Modeling security 1
Models - encryption r Alice and Bob have the same key k r Alice and Bob exchange encrypted messages r Eve wants to get the plaintext. What can she do? r What can Eve do? r The model we studied: eavesdropping, known plaintext, chosen plaintext/ciphertext r Bad news for the attacker Any reasonable algorithm (e.g. AES) beats all of these The best current (2012) attack on AES in the model breaks it in time and more than 2 80 chosen ciphertexts. 2
New security goals r We “know” how to do confidentiality, integrity and authentication. r Is anything else even needed Hint: we need to work even with those we don’t completely trust r n-out-of n secret sharing r t-out-of n secret sharing 3
4 Administrative Details r Grade – 100% test r Office hours :Wednesday 13:00-14:00 r – r Tel r Bibliography: Security engineering / R. Anderson Foundations of Cryptography, I and II/ O. Goldreich
Principles for the attacker r The model is a simplification r Complexity is your friend r Find the weakest link r Know the system Model assumes that attacker has full knowledge. Real life is different. r Know the attacks 5
Know the system r An encryption system includes Users Physical environment Plaintext storage & plaintext input Encryption software / hardware (Almost always) – a larger hardware / software system such as a computer A key A communication channel r Any of these elements can be vulnerable r The model considers just the communication link and input to the encryption algorithm 6
Know the Attacks r On users Social attacks – bribe the user, threaten the user, swindle the user Outside our scope r Physical environment Input attacks: e.g. key loggers, a bug in the wall Outside our scope 7
More attacks r Device hardware Side channel attacks – e.g. timing Fault attacks – e.g. glitch Optical attacks Chemical attacks r Question: so many options, why isn’t this part of the model? r Answer: they all require physical proximity and that is considered impossible 8
An economic approach r An attacker’s potential utility Money, knowledge, ideology, vengeance r The risks Cost of an attack Probability of failure Risk of getting caught r Example – table of attacks on encryption system 9
What about the defense? r A breach / exploit / attack has costs r Defense has its own costs r Problems All attack avenues must be adequately blocked Attacker’s model: plans, capabilities, utility are imperfectly known r Principles Know the attacks and the defenses Layered defense Redundancy is good But, remember the utility! 10
Shocking example 11 Do you know what this is? Here’s a hint