If the action in the preceding question commences instead in the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, and Demosthenes moves to dismiss pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2), the court will most likely

A.grant the motion because under the Erie doctrine the district court must follow the decision that a New Mexico court would be most likely to make.

B.deny the motion because under the Erie doctrine the federal district courts apply the jurisdictional basis rules of the state with the most significant contacts with the subject of the litigation, and that in this case, since plaintiff resides in Arizona and the subject property is in Arizona, Arizona’s jurisdictional statute, which goes to the constitutional limits, controls.

C.deny the motion because under the Erie doctrine the district court must follow the decision that a New Mexico court would be most likely to make, and Demosthenes is a New Mexico domiciliary and therefore subject to personal jurisdiction.

D.deny the motion because under the Erie doctrine questions of in personam jurisdiction are regarded as procedural and the federal court therefore need not follow the rules of the state in which it sits.

Dalrymple owns a four-acre tract of undeveloped land in northern New York. Dalrymple lives in Utah and has never been to New York. He inherited the land some years ago from a relative whom he had never met, and has paid no attention to his inheritance other than to pay the real property taxes timely. In late November, 2015, a hunter crossing Dalrymple’s land suffered injury and now sues Dalrymple seeking $100,000, alleging the presence of a hidden, dangerous condition that Dalrymple should have either remedied or warned people about. The action is in the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. Dalrymple’s counsel timely files a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). The court most likely will

A.grant the motion because Dalrymple has no minimum contacts with New York.

B.grant the motion because Dalrymple has performed no tortious act either in or out of New York and has transacted no business in New York.

C.deny the motion because this action is in federal court and Dalrymple is a resident of the United States, within the jurisdiction of the court.

D.deny the motion because the action arises from the in- state real property of which Dalrymple is the owner.

Peter has the same type of contract claim against Douglas as Paul has against Daniel. Peter sues Douglas and, in a separate action based on a separate contract, Paul sues Daniel. Both cases are pending in the same state court system. The two cases are virtually indistinguishable on their facts, and the pivotal issue of law in each is whether there is a valid contract under the state statute of frauds. Peter wins a judgment on the merits. Paul wishes to use that judgment to help him win his case. Paul may properly argue that the court in his case should reach the same result on the critical issue as did the court in Peter v. Douglas by invoking

A.offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel.

B.defensive nonmutual collateral estoppel.

C.stare decisis.

D.full faith and credit.

P, a citizen of North Dakota, sues D, a United States citizen permanently residing in Bermuda, on two causes of action in a federal court. The first cause of action is for breach of contract, and P claims $75,000 damages. The second cause of action is for defamation, and P claims $10,000 damages. Upon D’s timely motion to dismiss, the court should

A.grant the motion because P has failed to meet the amount- in-controversy requirement. The amount demanded must exceed $75,000, and P may not aggregate several claims in order to fulfill this requirement.

B.grant the motion because the parties do not satisfy the jurisdictional diversity requirement.

C.deny the motion because P and D are not citizens of the same state, and a plaintiff may aggregate claims asserted against a single defendant for purposes of satisfying the amount-in- controversy requirement.

D.deny the motion because otherwise P will have to sue D in Bermuda, and the Constitution prohibits depriving a citizen of any United States forum.

P sues D (both being United States citizens) in a federal court in the state in which both permanently reside. The cause of action is breach of contract. As a part of the complaint, P alleges that D will defend on the ground that a federal statute entitles D not to perform the contract in which the parties find themselves. P further alleges that the same federal statute contains exception language that removes D’s entitlement not to perform. There are no other issues separating the parties. P seeks $100,000 damages. D files an answer denying liability for the breach and, as P predicted, relying upon the federal statute. Upon D’s subsequent motion to dismiss the action, the court should

A.deny the motion because resolution of the controversy will turn on the federal statute’s application to the case, making the federal question outcome- determinative and making the case a federal question case within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

B.deny the motion because D waived any objection he may have had to jurisdiction when he filed his answer relying upon federal law without first moving to dismiss.

C.grant the motion on the ground that even if this is a federal question case, the parties’ common residence precludes the case from being heard in the federal courts unless federal law actually creates the cause of action upon which the plaintiff hopes to recover.

D.grant the motion on the ground that although federal law may determine whether the plaintiff wins, the case does not arise under federal law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Plaintiff, a citizen of California, sues Defendant, a citizen of Colorado, to recover for injuries arising out of a traffic accident on December 13, 2015, in Denver, Colorado, when Defendant was driving Plaintiff to a football game between the Denver Broncos and the Oakland Raiders. Plaintiff was severely injured. Plaintiff and Defendant, long-time friends (at least until the accident), root vigorously for the teams from their respective states. Plaintiff commences the action in a California trial court, having had Defendant served with a summons and complaint during Christmas dinner at Plaintiff’s house. Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s families have spent Christmas together for twenty-five years, alternating sites between Plaintiff’s and Defendant’s homes. This year was Plaintiff’s turn. If Defendant removes the action to the federal court, and Plaintiff moves to remand, the court should

A.grant the motion only if Plaintiff’s injuries were not severe enough in the eyes of the court to warrant a recovery of more than $75,000.

B.grant the motion because Plaintiff is entitled to his choice of forum unless there is a federal question involved.

C.deny the motion on the ground that the parties are diverse and that pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c), Plaintiff may recover in excess of $75,000, so one cannot say as a matter of law that the case fails to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement.

D.deny the motion if California provides no jury trial for automobile negligence cases, on the ground that to force Defendant to trial in such a forum would deny Defendant’s Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.

Assume that the federal court, whether rightly or wrongly, denies plaintiff’s motion to remand. Assume also that Colorado has a guest statute that precludes recovery by a non-paying passenger for the driver’s ordinary (not gross, willful or wanton) negligence. California has no comparable statute. If the parties stipulate that Plaintiff gave no compensation for the ill-fated trip and that the Defendant’s negligence, if any there was, did not rise to the level of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, then on Defendant’s motion for summary judgment the court should

A.grant the motion because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. The Colorado guest statute applies because Defendant is from Colorado, which ensures as a matter of law that Plaintiff cannot recover in excess of $75,000.

B.grant the motion if the California courts would have applied the Colorado guest statute.

C.deny the motion on the ground that the case is pending in a California federal court, and the Erie doctrine requires the court to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits. The absence of a guest statute in California makes summary judgment inappropriate.

D.deny the motion on the ground that the case began in the California state court, so the Tenth Amendment compels the federal court to apply the law of California.

Assuming still that defendant properly removed to federal court and that the federal court properly denied Plaintiff’s motion to remand, if Defendant now moves to dismiss the action on the ground that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege the existence of subject matter jurisdiction, the court should

A. grant the motion on the ground that the complaint fails to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).

B.grant the motion only if California law requires that plaintiffs plead subject- matter jurisdiction, on the ground that the Erie doctrine requires the federal court to apply the law of the state in which it sits.

C.deny the motion on the ground that it would deny due process to Plaintiff to remove his validly drafted complaint from the state court and then dismiss it for not complying with federal requirements that did not apply when Plaintiff drafted, served, and filed his complaint.

D.deny the motion on the ground that the burden to establish jurisdiction rests on the party invoking federal jurisdiction, making it unnecessary for Plaintiff to have pleaded jurisdiction.