Effectiveness of risk management process towards error reduction in the laboratory at Sakra World Hospital AUTHORS: Dr. Shabnam Roohi Mr. Deepak Agarkhed.

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Presentation transcript:

Effectiveness of risk management process towards error reduction in the laboratory at Sakra World Hospital AUTHORS: Dr. Shabnam Roohi Mr. Deepak Agarkhed

Introduction 60–70% of the most important clinical decisions are based on laboratory test results. The risk of inappropriate patient care due to laboratory errors ranges from 6.4% to 30%. Introduction of risk management strategies in the form of failure mode effect analysis (FMEA) into the laboratory arena should allow us to identify the risk of errors and to reduce the errors that are more likely to affect patient outcomes.

Failure Mode and effects analysis ( FMEA) A systematic way of examining a design prospectively for possible ways in which failure can occur. It assumes that no matter how knowledgeable or careful people are, errors will occur in some situations and may even be likely to occur. Source:JCI :5 th edition

Target The FMEA target is to measure the risk probability of any possible failure or nonconformity (NC), by an index, called risk priority number (RPN) that is the product of: The ‘‘Effect severity (S)” from 1 to 4 The ‘‘Failure occurrence (O)”, from 1 to 5 The ‘‘Failure detection (D)’’ from 1 to 4. The RPN can go from a minimum of 1 (1 X 1 X 1) to a maximum of 80 (4 X 5 X 4) as per the risk quantification scoring adopted by us.

Risk quantification Effect severity (S) ScoreSeverity description 4Catastrophic 3Critical 2Moderate 1Minor Failure occurrence (O) ScoreOccurrence characteristicsDescription of occurrence probability 5ContinuousDaily 4FrequentWeekly 3OccasionalMonthly 2UncommonIt may occur within 1 to 6 weeks 1RemoteIt may occur annually Failure detection (D) ScoreDescription of detection mechanisms 4The existing mechanisms will not identify 3Controls are partial 2Current controls would detect immediate failures, but they are not fail-safe 1Certain of detecting the failure before affecting the patient

Objectives of the Study To identify the potential errors that may occur in the laboratory. To establish the impact of the various errors on patient test results To prioritize the high impact errors and take appropriate corrective actions To analyse the effectiveness of the corrective actions taken in reducing the errors Implement modifications to laboratory procedures as appropriate.

Materials and methods The laboratory process mapping into preanalytical, analytical and post analytical. Data collection: Direct observation Incident/ NC reports. All potential risks listed out in FMEA form. Brainstorming sessions with the stake holders for allotment of RPN score before starting the study and after implementation of corrective actions taken.

Materials and methods The potential risks with an RPN of more than 30 were identified for risk mitigation. The risk quantification was again performed 6 months after implementation of corrective measures. The difference in the RPN score before and after each corrective action was implemented was considered for determining the effectiveness of the corrective actions taken.

Process mapping Pre analytical Step 1: Accommodation and safety Step 2: Equipment, reagents and consumables Sub process 1: Indenting of supplies. Sub process 2: Ordering of supplies. Sub process 3: Receiving supplies. Sub process 4: Storage of supplies Step 3: Sample collection Step 4: Sample transport Analytical Step 1: Quality assurance Sub process 1,2,3 … Step 2: Analysis Sub process 1,2,3…. Post analytical Step 1: Result transfer Sub process 1,2,3,… Step 2: Report generation Sub process 1: result checking Sub process 2: result calculation Sub process 3: result transcription Step 3: Report release Sub process 1: critical result information Sub process 2….

FMEA Form RPN = S X O X D 10

Results 80 potential risks were identified. 10 areas with RPN score of more than 30 were identified and appropriate corrective actions were implemented. The repeat risk quantification for the identified risks revealed a reduction in the RPN scores by 20% to 90%.

Process stepFAILURE MODE SEVERIT Y OCCURAN CE DETECTIO NRPNEFFECTACTION Pre analytical- step 2 Delay in receiving consumables from main store35460 Delay in treatment due to non availability of diagnostic reports in time. SOP for receipt of items changed and implemented. Pre analytical: Step 3 Test not billed on current date25440 Delay in treatment. Inconvenience to patients One month previous date to be selected for viewing of results in HIS Pre analytical: Step 2 Reagent not available34336 Delay in treatment due to non availability of diagnostic reports in time. Buffer stock and reorder level (ROL) for a reagents ad consumables defined. Pre analytical: Step 4 Delay in transport from accession to lab35230 Loss of stability of specimen leading to repeat collection.Training. Initial risk quantification and proposed action

PROCESS STEPFAILURE MODE SEVERI TY OCCURA NCE DETECTI ONRPNEFFECTACTION Post analytical: Step 3 Critical report not informed44348 Delay in treatment leading to loss of life. Improve detection control by strict monitoring and audit of all critical results. Post analytical Step 2 Results not seen on bulk verification screen35345 Delay in treatment. Inconvenience to patients Modification done in the LIS Post analytical: Step 2Calculation error34336 Inappropriate treatment if not detected or Delay in treatment if detected. Calculated parameters interfaced Post analytical: Step 2 Transcription error34336 Inappropriate treatment if not detected or Delay in treatment if detected. Automated tests interfaced. Pre typed but editable templates inserted into the result entry screen of LIS. Initial risk quantification and proposed action

PROCESS STEPFAILURE MODE SEVERI TY OCCURA NCE DETECTI ONRPNEFFECTACTION Post analytical: Step 2 Abnormal results not delta checked34336 Inappropriate treatment if not detected or Delay in treatment if detected Delta check to be incorporated into the LIS Pre analytical: Step 1Aerosol35230Injury to the personnel. Training and use of PPE Initial risk quantification and proposed action

Post implementation Table 2 EFFECT OF IMPROVEMENT ACTION ON RPN FAILURE MODEBEFOREAFTER% IMPROVEMENTOBSERVATION Delay in receiving store60690 Change in the process brought down the frequency and improved detection, but severity remained the same. Critical report not informed Change in the detection protocol brought down the frequency, but severity remained the same. Results not seen on bulk verification screen 45687Correction in HIS, frequency brought down. Test not billed on current date Change in the detection protocol brought down the frequency, but severity remained the same. Reagent not available Change in the process & detection protocol brought down the frequency, but severity remained the same.

Table 2 EFFECT OF IMPROVEMENT ACTION ON RPN FAILURE MODEBEFOREAFTER% IMPROVEMENTOBSERVATION Calculation error36683Automation of the process reduced frequency Transcription error36683Automation of the process reduced frequency Abnormal results not delta checked Change in the detection protocol brought down the frequency, but severity remained the same. Delay in transport from accession to lab Change in the detection protocol brought down the frequency, but severity remained the same. Aerosol Change in the detection protocol brought down the frequency, but severity remained the same. Post implementation

Discussion FMEA as a preventive technique well known in some areas of healthcare but at a nascent stage in the laboratory. We encountered a few difficulties during the implementation of FMEA related to: The time and manpower consumption for detailed analysis of the processes and data. The difficulty in getting all stakeholders in a single platform for brainstorming.

Conclusion The improvement potentially obtainable by FMEA in a clinical laboratory is high, and this fact should suggest further experiences in this field.