UI – ITS MANY AVATARS!. UNSCHEDULE INTERCHANGE It's more than what meets the eye!!!!

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Presentation transcript:

UI – ITS MANY AVATARS!

UNSCHEDULE INTERCHANGE It's more than what meets the eye!!!!

WHAT’S OUR OBJECTIVE? ECONOMIC OPERATION OF THE GRID ECONOMIC OPERATION OF THE GRID PROMOTE TRADE PROMOTE TRADE STABILITY OF THE GRID STABILITY OF THE GRID ROBUST SETTLEMENT SYSTEM ROBUST SETTLEMENT SYSTEM COMMERCIAL MECHANISM WHICH COMPLEMENTS SECURITY COMMERCIAL MECHANISM WHICH COMPLEMENTS SECURITY SEAMLESS CHANGE PROCESS SEAMLESS CHANGE PROCESS FREEDOM FREEDOM

LET’S SEE HOW THE UI MECHANISM OF ABT TAKES ON MANY AVATARS The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing …… —Greek poet Archilochus

THE MANY AVATARS PROMOTING TRADE PROMOTING TRADE COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT OPEN ACCESS OPEN ACCESS BALANCING/SPOT MARKET BALANCING/SPOT MARKET ROBUST SETTLEMENT MECHANISM ROBUST SETTLEMENT MECHANISM NASH EQUILIBRIUM NASH EQUILIBRIUM ULTIMATE OPTIMISER ULTIMATE OPTIMISER OPEN AND FAIR MARKET PLACE OPEN AND FAIR MARKET PLACE WIN-WIN PLATFORM WIN-WIN PLATFORM

IT’S SIMPLICITY ITSELF! INEXPENSIVE TO IMPLEMENT INEXPENSIVE TO IMPLEMENT MINIMUM LOGISTICS MINIMUM LOGISTICS METERING IN PLACE IN MOST PLACES METERING IN PLACE IN MOST PLACES PRICE SIGNAL AVAILABLE AT ANY POWER OUTLET ! PRICE SIGNAL AVAILABLE AT ANY POWER OUTLET ! EASY SETTLEMENT EASY SETTLEMENT EASE OF REGULATION EASE OF REGULATION EASY TO UNDERSTAND AND IMPLEMENT EASY TO UNDERSTAND AND IMPLEMENT

THE PROBLEMS EARLIER…. ERRATIC FREQUENCY ERRATIC FREQUENCY LOW VOLTAGES LOW VOLTAGES FREQUENT DISTURBANCES FREQUENT DISTURBANCES OVER/UNDER DRAWALS CAUSING CONSTRAINTS OVER/UNDER DRAWALS CAUSING CONSTRAINTS INDISCIPLINED SYSTEM OPERATION INDISCIPLINED SYSTEM OPERATION ARCHAIC SETTLEMENT SYSTEM ARCHAIC SETTLEMENT SYSTEM FREQ

THE AVATARS OF UI TRADITIONAL TRADITIONAL SETTLEMENT OF DEVIATIONS SETTLEMENT OF DEVIATIONS GRID DISCIPLINE GRID DISCIPLINE PRICE/OPTIMISATION VECTOR PRICE/OPTIMISATION VECTOR SPOT MARKET SPOT MARKET BALANCING MARKET BALANCING MARKET MERIT ORDER OPERATION MERIT ORDER OPERATION REGULATION REGULATION EASY TO REGULATE EASY TO REGULATE SINGLE VECTOR SINGLE VECTOR ACCOUNTABILITY OF ALL STAKEHOLDERS ACCOUNTABILITY OF ALL STAKEHOLDERS ‘RIGGING’ PROOF ‘RIGGING’ PROOF SEAMLESS CHANGE PROCESS SEAMLESS CHANGE PROCESS

THE AVATARS OF UI SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK SETTLEMENT FRAMEWORK PUMPED STORAGE PUMPED STORAGE MERCHANT GENERATOR MERCHANT GENERATOR CAPTIVE POWER PLANT CAPTIVE POWER PLANT DISCOMS DISCOMS ARBITRAGE ARBITRAGE CATALYST FOR COALITION CATALYST FOR COALITION CO-OPERATION THROUGH NON-CO-OPERATION CO-OPERATION THROUGH NON-CO-OPERATION SELF HEALING MECHANISM’ SELF HEALING MECHANISM’ TRANSPARENCY TRANSPARENCY IMPOSSIBLE TO RIG PRICES IMPOSSIBLE TO RIG PRICES NEUTRALITY NEUTRALITY PSEUDO COMPETITOR PSEUDO COMPETITOR PAYMENT SECURITY THROUGH THE POOL PAYMENT SECURITY THROUGH THE POOL FREEDOM OF CHOICE FREEDOM OF CHOICE ELIMINATES ELABORATE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS ELIMINATES ELABORATE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS

FREQ COMPARISION 3 YEARS HISTOGRAM OF FREQ SCROLL DMD VS FREQ

THE BASIC PREMISE OF UI HELPING THE GRID GETS REWARDED, HURTING THE GRID IS PENALISED UI Mechanism presumes constraint-less transmission system and ignores the losses. UI Mechanism presumes constraint-less transmission system and ignores the losses. UI market of a few crores regulates a market more than 100 times its size. UI market of a few crores regulates a market more than 100 times its size.

QUESTIONS CAN IT BE OPTIMISED FURTHER? CAN IT BE OPTIMISED FURTHER? WHAT IS THE FREQUENCY BAND WE WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN? WHAT IS THE FREQUENCY BAND WE WOULD LIKE TO MAINTAIN? WILL THE NEW VECTOR STILL PRESERVE THE STRONG EQUILIBRIUM? WILL THE NEW VECTOR STILL PRESERVE THE STRONG EQUILIBRIUM? IS IT KEEPING PACE WITH MARKET MATURITY? IS IT KEEPING PACE WITH MARKET MATURITY? DOES IT ENCOURAGE NEW INVESTMENT? DOES IT ENCOURAGE NEW INVESTMENT? DOES IT PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY TO THE SYSTEM OPERATOR ? DOES IT PROVIDE FLEXIBILITY TO THE SYSTEM OPERATOR ? COULD IT CAUSE FURTHER ECONOMY IN REAL TIME OPERATION ? COULD IT CAUSE FURTHER ECONOMY IN REAL TIME OPERATION ? SHOULD IT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE SAME FOR ALL THE REGION (GENERATION COST AND LOAD AND SEASONS ARE DIFFERENT) ? SHOULD IT NECESSARILY HAVE TO BE SAME FOR ALL THE REGION (GENERATION COST AND LOAD AND SEASONS ARE DIFFERENT) ? UI ACTS AS REFERENCE FOR THE PRICE OF BILATERAL TRADE – IS THAT GOOD? UI ACTS AS REFERENCE FOR THE PRICE OF BILATERAL TRADE – IS THAT GOOD? IS THE UI PRICE TOO HIGH OR TOO LOW ? IS THE UI PRICE TOO HIGH OR TOO LOW ? DOES IT ENCOURAGE OR DOES IT HINDER TRADE? DOES IT ENCOURAGE OR DOES IT HINDER TRADE?

UI : REFINEMENTS CHANGE THE SLOPE CHANGE THE SLOPE CHANGE THE FREQUENCY RANGE CHANGE THE FREQUENCY RANGE DIFFERENT CURVES FOR BUY/SELL DIFFERENT CURVES FOR BUY/SELL DIFFERENT CURVES FOR DIFFERENT SEASON DIFFERENT CURVES FOR DIFFERENT SEASON MULTI SLOPE/ KINKS MULTI SLOPE/ KINKS TIME-OF-DAY ELEMENT TIME-OF-DAY ELEMENT

CHANGING THE SLOPE FREQUENCY WOULD BE IN A TIGHTER RANGE (49.6 TO 50 HZ.) FREQUENCY WOULD BE IN A TIGHTER RANGE (49.6 TO 50 HZ.) WOULD HELP FGMO - AS UNITS ON BARS ON FGMO WOULD FACE LESS VARIATIONS. WOULD HELP FGMO - AS UNITS ON BARS ON FGMO WOULD FACE LESS VARIATIONS. SCOPE FOR COSTLIER UNITS TO GET DESPATCHED SCOPE FOR COSTLIER UNITS TO GET DESPATCHED ARBITRAGE WOULD BECOME DIFFICULT AS PRICE CHANGES WOULD BE RAPID. ARBITRAGE WOULD BECOME DIFFICULT AS PRICE CHANGES WOULD BE RAPID.

CHANGE THE FREQUENCY RANGE DURING PEAK MONTHS, THE SR FREQUENCY LIES BETWEEN 49.6 HZ. TO 49.0 HZ. MOST OF THE TIME. SQUEEZING THE FREQUENCY RANGE FROM 49.0 HZ. TO 50.5 HZ. TO 49.5 HZ. TO 50.3 HZ. RANGE WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPACT: DURING PEAK MONTHS, THE SR FREQUENCY LIES BETWEEN 49.6 HZ. TO 49.0 HZ. MOST OF THE TIME. SQUEEZING THE FREQUENCY RANGE FROM 49.0 HZ. TO 50.5 HZ. TO 49.5 HZ. TO 50.3 HZ. RANGE WOULD HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMPACT: FREQUENCY VARIATIONS WOULD COME DOWN – GOOD FOR FGMO FREQUENCY VARIATIONS WOULD COME DOWN – GOOD FOR FGMO EFFECTIVELY CHANGING SLOPE EFFECTIVELY CHANGING SLOPE

MULTIPLE SLOPE PROVIDE ‘KNEE POINT’ WHERE FREQUENCY WOULD PROBABLY CONCENTRATE FOR MOST PERIODS PROVIDE ‘KNEE POINT’ WHERE FREQUENCY WOULD PROBABLY CONCENTRATE FOR MOST PERIODS KNEE POINT CAN BE DECIDED BASED ON GENERATION MIX, SEASONAL PATTERNS KNEE POINT CAN BE DECIDED BASED ON GENERATION MIX, SEASONAL PATTERNS CAN BE USED TO ‘FOCUS’ ON INTER- REGIONAL TRADING – PROMOTE ‘GLOBAL ECONOMY’ CAN BE USED TO ‘FOCUS’ ON INTER- REGIONAL TRADING – PROMOTE ‘GLOBAL ECONOMY’ CONCEPT OF SOFT AND HARD RANGE MECHANISM CONCEPT OF SOFT AND HARD RANGE MECHANISM

DIFFERENT CURVES FOR BUYING AND SELLING TO INSULATE THE TRANSCO FROM LOSSES AND OTHER CHARGES TO INSULATE THE TRANSCO FROM LOSSES AND OTHER CHARGES MAKE THE PROCEDURE SIMPLER MAKE THE PROCEDURE SIMPLER NO POST-FACTO CALCULATION:LOSS IS IN- BUILT NO POST-FACTO CALCULATION:LOSS IS IN- BUILT BOTH CURVES CAN BE OFF-SET BY A SMALL AMOUNT, SAY PS. BOTH CURVES CAN BE OFF-SET BY A SMALL AMOUNT, SAY PS. ENABLE CPPS TO OPERATE SEAMLESSLY. ENABLE CPPS TO OPERATE SEAMLESSLY. PROVIDES FOR LOSSES – REDUCE POSSIBILITY OF GAMING (CFD-CONTRACT FOR DIFFERENCE) PROVIDES FOR LOSSES – REDUCE POSSIBILITY OF GAMING (CFD-CONTRACT FOR DIFFERENCE) MECHANISM EXISTS TO TAKE CARE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PAYABLES- RECEIVABLES MECHANISM EXISTS TO TAKE CARE OF DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PAYABLES- RECEIVABLES

SEASONAL UI CURVES TWO PREDOMINANT SEASONS : RAINY SEASON (JUNE-SEPT.) AND PEAK (OCT. – MAY) TWO PREDOMINANT SEASONS : RAINY SEASON (JUNE-SEPT.) AND PEAK (OCT. – MAY) GENERATION MIX SHOULD BE DIFFERENT FOR BOTH THESE SEASONS TO ENABLE OPTIMUM USE OF RUN-OF- THE-RIVER AND SHALLOW STORAGE PLANTS GENERATION MIX SHOULD BE DIFFERENT FOR BOTH THESE SEASONS TO ENABLE OPTIMUM USE OF RUN-OF- THE-RIVER AND SHALLOW STORAGE PLANTS PRICE SIGNAL SHOULD REFLECT THIS PRICE SIGNAL SHOULD REFLECT THIS

3D UI CURVE ‘TIME-OF-THE-DAY’ ELEMENT IS INTRODUCED ‘TIME-OF-THE-DAY’ ELEMENT IS INTRODUCED TOD, TFOD,FTOD,FODUI TOD, TFOD,FTOD,FODUI OVER/UNDER DRAWAL AT DIFFERENT TIME OF THE DAY IS CHARGED DIFFERENTLY OVER/UNDER DRAWAL AT DIFFERENT TIME OF THE DAY IS CHARGED DIFFERENTLY SCOPE FOR MORE REALISTIC DISPATCH SCOPE FOR MORE REALISTIC DISPATCH WOULD WORK IN NARROW FREQUENCY BAND WOULD WORK IN NARROW FREQUENCY BAND HELPS IN UNIT COMMITMENT HELPS IN UNIT COMMITMENT BRINGS MORE CERTAINTY TO UI PRICE BRINGS MORE CERTAINTY TO UI PRICE WOULD HELP IN FGMO50.5 WOULD HELP IN FGMO50.5 RETAINS ALL GOOD FEATURES OF EXISTING UI RATE RETAINS ALL GOOD FEATURES OF EXISTING UI RATE

3 D UI OF THE FUTURE? UI RATE

GAME THEORY CONCEPTS MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE. MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS FOR INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PEOPLE. THESE INTERACTIONS ARE CALLED GAMES. THESE INTERACTIONS ARE CALLED GAMES. GAMES ARE PLAYED BY RATIONAL PEOPLE. GAMES ARE PLAYED BY RATIONAL PEOPLE. RATIONAL PLAYERS IN A GAME LOOK TO MAXIMISING THEIR INDIVIDUAL PAY-OFF’s. RATIONAL PLAYERS IN A GAME LOOK TO MAXIMISING THEIR INDIVIDUAL PAY-OFF’s. AN EQUILIBRIUM POINT IS REACHED WHEN ANY PLAYER CANNOT INCREASE HIS PAYOFF UNILATERALLY. AN EQUILIBRIUM POINT IS REACHED WHEN ANY PLAYER CANNOT INCREASE HIS PAYOFF UNILATERALLY. THIS IS REFFERED TO AS A ‘NASH’ EQUILIBRIUM AFTER ITS PROPONENT JOHN NASH. THIS IS REFFERED TO AS A ‘NASH’ EQUILIBRIUM AFTER ITS PROPONENT JOHN NASH. SOME OF THE TYPES OF GAMES ARE SOME OF THE TYPES OF GAMES ARE ZERO SUM GAME ZERO SUM GAME CO-OPERATIVE/NON CO-OPERATIVE GAMES CO-OPERATIVE/NON CO-OPERATIVE GAMES REPETITIVE GAMES REPETITIVE GAMES GAME THEORY CONCEPTS ARE USED TO MODEL HUMAN BEHAVIOUR/STRATEGIES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET GAME THEORY CONCEPTS ARE USED TO MODEL HUMAN BEHAVIOUR/STRATEGIES IN A COMPETITIVE MARKET THESE CONCEPTS CAN FIND PARALLELS IN THE UI MARKETPLACE THESE CONCEPTS CAN FIND PARALLELS IN THE UI MARKETPLACE

GAME THORY AND UI ZERO SUM GAME :- Σ OF EVERY PLAYERS UI IS ZERO ZERO SUM GAME :- Σ OF EVERY PLAYERS UI IS ZERO REPETITIVE GAME :- PLAYED EVERY 15 MTS (ONE TIME BLOCK OF ABT) REPETITIVE GAME :- PLAYED EVERY 15 MTS (ONE TIME BLOCK OF ABT) NON-CO-OPERATIVE GAME :- EVERY PLAYER LOOKS TO MAXIMISING PAYOFF – ‘…. ITS’ HUMAN TO WANT MORE….!!!’ NON-CO-OPERATIVE GAME :- EVERY PLAYER LOOKS TO MAXIMISING PAYOFF – ‘…. ITS’ HUMAN TO WANT MORE….!!!’ EQUILIBRIA IS REACHED BETWEEN 49 AND 50.5 HZ- STEADY STATE FREQUENCY EQUILIBRIA IS REACHED BETWEEN 49 AND 50.5 HZ- STEADY STATE FREQUENCY MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN THE RANGE MULTIPLE EQUILIBRIUM POINTS IN THE RANGE THIS EXPLAINS WHY AN UI MARKET OF A FEW CRORES REGULATES A MARKET MORE THAN A THOUSAND TIMES ITS SIZE! THIS EXPLAINS WHY AN UI MARKET OF A FEW CRORES REGULATES A MARKET MORE THAN A THOUSAND TIMES ITS SIZE!