doc.: IEEE /1147r1 Submission November 2009 David Halasz, AclaraSlide 1 Path Protection Date: Authors:

doc.: IEEE /1147r1 Submission November 2009 David Halasz, AclaraSlide 2 Abstract The path selection protocol has similar security concerns of path messages in AODV. Since the path selection messages use Multihop Action frames, the Multihop Action frames should be protected with IEEE w mechanisms. This will protect path messages on a link- to-link basis and not end-to-end. As of s draft 3.04, this presentation has already been addressed with the exception of updating the PICS.

doc.: IEEE /1147r1 Submission From RFC3561 – AODV 11 Security Considerations “… Route protocols, however, are prime targets for impersonation attacks. … … However, when the network membership is known and there is a danger of such attacks, AODV control messages must be protected by use of authentication techniques, such as those involving generation of unforgeable and cryptographically strong message digests or digital signatures. …” November 2009 David Halasz, AclaraSlide 3

doc.: IEEE /1147r1 Submission Areas that need attention from IEEE Clause CTR with CBC-MAC Protocol (CCMP) –Propose no change to CCMP. Mesh control field will be encrypted. November 2009 David Halasz, AclaraSlide 4

doc.: IEEE /1147r1 Submission Areas that need attention from IEEE w Clause The Broadcast/Multicast Integrity Protocol –CCMP issue doesn’t apply since not encrypting payload. Clause Action field –Add “Robust” column to s draft table 7-24 Already modified on D3.04 November 2009 David Halasz, AclaraSlide 5

doc.: IEEE /1147r1 Submission Areas that need attention from IEEE s draft PICS –If Mesh and SAE then must protect the management frames November 2009 David Halasz, AclaraSlide 6

doc.: IEEE /1147r1 Submission References [1] Perkins, C., Royer, E. and S. Das, " Ad hoc On- Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing", RFC 3561, July November 2009 David Halasz, AclaraSlide 7