1. PREPARATIONS FOR VOTING: IN QUEST OF INTEGRITY AND PUBLIC CONFIDENCE by Roy G. Saltman Consultant on Election Policy and Technology ------------------------------------------------ Voting Systems Testing Summit 2005 Sacramento, CA, Nov. 29 ------------------------------------------------

2. TESTING SEQUENCE (1) BY THE VOTING SYSTEMS TESTING LAB (VSTL, also called ITA) (2) BY THE LOCAL ELECTION AGENCY (a) CHECKOUT OF NEW SOFTWARE RECEIVED FROM THE VSTL (b) SYSTEM SPECIALIZATION AND CHECKOUT BEFORE EACH ELECTION (3) VERIFICATION AFTER EACH ELECTION

3. TESTING BY THE VSTL (1) AUDIT REQUIREMENT (2) HARDWARE (3) SOFTWARE (4) HUMAN FACTORS

4. AUDIT REQUIREMENT (1) THERE MUST BE NO FINANCIAL CONNECTION OR CONFLICT OF INTEREST BETWEEN A VSTL, INCLUDING ITS EMPLOYEES, AND ANY VENDOR OF ELECTION EQUIPMENT. (2) ACCREDITATION OF A VSTL MUST INCLUDE ITS AGREEMENT TO ALLOW ITS TECHNIQUES AND PROCEDURES TO BE AUDITED BY EXPERTS IDENTIFIED BY NIST AND THE TGDC.

5. HARDWARE (1) LOGIC DESIGN CHECKING (2) TOUCHSCREEN REGISTRATION AND STABILITY (3) TESTING UNDER SIMULATED FIELD CONDITIONS (a) ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS (b) VOTE-SENSING HARDWARE RESPONDING TO CHOICES BY REAL PEOPLE, NOT MACHINES

6. SOFTWARE (1) SOFTWARE IS RECEIVED AND TRANSMITTED WITH A SECURITY POLYNOMIAL PROTECTOR (2) ASSURANCE AGAINST HIDDEN OR MALICIOUS CODE - CONCERN FOR “SPECIAL ENTRY SIGNALS” (3) NO EXEMPTION FOR COMMERCIAL OFF-THE- SHELF (COTS) SOFTWARE (4) PRICE FOR SOFTWARE TESTING PROPORTIONAL TO SQUARE OR EVEN CUBE OF TESTING TIME

7. HUMAN FACTORS (1) TO BE IMPLEMENTED WHEN STANDARDS ARE DEVELOPED (2) RESIDUAL VOTES: TO WHAT EXTENT DO VOTERS MISTAKENLY FAIL TO VOTE ON THE TOP CONTEST? (3) TOTAL CORRECTNESS OF CHOICES: IN A SIMULATED ELECTION, TO WHAT EXTENT DO VOTERS CORRECTLY SELECT A SET OF CANDIDATES ASSIGNED TO THEM, GIVEN AN INCENTIVE TO VOTE CORRECTLY?

8. TESTING BY THE LOCAL ELECTION AGENCY (1) SOFTWARE RECEIVED FROM VSTL IS VERIFIED AGAINST THE COPY SUBMITTED BY VENDOR TO NIST’S NATIONAL SOFTWARE REFERENCE LIBRARY (2) SPECIALIZATION VERIFICATION (3) VOTE-SENSING EQUIPMENT WORKING PROPERLY (within acceptable tolerances) (4) SYSTEM EXERCISE RESPONDING CORRECTLY TO A SIGNIFICANT VARIETY OF VOTE PATTERNS

9. POST-ELECTION VERIFICATION (1) AUDIT OF RESULTS WILL ASSURE AGAINST CERTAIN FRAUDS OR ERRORS AND CONTRIBUTE TO PUBLIC CONFIDENCE (2) ACCURATE RECORD OF NUMBER OF VOTERS SIGNED IN IS ESSENTIAL TO AUDIT OF RESULTS (3) “NO VOTES” MUST BE POSITIVELY RECORDED FOR EACH CONTEST - SUM OF CANDIDATE VOTES PLUS “NO VOTES” EQUALS NUMBER OF VOTERS SIGNED IN (in a “vote for one” contest) (4) WITH BALLOT SYSTEMS - A SAMPLE MANUAL RECOUNT SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN - PERCENT SAMPLE SHOULD INCREASE WITH CLOSENESS OF CONTEST (5) WITH DRE SYSTEMS - A SAMPLE OF EBIs SHOULD BE SEPARATELY SUMMED AND COMPARED WITH TOTALS FROM THEIR RESPECTIVE UNITS - PERCENT SAMPLE SHOULD SIMILARLY INCREASE

10. OTHER FACTORS FOR INTEGRITY (1) TESTING IS ONLY ONE ASPECT (2) PHYSICAL SECURITY OF SITES IS ESSENTIAL (3) SECURITY IN TRANSPORTATION OF HARDWARE, SOFTWARE, BALLOTS AND SUPPLIES IS ALSO ESSENTIAL (4) PERSONNEL MUST BE WELL TRAINED (5) ASSURANCE OF ACCURATE VOTER REGISTRATION LISTS REQUIRES THOUGHTFUL ANALYSIS AND CAREFUL PROCESS