Reviews Rocky K. C. Chang 20 April 2007.

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Presentation transcript:

Reviews Rocky K. C. Chang 20 April 2007

Foci of this course Understand the 3 fundamental cryptographic functions and how they are used in network security. Understand the main elements in securing today’s Internet infrastructure. Exposed to some current Internet security problems.

Types of attacks Passive attacks (eavesdropping), e.g., ciphertext-only attacks (recognizable plaintext attacks) Fred has seen some ciphertext. known-plaintext attacks Fred has obtained some <plaintext, ciphertext> pairs. chosen-plaintext attacks Fred can choose any plaintext he wants. Active attacks, e.g., pretend to be someone else (impersonation) introduce new messages in the protocol delete existing messages substituting one message for another replay old messages

Three cryptographic functions Hash functions: require 0 key Secret key functions: require 1 key Public key functions: require 2 keys

Symmetric cryptography Secret key functions Stream cipher vs block cipher Symmetric cryptography based on substitution (confusion) and diffusion 64-bit DES and 128/192/256-bit AES Secrecy service Encrypting data of any size: cipher block chaining (CBC) Security problems with CBC, e.g., identical and nonidentical ciphertext blocks.

Cryptographic hash functions and MAC 3 properties: pre-image resistance, collision resistance, and mixing transformation The birthday problem and attack k  1.774q, where q is the number of distinct hash outputs The length of a secure hash output ≥ 256 bits Hash function standards (MDx, SHA-x) 2 problems: length extension and partial message collision Message authentication codes A successful attack on MAC CBC-MAC and HMAC

The public-key cryptography Prime numbers, modulo a prime A group for the set of numbers modulo a prime p without 0 under multiplication Compute the multiplicative inverse using the extended Euclid algorithm. Generate a large prime number. The Rabin-Miller test determines whether an odd integer is prime. Each party involved in a public-key cryptographic system is one secret and one public “key”.

The Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol The DH protocol uses the multiplicative group modulo p, where p is a very large prime. A generator g generates a set of numbers 1, g, g2, …, gt-1 (gt = 1 again). Subgroups (t < p-1) and group (t = p-1) The basic Diffie-Hellman (DH) protocol (g, p) and a random number in (1, 2, …, p-1) The discrete logarithm problem Security problems Using a smaller subgroup ({1}, {1, p-1}) and a safe prime Squares and nonsquares Man in the middle attack

The RSA algorithm In RSA, we perform modulo a composite number n = p  q, where p and q are large primes. Use 2 different exponents e (public) and d (private), such that e  d = 1 mod t, where t = lcm(p – 1, q – 1). To encrypt m, compute c = me mod n; to decrypt c, compute cd mod n = m. To sign m, compute s = m1/e mod n; to verify the signature, compute se = m mod n. Choices of e, p, and q Pitfalls of using RSA, e.g., encrypting a small message, message signing.

Authentication Network-based, password-based Cryptographic authentication Symmetric and asymmetric Challenge and response Mutual authentication  2 x one-way authentication. Reflection attack and man in the middle attack Principles: One-way: Have the responder influence on what she encrypts or hashes. Have both parties have some influence over the quantity signed.

Authenticated key exchange Authenticated Diffie-Hellman exchange Perfect forward secrecy Allow both sides to agree on the crypto. algorithms and the DH parameters. A partial solution to denial-of service attacks using cookies It is prudent to couple the key exchange with authentication.

Secure network protocols in practice

PKI Alice generates her public/private key pair. Keep the private key. Take the public key to the CA, say k The CA has to verify that Alice is who she says she is. The CA then issues a digital statement stating that k belongs to Alice. There will never be a single CA for all or most of all. There are going to be a large number of PKIs. Use different key pairs in different PKIs. Choose between a key server approach and a PKI approach.

IPSec Unicast, unidirectional security association at the IP layer Authentication Header and Encapsulation Security Payload Partial solution to the replay attack Tunnel mode and transport mode Encryption without authentication is useless. Outbound and inbound packet processing

IKEv.1 IKE phase 1 (ISAKMP association) and phase 2 The main mode consists of 3 message pairs. 1st pair: ISAKMP SA negotiation 2nd pair: a D-H exchange and an exchange of nonces 3rd pair: Peer authentication The phase 1 is protected with encryption and authentication. Establish IPSec associations and the necessary keys. A new issue here is hiding the identities of the end points

TLS 1.0/ SSL 3.0 Pros and cons of providing security services at the transport layer instead of the IP layer. The TLS Handshake and Record layers. Session states and connection states The session states can be reused to establish a new connection. Server and client authentication

Network security is more than the above Wireless security: IEEE 802.11i, RFID, Bluetooth, IP telephony, etc Worms and buffer overflow attacks Denial-of-service and degradation-of-service attacks Data security Covert channel, privacy protection

Network security is more than the above Security policies Operational issues Human issues Vulnerability analysis Auditing Intrusion detection System security Program security etc

“Security is a chain; it’s only as secure as the weakest link “Security is a chain; it’s only as secure as the weakest link.” “Security is not a product; it itself is a process.” Bruce Schneier