APNIC DNSSEC deployment considerations APNIC 23, Bali George Michaelson R&D Officer APNIC.

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Presentation transcript:

APNIC DNSSEC deployment considerations APNIC 23, Bali George Michaelson R&D Officer APNIC

Overview DNSSEC benefits What we have done What needs to be done? What does APNIC need to do? Let’s set some DNSSEC goals!

DNSSEC benefits Trustable DNS lookup –Forward and reverse Signed delegations –Positive and negative confirmations Some additional protections against phishing and related attacks on the DNS

What has been done Extensive testing of DNSSEC –For resolving parties –For domain managers Systems provisioning on some APNIC name servers Initial design discussions –Systems capacity planning –DNS management system

What needs to be done? Motivations: time to take a position! Address resolver-side issues Address server-side issues Deployment planning

Motivations DNSSEC standards now 10+ years in the making – No clear driver from APNIC community APNIC to research requirements and promote DNSSEC –Implement support in deployed servers –Update APNIC RMS to handle DNSSEC delegations –Join RIPE NCC in deploying DNSSEC in reverse-DNS

Resolver-side issues No date for signed root –Would have to distribute out of band, as RIPE NCC do 512 byte packet filtering considerations –Resolver, firewall upgrades –This is not only a problem for DNS APNIC services must work regardless of DNSSEC –Wish to avoid 'fate sharing' problems DNSSEC outage affecting APNIC services -(we provision other peoples DNS) Need cleaner functional separation of servers -Much of this already done APNIC no different to any DNS consumer

Server-side issues RIPE NCC deployment in in-addr.arpa –Revealed problems with APNIC secondary Lack of CPU, memory Software configuration issues Now resolved with new hardware and software Some increases in network traffic Key management problem –Managed rollovers, distribution No insurmountable problems –APNIC ready to deploy DNSSEC enabled servers in 2007 (in planning)

APNIC resource management changes APNIC needs a way to get “DS” info –The APNIC zone production process has to create a signed state over the collected DS of all sub-zones it delegates to –...and generate the NSEC records to cover the ‘gaps’ in signing Design work needed for APNIC resource management system –Should aim to include DS support in 2008

Issues: shared zones Mechanisms for managing DNSSEC in shared zones –APNIC sub-zone shares with NIR Solved in APNIC RMS work –Inter-RIR shared zones (ERX) Requires inter-RIR changes -NRO engineering coordination group would need to coordinate

What does APNIC need to do? Upgrade deployed name servers –Done. Will be ready in 2007 Upgrade RMS –DS support –Zone signing in DNS zone production engine Requires spec work, can be ready 2008 Progress shared zone issues –Discuss with key stakeholders (NIR/RIR) May not be fully resolved in 2008

Lets set some DNSSEC goals! APNIC DNSSEC 'ready' in 2008 Full support in RMS, zone production OOB TA distribution until root signed APNIC DNSSEC promoting 2007/8 Ongoing experiments, measurements and testing Training/documentation S/W & systems development Active promotion of DNSSEC - support/assist signed root planning Full DNNSEC in reverse-DNS in 2008 –Inter RIR, inter NIR. Requires coordination

Goals for 2007 Systems deployment (already planned) Server upgrades, software upgrades in progress NRO & NIR coordination –Focus on shared zone improvements –Plan for DS support in 2008 Present detailed plan at APNIC 24 –For deployment in 2008

Discussion