MIKEY-IBAKE and LI Requirements. All Rights Reserved © 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Page 2 | Introduction 3GPP TSG-SA WG3-LI adopted requirements for LI relating.

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MIKEY-IBAKE and LI Requirements

All Rights Reserved © 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Page 2 | Introduction 3GPP TSG-SA WG3-LI adopted requirements for LI relating to the use of operator applied encryption in 3GPPSA3#37-LI  SA3LI10_039r5 This contribution provides comparison of MIKEY-IBAKE as specified in TR against these requirements

All Rights Reserved © 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Page 3 | LI Requirements for Encrypted Services (1/5) 1. When an encryption service is provided by the PLMN, lawful interception shall take place as for a non encrypted communications. a. In addition encrypted communications shall be decrypted, or the decryption keys and any required associated information (e.g. roll over counters) shall be provided to the LEMF. b. For the specific case where a key server based solution is used, it is a national option for the operator to make keys and any associated information (e.g. roll over counters) directly available to the LEMF for the decryption of communications MIKEY-IBAKE: MIKEY-IBAKE: The session is re-routed through the Lawful MITM which decrypts it and delivers the un-encrypted traffic to the LEMF.

All Rights Reserved © 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Page 4 | LI Requirements for Encrypted Services (2/5) 2. Interception shall be performed in such a manner as to avoid detectability by the Target or others. In particular: a. There shall be no significant difference in latency during call setup or during communications compared to a non intercepted communications. MIKEY-IBAKE: MIKEY-IBAKE: There is no perceivable increase in latency due to re- routing through MitM or reprocessing of user data. b. Interception of a Target shall not prevent the use of key exchange applications which provide a user key confirmation mechanism. MIKEY-IBAKE: MIKEY-IBAKE: Protocol manipulation by Lawfully Authorized MitM prevents detectability as presented in accompanying discussion paper c. Should interception fail during a call (or during call setup), the call shall be unaffected MIKEY-IBAKE: MIKEY-IBAKE: Failure of Lawfully Authorized MitM is undetectable.

All Rights Reserved © 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Page 5 | LI Requirements for Encrypted Services (3/5) 3. Where the PLMN operator provides decryption of the communication, it is the operator’s choice where in the network this decryption is performed. However, following decryption, all IRI and CC shall be provided to the LEMF using handover mechanisms as per a non encrypted communication. MIKEY-IBAKE: MIKEY-IBAKE: This requirement is independent of key exchange mechanism.

All Rights Reserved © 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Page 6 | LI Requirements for Encrypted Services (4/5) 4. An encryption solution shall not prohibit commencement of Interception and decryption of an existing communication. MIKEY-IBAKE: MIKEY-IBAKE: This requirement is supported by the network-initiated re-keying feature of MIKEY-IBAKE. During the re-keying procedure, the Lawfully authorized MitM is invoked, and remains in the communication path for the duration of the session.

All Rights Reserved © 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Page 7 | LI Requirements for Encrypted Services (5/5) 5. If key material and any associated information are available, it shall be possible to retrospectively decrypt encrypted communications. MIKEY-IBAKE: MIKEY-IBAKE: If all encrypted communication content and associated key material are retained, encrypted communications can be decrypted.

All Rights Reserved © 2010 Alcatel-Lucent Page 8 |