FairTorrent: BrinGing Fairness to Peer-to-Peer Systems

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Presentation transcript:

FairTorrent: BrinGing Fairness to Peer-to-Peer Systems

Problem Delivering content using a P2P network is cheap, as P2P leverages user upload bandwidth… … however today’s P2P networks lack strong incentives mechanisms for users to contribute bandwidth

Problem Free-Riders and Low-Contributing peers Consume much bandwidth in P2P networks Cause much slower downloads for other users High-Contributing peers often receives much less bandwidth than they contribute

Question Can one design a P2P system that comes close to “ideal fairness”? Ideal fairness: a peer downloads data at a rate at which it uploads

Related Work Credit-Based Systems (e.g. Dandelion) No real-time fairness Peer Reputation Systems (e.g. Eigentrust) Probabilistic, inexact BitTorrent-like (most popular) Tit-for-Tat, Proportional Response, K-TFT

BitTorrent Overivew File: Seed Seed Leechers

BitTorrent’s Tit-for-Tat (TFT) Estimates used as prediction Willing to reciprocate at a higher rate Commits BW for a duration of a round Unstable peer relationships 1 2.5 0.5 1 Peer i 2.5 2 2 2.5 2.5

BitTorrent’s TFT Leads to: Long peer discovery times [NSDI ’07] Much bandwidth waste, easily exploited by strategic clients (e.g., LargeView, BitTyrant)

Proportional Response [STOC ’07] In each round peer reallocates upload rates in proportion to observed download rates Assumes in each round peers can accurately estimate intended rate allocations of all neighbors In practice, PropShare client [SIGCOMM ’08] Cannot accurately estimate inteded rate allocations Relies on optimistic unchoking to discover better peers Exhibits poor upload/download rate convergence

K-TFT [INFOCOM ’06] Leecher Li stops uploading to leecher Lj when the trade “deficit” reaches some threshold of K bytes Used by BitTyrant [NSDI ‘07] peers with one another Problem: prevents high-uploaders from utilizing their bandwidth

Inherent Flaw: rate-allocation Bit-Torrent-like approaches rely or rate allocation Inherently imprecise Perform poorly in realistic scenarios If we do not use rate-allocation, what can be done…

FairTorrent Algorithm: Leechers

FairTorrent Algorithm: Leechers Effect: ensures fast rate convergence of a leecher’s download and upload rates total upload and download rates peerwise data-exchange rates

FairTorrent Algorithm: Seeds Effects: Evenly splits seed bandwidth among leechers Helps new peers to bootstrap

Properties Fast Rate Convergence of upload/download rates Resilience to Strategic Peers E.g. free-riders

Strategic Lj Lk DFij =1 DFik =1 Li DFil =0 Ll DFim =0 Lm Rji = data rate from Lj to Li If Rmi > Rji => Rim > Rij

Claim: reaches convergence quickly = upload capacity of Li Lj Assume: Lk DFij =1 DFik =1 Li DFil =1 Ll DFim =1 DFin =0 Lm Ln Sends to new peers until:

Fairness Metric DFij(t) = deficit at time t Fairness metric = Maximum Deficit … the maximum number of data blocks owed to Li at any time

Theorem In a network with N leechers, with upload capacities selected uniformly from the range: [1,r] assuming leechers have data to exchange, for any leecher Li, with probability at least :

Corollary 1: fast rate convergence, because the amount of data downloaded by a leecher lags what it has uploaded by at most O(log(N)) Corollary 2: a strategic peer, such as a free-riders receives at most O(log(N)) free data blocks

Leechers Li, Lj, Lk with upload capacities 3,2, and 2 data blocks/sec Idea data-exchange rates: Li 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.5 Lj Lk 0.5

Leechers Li, Lj, Lk with upload capacities 3,2, and 2 data blocks/sec FairTorrent: converges in 2 sec. BitTorrent: Li loses 1 block each sec Li Li 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 0.5 1 Lj Lk Lj Lk 0.5 1 Li K-TFT: capacity under- utilized 1 1 1 1 1 Lj Lk 1

PropShare: Time 0 to 10 Time 10 to 20 Li Li Lj Lk Lj Lk Time 20 to 30 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1 1 1.2 1.2 1 0.8 Lj Lk Lj Lk 1 0.8 Time 20 to 30 Time 30 to 40 Li Li 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.28 1.28 1.31 1.31 0.74 0.69 Lj Lk Lj Lk 0.74 0.69

Properties Fast Rate Convergence Resilience to Strategic Peers Fully Distributed Simple, requires no changes to protocol Requires: No estimates of peers’ intended rate allocations No upload rate allocations No rounds or other parameter tuning

Evaluation We implemented FairTorrent on top of the original python BitTorrent client Evaluated on PlanetLab against: Original BitTorrent client Azureus (most popular) PropShare BitTyrant (uses K-TFT with other BitTyrant clients)

Scenarios Base Case: uniform distribution Live: rates picked from observed live networks Skewed: many low-contributors Running inside live BitTorrent swarms

Uniform Distribution 50 leechers with rates picked uniformly from a large range 1-50 KB/s 10 seeds upload at 25 KB/s 32 MB File Repeated experiment five times with each network

How fast do the leechers reach download rate from leechers>= 90% of upload? Leechers that upload 40-50 KB/s

Maximum Deficit FT(0.43MB), BT(8MB), AZ(8), PS(19), TY(31)

Download Times for Peers with 40-50 KB/s upload FT (756 ), BT(876), AZ(980), PS(1200), TY(1298)

Live Upload Rates Exponential-like distribution. Capacities from 4-197 KB/s. Mean 17KB/s. [Piateck07] Top 10% of leecers account for 50% of total upload capacity Dynamic arrivals/departures. New leecher enters every 5 seconds. Doubled network size: 100 leechers, 20 seeds

Avg Download Times of the top 10% of the Leechers Download times: 372 (FT), 593(BT), 733(AZ) 624(PS), and 842 (TY) seconds. FT 37%-56% faster.

Live Upload Rates FT high-uploaders reduce download times by 37% in BT, 41% in AZ, 47% in PS, 56% in TY

Live Upload Rates Download times in AZ are reduced by 41% with AZ, 5% by PS and 9% by TY

Skewed Distribution One high-uploader at 50 KB/s 49 low-contributors: upload at 1-5 KB/s

Skewed Distribution Download Times: FT 644s, 3-5 times faster than BT (1804), AZ(1859), PS(1633) and TY(3305)

Skewed Distribution FT high-uploader reduces download times by 61% in BT, 39% in AZ, 75% in PS, 81% in

Live Swarms Large popular swarms with thousands of users File sizes 1-10 GB Joined 40 swarms for 1500 seconds. Measured download rate Each client uploads at 300KB/s, Download capped at 600 KB/s Max Connections: 50, 500 500 (default for PropShare, BitTyrant) 50 (default for Azureus)

Live Swarms FT outperforms AZ, PS, TY by 58-108% with 500 connections limit

Live Swarms FT outperforms AZ, PS, TY by 63-79% with 50 connection limit

Conclusions We introduce, implement and evaluate a new simple deficit-based approach FairTorrent achieves much more optimal fairness, rate-convergence and resilience to strategic peers than rate-allocation approaches Guarantees better performance for high-contributing peers Paves the way for implementation of more reliable content delivery services over P2P

Future Work Incentives in P2P streaming Exploiting network locality

Thank You Project: http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~asherman/fairtorrent Email: asherman@cs.columbia.edu