1. Concepts And Generic Knowledge

2. Concepts
“Concepts” are categories of objects, events, or ideas (e.g., car, wedding, freedom) that share a set of traits that determines membership in the category. They are one of the building blocks of knowledge and thought.
We all know many concepts, but what do we mean when we say that we “understand” a concept?

3. Concept = Dictionary Definition
One possible way to answer the previous question is to say that our understanding of a concept is something like a dictionary definition.
There is, however, an obvious problem. Regardless of the definition, it is a simple matter to find an exception to the definition.

4. Family Resemblance
Wittgenstein proposed the idea of family resemblance as a way to highlight what members of a category have in common, yet allowing exceptions to be included.
Given a set of characteristic features of a category, the more features an object has, the more likely it will be considered a member of the category: membership is a matter of degree, not an all-or-none proposition

5. Prototype Theory
Rosch proposed a theory to represent Wittgenstein’s idea of family resemblances: Prototype Theory.
Prototype - an “ideal” or “typical” example of the category.
A test case is compared with the prototype and, if similar, will be considered a member of the category, otherwise it will not.
Prototype theory employs the idea of fuzzy boundaries. In this way, some members are “better” members than others.

6. Support For Prototype Theory
There is a considerable variety of support for the prototype theory:
Sentence verification
Production task
Picture-identification task
Rating task
Sentence sensibility
Judgment differences

7. Basic-Level Categories
In addition to central members having an advantage over less central members, level of categorization also shows preferences. Basic-level categories (e.g., “pen,” “car,” “house”) seem to be the preferred level of categorization
We tend to speak at the basic-level of categorization, misrecall in the direction of basic-levels, and even when learning to talk.

8. Exemplars
We have been discussing how prototypes are used to evaluate category membership. Some argue there is another possibility: exemplar-based reasoning.
It works the same as prototype theory, except the “prototypes” are examples of experiences, rather than “averages” of traits for general categories.

9. Why Exemplar-Based Reasoning?
Why would you be able to respond that “apple” was a fruit much more quickly than a “fig”?
Exemplar-based reasoning also captures another aspect that prototypes do not so easily: variability within a category.

10. Combining Prototypes and Exemplars
As it turns out, we have no reason to consider prototype theory and exemplar-based reasoning as an “either-or” proposition. Since both work on the same principles, there is good reason to believe they are both used when appropriate.

11. Difficulties With Categorizing via Resemblance
The view of prototype theory is that judgments of typicality and category membership are based on the same source… resemblance to an exemplar or prototype.
There are, however, situations in which typicality and membership are independent. What this means is that an object can be a member of a category, but be atypical (e.g., penguin) OR an object can seem typical for a category, but not be a member of the category (e.g., porpoise)!

12. Categorizing via Resemblance (con’t)
That is, people can easily judge how “typical” an object is for a category (e.g., robin), but then judge category membership in a manner that is independent of typicality.
Odd Numbers
Lemons
Counterfeits

13. “Deep Features”
If category judgments are not based on typicality alone, on what else is category membership based? “Deep features” - the essential properties of an object.
The appearance or surface features of an object are not the most important thing when it comes to category membership. Apparently, “if it looks like a duck, walks like a duck, and quacks like a duck, it isn’t necessarily a duck.”

14. “Deep Features” (con’t)
Deep features are dependent on one’s beliefs of what is the “essence of the object’s nature.”
Thus, the essential properties depend on the category and your beliefs about the category: different categories will have different “essences” (e.g., parentage for twins, age for antiques, time signature for a ‘march,’ etc)

15. Where Does Resemblance Come Into Play?
We seem to be changing our opinion about the relevance of using resemblance to establish category membership, yet prototype theory requires that resemblance be used to establish category membership.
Resemblance is used at the level of deep features. That is, we use resemblance when considering the properties that matter in the category under consideration.
Of course, what properties are essential are determined primarily by our beliefs about the category.

16. Categorization Heuristics
While we cannot equate typicality with category membership, in our everyday thinking, we need to make quick and (reasonably) accurate judgments about concepts.
Using resemblance of superficial characteristics to a prototype or exemplar is a fairly good heuristic - a “short-cut” strategy that has worked in the past and has a reasonable chance of working in the present situation.
Though not perfect, judgments based on resemblance will, in many cases, be correct.

17. Categorization Theories
However, we have yet to address a broader issue: even though you have a prototype and exemplars of a “car,” to know what a “car” is, implies you also know what “tires,” “steering wheel,” “speedometer,” etc are and how they are related.
Our beliefs about those concepts allows us to form an “implicit causal theory” about the nature of the concept. That theory provides the knowledge base for thinking about the concept and to understand new facts we encounter about the concept.

18. Use of Theories in Categorization
Our theories can impact our thinking in a number of ways:
1. How we categorize new cases.
2. How we learn new concepts.
3. How we reason about categories

19. Inferences Based On Theories
Categorization allows us to apply our knowledge to new objects we encounter and to draw conclusions based on our experience.
Our theories influence our inferences in several ways:
1. A characteristic of a typical member is more likely to be assumed true for the whole category, but not so for characteristics of atypical members.
2. A characteristic of one concept is more willingly accepted as part of another similar concept, but not for dissimilar concepts.
3. A characteristic common to two or more diverse examples of a subordinate category is more likely to be accepted for the superordinate category, than for two less diverse examples of the subordinate category.
In each case, thinking about the concept is guided by our causal theories.