DRAFT STEP-BY-STEP DNS SECURITY ILLUSTRATIVE GUIDE Version 0.2 Sparta, Inc. 7075 Samuel Morse Dr. Columbia MD 21046 Ph: 410.872.1515

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Presentation transcript:

DRAFT STEP-BY-STEP DNS SECURITY ILLUSTRATIVE GUIDE Version 0.2 Sparta, Inc Samuel Morse Dr. Columbia MD Ph:

DRAFT Zone Signing Key (ZSK) Generation ZSK (public) ZSK (private) Key Signing Key (KSK) Generation 3 KSK (public) KSK (private) 2 Key Generation Store safely and at different locations

DRAFT Zone Signing Key (ZSK) Generation 2 Key Signing Key (KSK) Generation 3 Unsigned Zone File PublicPrivate ZSK KSK Zone Signing with absent or “unsecured” child delegations Zone Signing operation Checked Zone File (with keys) 4 Check Zone for errors Include public keys in zone file Command line arguments to dnssec_signzone Signed Zone File Keyset File DSset File

DRAFT Zone Signing Key (ZSK) Generation 2 Key Signing Key (KSK) Generation 3 Zone Signing operation Unsigned Zone File Checked Zone File (with keys) 5 Check Zone for errors PublicPrivate ZSK KSK Keyset File Keyset File (from child) Secure Exchange of the keyset file Zone Signing with secured child delegations Child Zone Value or location is given as command line arguments to dnssec_signzone Include public keys in zone file Signed Zone File (with child’s DS) Keyset File DSset File

DRAFT Keyset File Secure Exchange of the keyset file named process Create Delegation at parent 8 Wait for the correct DS to appear Securing Delegations – Child zone activity 7.3 Parent Zone 7.2 DSset Zone Signing operation 4.5 or 5.5

DRAFT Keyset File Child Zone Keyset File (from child) Secure Exchange of the keyset file Securing Delegations – Parent zone activity Zone Signing Operation 8.4 Signed Zone File (with child’s DS) Keyset File DSset File Reload the parent zone 8.5 named process Unsigned Parent Zone File (containing delegation to child) Public keys at parent (ZSK and KSK) 8.1

DRAFT Public keys - - Old ZSK and KSK Old ZSK (private) Zone Signing Operation 9.4 Reload the zone 9.5 Wait one max zone TTL 9.6 Zone Signing Operation 9.7 Reload the zone 9.8 Wait one max zone TTL 9.9 Zone Signing Key (ZSK) Generation 9.2 Unsigned Zone File Zone Signing Operation 9.11 Reload the zone 9.12 public private ZSK Rollover – Pre-publish scheme Signed zone DS setKeyset Signed zone DS setKeyset Signed zone DS set Keyset Start End KSK (private)

DRAFT Key Signing Key (KSK) Generation 10.2 public private KSK Rollover – Double Signature Scheme Zone Signing Operation 10.4 Old KSK (private) DS setKeyset Signed zone Reload the zone 10.5 Wait one max zone TTL 10.6 Zone Signing Operation 10.8 Unsigned Zone File ZSK (private) Public keys - - ZSK and old KSK Only include the ZSK Start DS set Signed zone End Reload the zone Keyset 10.9 Wait for the correct DS to appear Secure delegation – parent zone activity named process Secure Exchange of the keyset file Parent Zone

DRAFT Zone Signing Key (ZSK) Generation 11.1 public private Zone Signing Operation 11.3 DS setKeyset Signed zone Reload the zone 11.4 KSK (private) KSK public key Start Unsigned Zone File Emergency ZSK Rollover End

DRAFT Key Signing Key (KSK) Generation 12.1 Zone Signing Operation 12.3 DS set Signed zone Reload the zone 12.7 ZSK (private) Start Emergency KSK Rollover Keyset 12.4 Wait for the correct DS to appear 7.3 public private ZSK public key Unsigned Zone File End 8 Secure delegation – parent zone activity named process Secure Exchange of the keyset file Parent Zone