BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy

Slides:



Advertisements
Similar presentations
Bayes rule, priors and maximum a posteriori
Advertisements

DO’S AND DONT’S WITH LIKELIHOODS Louis Lyons Oxford (CDF)
1 BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy Louis Lyons Oxford University LBL, January 2008.
27 th March CERN Higgs searches: CL s W. J. Murray RAL.
BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy 1 Louis Lyons Imperial College and Oxford University CERN Latin American School March 2015.
Psychology 290 Special Topics Study Course: Advanced Meta-analysis April 7, 2014.
1 Methods of Experimental Particle Physics Alexei Safonov Lecture #21.
1 LIMITS Why limits? Methods for upper limits Desirable properties Dealing with systematics Feldman-Cousins Recommendations.
BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy 1 Louis Lyons Imperial College and Oxford University Heidelberg April 2013.
Bayesian inference Gil McVean, Department of Statistics Monday 17 th November 2008.
1 BAYES versus FREQUENTISM The Return of an Old Controversy The ideologies, with examples Upper limits Systematics Louis Lyons, Oxford University and CERN.
Statistics In HEP 2 Helge VossHadron Collider Physics Summer School June 8-17, 2011― Statistics in HEP 1 How do we understand/interpret our measurements.
1 Do’s and Dont’s with L ikelihoods Louis Lyons Oxford CDF Mexico, November 2006.
Statistics for Particle Physics: Intervals Roger Barlow Karlsruhe: 12 October 2009.
Slide 1 Statistics for HEP Roger Barlow Manchester University Lecture 1: Probability.
1 BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy Louis Lyons Oxford University CERN, October 2006 Lecture 4.
1 BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy Louis Lyons Oxford University SLAC, January 2007.
1 Do’s and Dont’s with L ikelihoods Louis Lyons Oxford CDF CERN, October 2006.
Credibility of confidence intervals Dean Karlen / Carleton University Advanced Statistical Techniques in Particle Physics Durham, March 2002.
G. Cowan Lectures on Statistical Data Analysis Lecture 12 page 1 Statistical Data Analysis: Lecture 12 1Probability, Bayes’ theorem 2Random variables and.
1 Do’s and Dont’s with L ikelihoods Louis Lyons Oxford CDF Manchester, 16 th November 2005.
I The meaning of chance Axiomatization. E Plurbus Unum.
1 BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy Louis Lyons Imperial College and Oxford University Vienna May 2011.
G. Cowan 2011 CERN Summer Student Lectures on Statistics / Lecture 41 Introduction to Statistics − Day 4 Lecture 1 Probability Random variables, probability.
G. Cowan Lectures on Statistical Data Analysis Lecture 10 page 1 Statistical Data Analysis: Lecture 10 1Probability, Bayes’ theorem 2Random variables and.
1 Statistical Inference Problems in High Energy Physics and Astronomy Louis Lyons Particle Physics, Oxford BIRS Workshop Banff.
G. Cowan Lectures on Statistical Data Analysis 1 Statistical Data Analysis: Lecture 7 1Probability, Bayes’ theorem, random variables, pdfs 2Functions of.
1 Practical Statistics for Physicists Stockholm Lectures Sept 2008 Louis Lyons Imperial College and Oxford CDF experiment at FNAL CMS expt at LHC
Lecture 9: p-value functions and intro to Bayesian thinking Matthew Fox Advanced Epidemiology.
Statistical Analysis of Systematic Errors and Small Signals Reinhard Schwienhorst University of Minnesota 10/26/99.
Machine Learning Queens College Lecture 3: Probability and Statistics.
1 Probability and Statistics  What is probability?  What is statistics?
Statistical Decision Theory
G. Cowan 2009 CERN Summer Student Lectures on Statistics1 Introduction to Statistics − Day 4 Lecture 1 Probability Random variables, probability densities,
Theory of Probability Statistics for Business and Economics.
G. Cowan Lectures on Statistical Data Analysis Lecture 1 page 1 Lectures on Statistical Data Analysis London Postgraduate Lectures on Particle Physics;
Statistics Lectures: Questions for discussion Louis Lyons Imperial College and Oxford CERN Summer Students July
Practical Statistics for Particle Physicists Lecture 3 Harrison B. Prosper Florida State University European School of High-Energy Physics Anjou, France.
Bayesian vs. frequentist inference frequentist: 1) Deductive hypothesis testing of Popper--ruling out alternative explanations Falsification: can prove.
Statistics In HEP Helge VossHadron Collider Physics Summer School June 8-17, 2011― Statistics in HEP 1 How do we understand/interpret our measurements.
Making sense of randomness
Confidence Intervals First ICFA Instrumentation School/Workshop At Morelia, Mexico, November 18-29, 2002 Harrison B. Prosper Florida State University.
Statistical Decision Theory Bayes’ theorem: For discrete events For probability density functions.
BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy 1 Louis Lyons Imperial College and Oxford University CERN Summer Students July 2014.
1 Methods of Experimental Particle Physics Alexei Safonov Lecture #24.
G. Cowan Lectures on Statistical Data Analysis Lecture 8 page 1 Statistical Data Analysis: Lecture 8 1Probability, Bayes’ theorem 2Random variables and.
1 Introduction to Statistics − Day 3 Glen Cowan Lecture 1 Probability Random variables, probability densities, etc. Brief catalogue of probability densities.
G. Cowan Lectures on Statistical Data Analysis Lecture 4 page 1 Lecture 4 1 Probability (90 min.) Definition, Bayes’ theorem, probability densities and.
In Bayesian theory, a test statistics can be defined by taking the ratio of the Bayes factors for the two hypotheses: The ratio measures the probability.
G. Cowan Lectures on Statistical Data Analysis Lecture 12 page 1 Statistical Data Analysis: Lecture 12 1Probability, Bayes’ theorem 2Random variables and.
1 BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy Louis Lyons Imperial College and Oxford University Amsterdam Oct 2009.
Bayesian Estimation and Confidence Intervals Lecture XXII.
Statistical Issues in Searches for New Physics
The asymmetric uncertainties on data points in Roofit
Confidence Interval Estimation
What is Probability? Bayes and Frequentism
Probability and Statistics for Particle Physics
Statistical Issues for Dark Matter Searches
BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy
Confidence Intervals and Limits
Likelihoods 1) Introduction 2) Do’s & Dont’s
Lecture 4 1 Probability (90 min.)
Lecture 4 1 Probability Definition, Bayes’ theorem, probability densities and their properties, catalogue of pdfs, Monte Carlo 2 Statistical tests general.
Statistical Tests and Limits Lecture 2: Limits
Bayes for Beginners Luca Chech and Jolanda Malamud
CS 594: Empirical Methods in HCC Introduction to Bayesian Analysis
Introduction to Statistics − Day 4
Lecture 4 1 Probability Definition, Bayes’ theorem, probability densities and their properties, catalogue of pdfs, Monte Carlo 2 Statistical tests general.
Statistics for HEP Roger Barlow Manchester University
Mathematical Foundations of BME Reza Shadmehr
Presentation transcript:

BAYES and FREQUENTISM: The Return of an Old Controversy Louis Lyons Imperial College and Oxford University Benasque Sept 2016

Topics Who cares? What is probability? Bayesian approach Examples Frequentist approach Summary . Will discuss mainly in context of PARAMETER ESTIMATION. Also important for GOODNESS of FIT and HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Example of ‘analysing data’ Measure height of everyone in this room Is data consistent with bell-shaped curve (Gaussian or normal distribution)? b) What are the best values for the position and the width of the bell-shaped curve? (e.g. 1.71m and 0.16m)

Example of ‘analysing data’ Measure height of everyone in this room Is data consistent with bell-shaped curve (Gaussian or normal distribution)? Goodness of Fit b) What are the best values for the position and the width of the bell-shaped curve? (e.g. 1.71m and 0.16m) Parameter Determination

It is possible to spend a lifetime analysing data without realising that there are two very different fundamental approaches to statistics: Bayesianism and Frequentism.

µtrue How can textbooks not even mention Bayes / Frequentism? For simplest case with no constraint on µtrue , then µtrue at some probability, for both Bayes and Frequentist (but different interpretations) See Bob Cousins “Why isn’t every physicist a Bayesian?” Amer Jrnl Phys 63(1995)398

We need to make a statement about Parameters, Given Data The basic difference between the two: Bayesian : Probability (parameter, given data) (an anathema to a Frequentist!) Frequentist : Probability (data, given parameter) (a likelihood function)

WHAT IS PROBABILITY? MATHEMATICAL Formal FREQUENTIST Based on Axioms FREQUENTIST Ratio of frequencies as n infinity Repeated “identical” trials Not applicable to single event or physical constant BAYESIAN Degree of belief Can be applied to single event or physical constant (even though these have unique truth) Varies from person to person *** Quantified by “fair bet” LEGAL PROBABILITY

Bayesian versus Classical P(A and B) = P(A;B) x P(B) = P(B;A) x P(A) e.g. A = event contains t quark B = event contains W boson or A = I am in Benasque B = I am giving a lecture P(A;B) = P(B;A) x P(A) /P(B) Completely uncontroversial, provided….

Bayesian p(param | data) α p(data | param) * p(param) Bayes’ Theorem p(param | data) α p(data | param) * p(param) posterior likelihood prior Problems: p(param) Has particular value “Degree of belief” Prior What functional form? Coverage

P(parameter) Has specific value “Degree of Belief” Credible interval Prior: What functional form? Uninformative prior: flat? In which variable? e.g. m, m2, ln m,….? Even more problematic with more params Unimportant if “data overshadows prior” Important for limits Subjective or Objective prior?

Data overshadows prior Mass of Z boson (from LEP) Data overshadows prior

Even more important for UPPER LIMITS Prior Even more important for UPPER LIMITS

Mass-squared of neutrino Prior = zero in unphysical region

Bayes: Specific example Particle decays exponentially: dn/dt = (1/τ) exp(-t/τ) Observe 1 decay at time t1: L(τ) = (1/τ) exp(-t1/τ) Choose prior π(τ) for τ e.g. constant up to some large τ L Then posterior p(τ) =L(τ) * π(τ) has almost same shape as L(τ) Use p(τ) to choose interval for τ τ in usual way Contrast frequentist method for same situation later.

Bayesian posterior  intervals Upper limit Lower limit Central interval Shortest

Upper Limits from Poisson data Expect b = 3.0, observe n events Ilya Narsky, FNAL CLW 2000 Upper Limits from Poisson data Expect b = 3.0, observe n events Upper Limits important for excluding models

P (Data;Theory) P (Theory;Data) HIGGS SEARCH at CERN Is data consistent with Standard Model? or with Standard Model + Higgs? End of Sept 2000: Data not very consistent with S.M. Prob (Data ; S.M.) < 1% valid frequentist statement Turned by the press into: Prob (S.M. ; Data) < 1% and therefore Prob (Higgs ; Data) > 99% i.e. “It is almost certain that the Higgs has been seen”

P (Data;Theory) P (Theory;Data)

P (Data;Theory) P (Theory;Data) Theory = male or female Data = pregnant or not pregnant P (pregnant ; female) ~ 3%

P (Data;Theory) P (Theory;Data) Theory = male or female Data = pregnant or not pregnant P (pregnant ; female) ~ 3% but P (female ; pregnant) >>>3%

Example 1 : Is coin fair ? Toss coin: 5 consecutive tails What is P(unbiased; data) ? i.e. p = ½ Depends on Prior(p) If village priest: prior ~ δ(p = 1/2) If stranger in pub: prior ~ 1 for 0 < p <1 (also needs cost function)

Example 2 : Particle Identification Try to separate π’s and protons probability (p tag; real p) = 0.95 probability (π tag; real p) = 0.05 probability (p tag; real π) = 0.10 probability (π tag; real π) = 0.90 Particle gives proton tag. What is it? Depends on prior = fraction of protons If proton beam, very likely If general secondary particles, more even If pure π beam, ~ 0

Peasant and Dog Dog d has 50% probability of being 100 m. of Peasant p Peasant p has 50% probability of being within 100m of Dog d ? d p x River x =0 River x =1 km

Given that: a) Dog d has 50% probability of being 100 m. of Peasant, is it true that: b) Peasant p has 50% probability of being within 100m of Dog d ? Additional information Rivers at zero & 1 km. Peasant cannot cross them. Dog can swim across river - Statement a) still true If dog at –101 m, Peasant cannot be within 100m of dog Statement b) untrue

Neyman “confidence interval” avoids pdf for Classical Approach Neyman “confidence interval” avoids pdf for Uses only P( x; ) Confidence interval : P( contains t ) = True for any t Varying intervals from ensemble of experiments fixed Gives range of for which observed value was “likely” ( ) Contrast Bayes : Degree of belief = is in

Classical (Neyman) Confidence Intervals Uses only P(data|theory) μ≥0 No prior for μ

90% Classical interval for Gaussian σ = 1 μ ≥ 0 e.g. m2(νe), length of small object xobs=3 Two-sided range xobs=1 Upper limit xobs=-1 No region for µ Other methods have different behaviour at negative x

at 90% confidence Frequentist Bayesian and known, but random unknown, but fixed Probability statement about and Frequentist and known, and fixed unknown, and random Probability/credible statement about Bayesian

Frequentism: Specific example Particle decays exponentially: dn/dt = (1/τ) exp(-t/τ) Observe 1 decay at time t1: L(τ) = (1/τ) exp(-t1/τ) Construct 68% central interval t = .17τ dn/dt τ t t = 1.8τ t1 t 68% conf. int. for τ from t1 /1.8  t1 /0.17

Coverage Fraction of intervals containing true value Property of method, not of result Can vary with param Frequentist concept. Built in to Neyman construction Some Bayesians reject idea. Coverage not guaranteed Integer data (Poisson)  discontinuities Ideal coverage plot C μ

Coverage : L approach (Not Neyman construction) P(n,μ) = e-μμn/n! (Joel Heinrich CDF note 6438) -2 lnλ< 1 λ = P(n,μ)/P(n,μbest) UNDERCOVERS

Frequentist central intervals, NEVER undercovers (Conservative at both ends)

Feldman-Cousins Unified intervals Neyman construction, so NEVER undercovers

Classical Intervals Hard to understand e.g. d’Agostini e-mail Problems Hard to understand e.g. d’Agostini e-mail Arbitrary choice of interval Possibility of empty range Nuisance parameters (systematic errors) Widely applicable Well defined coverage Advantages

FELDMAN - COUSINS Wants to avoid empty classical intervals  Uses “L-ratio ordering principle” to resolve ambiguity about “which 90% region?”  [Neyman + Pearson say L-ratio is best for hypothesis testing] No ‘Flip-Flop’ problem

Xobs = -2 now gives upper limit

Flip-flop Black lines Classical 90% central interval Red dashed: Classical 90% upper limit

Poisson confidence intervals. Background = 3 Standard Frequentist Feldman - Cousins

Standard Frequentist Pros: Coverage Widely applicable Cons: Hard to understand Small or empty intervals Difficult in many variables (e.g. systematics) Needs ensemble

Bayesian Pros: Easy to understand Physical interval Cons: Needs prior Coverage not guaranteed Hard to combine

Bayesian versus Frequentism Bayesian Frequentist Basis of method Bayes Theorem  Posterior probability distribution Uses pdf for data, for fixed parameters Meaning of probability Degree of belief Frequentist definition Prob of parameters? Yes Anathema Needs prior? No Choice of interval? Yes (except F+C) Data considered Only data you have ….+ other possible data Likelihood principle?

Bayesian versus Frequentism Bayesian Frequentist Ensemble of experiment No Yes (but often not explicit) Final statement Posterior probability distribution Parameter values  Data is likely Unphysical/ empty ranges Excluded by prior Can occur Systematics Integrate over prior Extend dimensionality of frequentist construction Coverage Unimportant Built-in Decision making Yes (uses cost function) Not useful

Bayesianism versus Frequentism “Bayesians address the question everyone is interested in, by using assumptions no-one believes” “Frequentists use impeccable logic to deal with an issue of no interest to anyone”

Approach used at LHC Recommended to use both Frequentist and Bayesian approaches If agree, that’s good If disagree, see whether it is just because of different approaches