Legislative oversight By Riccardo Pelizzo

Introduction-1 Parliaments or legislatures perform 3 basic functions: A representative function A legislative function An oversight function

Introduction-2 The purpose of this presentation is to discuss What can be scrutinized What tools can be used to perform the oversight function What conditions ensure that oversight function is performed effectively And why effective oversight matters

What can be scrutinized? Parliaments can oversee any area of government activity Every area of government activity can be overseen by a legislature Formal and political considerations may affect how the oversight function is performed—a point on which we shall later return Budget implementation, defence and foreign affairs are areas that are on average more likley to be overseen by the legislature There is however cross-country variation

Tools of legislative oversight-1 Parliaments have a variety of tools that they can use to perform the oversight function Questions (oral, written) Interpellations Hearings Motions (debate, censure) Oversight committees (such as PACs) Inquiry committees Missions Reports

Tools of legislative oversight-2 Questions can be oral or written They are generally submitted in writing Written questions are answered in wiritng and are not debated Oral questions are answered and debated during Question Time Questions can be asked by individual MPs They are the most common oversight tools They are not the most effective oversight tool

Tools of legislative oversight-3 Interpellations are less common but more powerful oversight tool than question 3 differences between questions and interpellations 1) interpellations cannot be asked by individual MPs 2) the question seeks information, the interpellation seeks an explanation/justificatino 3) may lead to government crisis in parliamentary systems and to a motion of censure in presidential systems

Tools of legislative oversight-4 motions for debate can be used to scrutinize the implementation of government policies and activities

Tools of legislative oversight-5 motions of censure are directed against individual government members, against the government as a whole or against the head of government. If successful they can have a whole range of consequences. In some presidential countries (Burundi) they are simply put on record while in others, such as (Liberia) they can lead to the dismissal of the head of government.

Tools of legislative oversight-6 Committees are crucial for oversight: Committee hearings are, along qwith questions, the most common and one of the most effective oversight tools Some (standing) committees such as PACs have only an oversight mandate Inquiry committees are set up for a limited amount of time to conduct an inquiry

Tools of legislative oversight-7 Missions are less common oversight tools In several countries (e.g., Benin, Burundi, Congo, Djibouti and Indonesia), fact-finding missions are carried out to gather the necessary information on the efficiency and the effectiveness of government policy implementation

Tools of legislative oversight-8 In several countries (e.g., Cyprus, Djibouti and South Korea), specific provisions compel the executive branch of the government to submit regular reports to the legislature about the implementation of its policies and programs. It is not uncommon for such reports to be the subject of a debate in the plenary.

Oversight capacity and effectiveness-1 The relationship between oversight capacity (number of tools) and effectiveness has been regarded either as direct or mediated It is direct for those who believe that effectiveness is a necessary and inevitable consequence of capacity For this group of scholars, capacity can be used as a proxy for effectiveness and measures of capacity can be used as indicators of effectiveness

Oversight capacty and effectiveness-2 Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) showed that oversight capacity – having more oversight tools-does not necessarily lead to more effective oversight

Oversight capacity and effectiveness-3 Scholars and practitioners have responded in 4 ways to this finding 1) some scholars and practitioners have devised new ways to measure capacity- Stapenhurst (2011) suggested that a proper measure of capacity should look beyond the number of tools and look at ‘external’ tools such as ACA, SAI and Mobuds and facilitating conditions (resources)

Oversight capacity and effectiveness-4 2) some scholars and practitioners have devised new ways of measuring the effectiveness of legislative overisght (Draman) 3) USAID conceived a new way of assessing the relationship between capacity and effectiveness 4) Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) suggested that we need to go beyond capacity owever measured and consider agency and political will

Oversight capacity and effectiveness-5 APPG (2008:7) observed that “training parliamentary clerks or improving IT equipment, for example, will not make the executive more accountable to parliament unless MPs and their parties have the political will to ask parliamentary questions, table amendments to legislation and challenge ministers to justify how they spend public money and how they run their ministries”.

Oversight capacity and effectiveness-6 The inability to effectively oversee the defence sector (Ebo and N’Diaye, 2008), keep governments accountable (APPG, 2008), examine the legislative proposals of the executive (Balde, 2009), amend government legislative proposals (Coulibaly, 2006) oversee budget implementation (Coulibaly, 2006) are all attributed on the absence of political will.

Oversight capacity and effectiveness-7 Instead of expanding capacity is more important to ensure that the existing capacity is put to good use International organizations should adjust/modify their startegy accordingly

Oversight capacity and effectiveness-8 The literature on political will (Kpundeh and Didinio, 2006) proposed four strategies for promoting political will. 1) explaining to MPs why oversight is important, 2)explaining to voters why it is important, 3) securing international support for overseers 4) introducing proper institutional reforms

Oversight capacity and effectiveness-9 Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2012) suggested that the promotion of a popular demand for oversight was the most important of the four strategies identified by Kpundeh and Didinio (2006)

The dividends of effective oversight When legislatures effectively perform their oversight function, they keep governments accountable The effective perfomance of the oversight function is highly beneficial Oversight effectiveness is strongly related to political stability, to the ability to control corruption, to the level/quality of democracy and with the legitimacy of the democratic regime

The dividends of effective oversight

Conclusions Legislative oversight is good in itself and for the benefits it generates if adequately performed This evidence should be used to create and sustain a demand for effective oversight