person is a phase sortal We are not ‘only animals’ insofar as non-animal predicates are true of us E.g. those involved with person being a ‘forensic term’, etc. Compare Strawson’s P and M predicates or material and game predicates of chess pieces.

Neo-Lockean Alternatives The Constitution View • Lewis’s Temporal Parts Account • Hume • People don’t exist

Identity, Coincidence and Constitution

The Statue and the Clay The statue and the clay occupy exactly the same place Both the statue and the lump of clay of which it’s made are shaped statuesquely, have the same weight, etc. But they have different identity conditions

The Statue and the Clay The lump can survive a radical change of shape but not loss or replacement of parts. The statue can survive replacement of parts but not radical change of shape

Lynne Baker’s Constitution View The lump of clay constitutes the statue Constitution is not identity! Problem: modal properties grounded in categorial properties Problem: different properties go with different kinds of things Baker’s solution: things may have properties derivatively or non- derivatively An object has a property derivatively if it instantiates it only in virtue of being colocated with another object An object has a property non-derivatively if it instantiates that property independently of being independently of being colocated with another object

The Derivative/Non-Derivative Distinction If one object, x, constitutes another object, y and both instantiate some property F then: x (the constituting object) instantiates F nonderivatively in the event it would instantiate F even if it did not constitute y (the constituted) y instantiates F nonderivatively in the event that x would fail to instantiate F if x did not constitute y; and y instantiates F derivatively in the event that x would instantiate F even if it did not constitute y.

Persons are constituted by human animals Persons are animals derivatively First person perspective is essential to being a person First person perspective is unique to persons Each of us persons posesses the first-person perspective essentially and nonderivatively Because the human animal that constitutes you possesses a first-person perspective only derivatively, it is unable to self-refer.

David Lewis’s Perdurantist View Agrees with Locke: Persons and animals have different persistence conditions The persistence conditions for persons are psychological Persistence conditions are to be understood in terms of ‘unity relations’ holding on stages Persons are (ordinarily) temporal (proper) parts of human animals While a person exists, every stage of the person is identical to a stage of the human animal Ordinarily some human animal stages that animal-unity-related to person- stages are not themselves person-stages

Persons and Their Animals There are lots of different (but at some times co-located) things here that count as one time fetus stages corpse stages person stages brain-dead stages human animal stages human body stages

Arguments Arguments for and objections to Animalism

The Thinking Animal Argument There is a human animal sitting in your chair. The human animal sitting in your chair is thinking. The one and only thinking being sitting in your chair is you You are that animal This argument can be generalized (see symbolized version): conclusion is that we is (identical to) an animal Note: the most crucial premise is 3—Olson will argue that denying animalism we get the absurd conclusion that there are two thinkers: the person and the animal.

Alternatives to Animalism Alternative One: there are no human animals Chisholm’s mereological essentialism: animals are ens sucessiva Alternative Two: human Animals can’t think If human animals can’t think, dogs can’t either. ‘Body’ can’t be substituted for person in every context Alternative Three: you are not Lewis counting overlapping individuals as one (see Problem of the Many!) How do I know I’m the person not the animal? Couldn’t be more than one person around If conscious non-people ’would derive personhood of significance

The Problem of the Many “Overcrowding” isn’t peculiar to the problem of personal identity The table in the table in the table…

More objections to Thinking Animal Argument Constitution View (P3 should be rejected): first-person thoughts/utterances refer only to persons, who have them non- derivatively Rival Candidates Problem (P1 doesn’t help): there are many different kinds of things, e.g. mass of matter, mere body, etc. colocated with the animal. Thinking Parts Objection (P1 doesn’t help): lots of different overlapping animal parts include the brain (responsible for thinking): I can’t be identical to all of them.

Hard Choices: Asking the Right Questions Philosophers, beginning with Locke have begun the discussion on personal identity by asking the persistence question: ‘What makes me now the same person as me at some other time? Motivation: interest in survival, responsibility for past actions, reward and punishment Focus on puzzle cases of persistence, e.g. brain transplant ‘Compare the thinking animal argument with the transplant argument: Which is more likely: no animals, no animals think, too many thinkers or You don’t go along with your transplanted cerebrum?

What would it mean if we were animals? On the misuse of puzzle cases of identity through time: consider actual cases. We once were fetuses, and infants, and in the future, we may become brain brain-dead non-persons Note: person is a phase sortal! Begin not with the persistence question but the question of what am I and then consider the persistence conditions for what I am, viz. an animal

…Whatever else we are Are we animals? On the orthodox (neo-Lockean) account, yes and no At any given time I, the person, occupy the same region as an animal: to that extent I am an animal, i.e. the animal and I count as one But as a person I have different persistence conditions than my animal so My animal may predate and postdate me, the person And conceivably I may survive my animal, e.g. in a resurrection world A physicalist account of what persons are at any time doesn’t preclude a mentalistic account of personal identity through time …Whatever else we are

We’re People!