The RGGI Auction Allocation Process: Concerns and Recommendations Presented by James H. Savitt, Ph.D To The RFF Auction Workshop in NYC 20 July 2006.

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Presentation transcript:

The RGGI Auction Allocation Process: Concerns and Recommendations Presented by James H. Savitt, Ph.D To The RFF Auction Workshop in NYC 20 July 2006

Observation The allocation of CO 2 allowances affects the use of Generation Capacity in the following ways: –Investment in new capacity. –Power purchase agreements for new and existing capacity. –The sale and procurement of installed capacity (ICAP). –The generation of power from capacity. –Capacity-based system and local reliability requirements.

Recommendations Initial auctions of allowances must be consummated before the seasonal ICAP cycles begin. (Clarification) Verify that a three-year compliance period means that any allowances issued during that period can be used to meet the emissions requirements for the entire period. –Consider the costs and benefits of auctioning all at once 25% of the allowances for the three-year compliance period. Clarify how new capacity will obtain allowances. Quarterly monitoring process check: – Prices, –Allowances consumed, –Electricity generated for the market and for reliability, –Weather, and other relevant information, –Objective: Anticipate the offset trigger Consider other actions to address emerging issues.

Recommendations The allocation of allowances to the public benefit purpose (e.g., an auction) should not exceed 25% of the annual total. To help the auction develop, to protect existing contracts, and to support the current investment queue, consider having the right of first access to 2/3 of the public benefit allowances go to generator owners.

Investment in New Capacity Recognize that investment decisions are made in a timeframe greater than three years ahead (planning). Reduce uncertainty by clarifying how new investment obtains allowances (viability). Revenue stream from power purchase agreements must account for allowance costs (marginal costs, profitability).

Power Purchase Agreements Existing PPAs may not have CO 2 allowance cost adjustments built in. Uncertainty in the availability of allowances and in their price will tend to shorten the length of future PPAs. New investment that counts on PPAs becomes riskier if their length becomes shorter. –The increased risk may well reduce future investments, or at best, increase costs.

Installed Capacity (ICAP) The timing of an allowance auction, the number of allowances in the auction, and the timeframe covered by the auction all affect the cost and amount of ICAP made available. Uncertainty in the availability of allowances increases the risk associated with selling ICAP, either increasing the ICAP offer price, reducing the amount offered and transacted, or both. Mitigation rules in NYC require that certain facilities be fully offered as ICAP.

Generation of Power The CO 2 allowance is actually consumed when power is generated. –Unavailability of allowances creates uncertainty of compliance, even with a three-year window. Power prices will reflect the costs of the marginal unit. –Fuel, O&M, certain others as before. –Allowance costs. –Risks of being unable to obtain allowances. –Opportunity costs associated with the use of an allowance now rather than later.

Reliability Requirements Load must be served consistent with NYSRC, NPCC, and NERC standards. Certain units must be on (or burn certain kinds of fuel) in ways not accounted for by the policy models. –Some units are run out of economic merit order. –Some units are run more often or at less efficient levels than forecast, and will consume allowances faster than anticipated. –Some units are subject to being run on short notice in real- time, and may not have the requisite allowances. –Units on for local reliability generally do not set market clearing prices and so cannot recover their operating costs directly through market prices.

Recommendations Again Public benefit allocation of allowances kept at 25%. Clarify how new capacity will obtain allowances. Clarification of the three-year compliance period with respect to specific allowances. Initial auctions should precede the seasonal ICAP cycles. An auction of 25% of three years’ worth of allowances with generator right of first access to 2/3 of that amount. Quarterly monitoring process check.