1. Three Modern Approaches

2. Introduction Rawls, Nozick, and MacIntyre Rawls, Nozick, and MacIntyre Have significant new approaches Have significant new approaches Which are related to past approaches Which are related to past approaches And show the continuing openness of debate And show the continuing openness of debate Is that a good thing? After 2500 years? Is that a good thing? After 2500 years?

3. Rawls on the Just State John Rawls (1921 – 2002) John Rawls (1921 – 2002) A Theory of Justice (1971) A Theory of Justice (1971)

4. Rawls on the Just State Justice as fairness Justice as fairness A just society is one run on just principles A just society is one run on just principles A just society would be a fair society A just society would be a fair society Fairness involves Distributive Justice Fairness involves Distributive Justice There is a fair distribution of primary social goods There is a fair distribution of primary social goods wealth, wealth, opportunities, opportunities, liberties and privileges, liberties and privileges, bases of self respect (e.g. equality of political representation) bases of self respect (e.g. equality of political representation)

5. Rawls on the Just State What is a Fair Society? What is a Fair Society? Would a fair society would be one that any rational, self-interested person would want to join? Would a fair society would be one that any rational, self-interested person would want to join? Not quite. They will be biased to their own talents. Not quite. They will be biased to their own talents.

6. Rawls on the Just State The Veil of Ignorance The Veil of Ignorance Suppose they chose from behind a Veil of Ignorance where they didn’t know what their talents were or where they would be placed in society? Suppose they chose from behind a Veil of Ignorance where they didn’t know what their talents were or where they would be placed in society? They would choose a society that would be fair to all because they’d have to live with their choice They would choose a society that would be fair to all because they’d have to live with their choice So, a fair society is one that any rational, self- interested person behind the veil of ignorance would want to join So, a fair society is one that any rational, self- interested person behind the veil of ignorance would want to join

7. Rawls on the Just State The Original Position The Original Position Rawls is a Social Contract Theorist Rawls is a Social Contract Theorist In forming a social contract we decide upon the basic structure of society In forming a social contract we decide upon the basic structure of society We do so as self-interested and rational choosers, from behind the veil of ignorance We do so as self-interested and rational choosers, from behind the veil of ignorance This choice position Rawls calls The Original Position This choice position Rawls calls The Original Position

8. Rawls on the Just State The Original Position The Original Position How would we choose? How would we choose? We are choosing fundamental social conditions determining our life prospects We are choosing fundamental social conditions determining our life prospects We get to choose just once We get to choose just once We would follow a maximin choice principle We would follow a maximin choice principle choose the setup in which your worst outcome is better than your worst outcome in any other setup choose the setup in which your worst outcome is better than your worst outcome in any other setup We wouldn’t give up fundamental rights and liberties We wouldn’t give up fundamental rights and liberties

9. Rawls on the Just State Two Principles of Justice Two Principles of Justice 1.Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of basic rights and liberties, compatible with the same scheme for all 2.Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: a. they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; b. they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society (The Difference Pinciple)

10. Rawls on the Just State Prioritizing the Principles of Justice Prioritizing the Principles of Justice There are really three principles here: There are really three principles here: Principle of Liberty Principle of Liberty Equality of Opportunity Equality of Opportunity Difference Principle Difference Principle They can conflict and are ordered by lexical priority. They can conflict and are ordered by lexical priority. The Principle of Liberty must be satisfied before any other principle. The Principle of Liberty must be satisfied before any other principle. Equality of Opportunity must be satisfied before the Difference Principle. Equality of Opportunity must be satisfied before the Difference Principle.

11. Rawls on the Just State The Difference Principle The Difference Principle If primary social goods were distributed evenly, we would have a perfectly egalitarian society. If primary social goods were distributed evenly, we would have a perfectly egalitarian society. But there are good reasons for thinking that everyone would be economically worse off in such a society. But there are good reasons for thinking that everyone would be economically worse off in such a society. One obvious reason is that incentives are needed for people to work hard and use their talents to create wealth One obvious reason is that incentives are needed for people to work hard and use their talents to create wealth

12. Rawls on the Just State The Difference Principle The Difference Principle Taxation is a means of redistributing wealth for the benefit of the least well-off Taxation is a means of redistributing wealth for the benefit of the least well-off But, everyone, including the least well-off, would suffer with excessive taxation But, everyone, including the least well-off, would suffer with excessive taxation On the other hand, too little taxation and the least well-off suffer economically On the other hand, too little taxation and the least well-off suffer economically Between these extremes there will be an optimum taxation level, according to the difference principle Between these extremes there will be an optimum taxation level, according to the difference principle

13. Nozick on the Minimal State Robert Nozick (1938 – 2002) Robert Nozick (1938 – 2002) Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia (1974)

14. Nozick on the Minimal State Justice as Respect Justice as Respect Recall Kant’s Principle of Ends Recall Kant’s Principle of Ends Act to treat others as means not just as ends People can’t be used as ‘resources’ People can’t be used as ‘resources’ A state committed to ‘distributive justice’ must treat its citizens as means to a distributive end A state committed to ‘distributive justice’ must treat its citizens as means to a distributive end Any such action is unethical Any such action is unethical Therefore distributive justice can’t be an ethical goal Therefore distributive justice can’t be an ethical goal

15. Nozick on the Minimal State Distributive Justice vs. Entitlements Distributive Justice vs. Entitlements DJ assumes wealth is just a natural resource DJ assumes wealth is just a natural resource Nozick thinks that justice in wealth involves a recursive definition of entitlement: Nozick thinks that justice in wealth involves a recursive definition of entitlement: 1. Justice in original acquisition 2. Justice in transaction 3. No wealth is held justly except by combinations of 1 & 2 NB. Redistribution can’t produce justice in holdings NB. Redistribution can’t produce justice in holdings

16. Nozick on the Minimal State Distributive Justice vs. Entitlements Distributive Justice vs. Entitlements There may be unjust holdings because of past history but that doesn’t make the theory of entitlement incorrect There may be unjust holdings because of past history but that doesn’t make the theory of entitlement incorrect Compare: a state may in fact distribute wealth badly – but that doesn’t affect the theory of DJ. Compare: a state may in fact distribute wealth badly – but that doesn’t affect the theory of DJ. There needs to be an entitlement theory of rectification There needs to be an entitlement theory of rectification

17. MacIntyre on the Moral Order Alasdair Macintyre (1929 – ) Alasdair Macintyre (1929 – ) After Virtue (1984) After Virtue (1984)

18. MacIntyre on the Moral Order The current moral disorder The current moral disorder Imagine a catastrophe where most scientific knowledge and the habits of science were lost Imagine a catastrophe where most scientific knowledge and the habits of science were lost

19. MacIntyre on the Moral Order The current moral disorder The current moral disorder Imagine a catastrophe where most scientific knowledge and the habits of science were lost Imagine a catastrophe where most scientific knowledge and the habits of science were lost Then suppose the survivors tried to reconstruct science from the leftover fragments Then suppose the survivors tried to reconstruct science from the leftover fragments

20. MacIntyre on the Moral Order The current moral disorder The current moral disorder Imagine a catastrophe where most scientific knowledge and the habits of science were lost Imagine a catastrophe where most scientific knowledge and the habits of science were lost Then suppose the survivors tried to reconstruct science from the leftover fragments Then suppose the survivors tried to reconstruct science from the leftover fragments They’d probably produce gibberish that ‘looked like’ science but wasn’t They’d probably produce gibberish that ‘looked like’ science but wasn’t

21. MacIntyre on the Moral Order The current moral disorder The current moral disorder MacIntyre thinks there’s been a slow catastrophe where most moral knowledge has been lost MacIntyre thinks there’s been a slow catastrophe where most moral knowledge has been lost

22. MacIntyre on the Moral Order The current moral disorder The current moral disorder MacIntyre thinks there’s been a slow catastrophe where most moral knowledge has been lost MacIntyre thinks there’s been a slow catastrophe where most moral knowledge has been lost We have tried to reconstruct morality from the fragments We have tried to reconstruct morality from the fragments

23. MacIntyre on the Moral Order The current moral disorder The current moral disorder MacIntyre thinks there’s been a slow catastrophe where most moral knowledge has been lost MacIntyre thinks there’s been a slow catastrophe where most moral knowledge has been lost We have tried to reconstruct morality from the fragments We have tried to reconstruct morality from the fragments We have produced gibberish that ‘looks like’ morals but isn’t We have produced gibberish that ‘looks like’ morals but isn’t

24. MacIntyre on the Moral Order The current moral disorder The current moral disorder Since moral arguments are gibberish they can’t be conclusive in deciding what to do Since moral arguments are gibberish they can’t be conclusive in deciding what to do But we must decide what to do so we adopt another method But we must decide what to do so we adopt another method We use emotions, passions, self interest, … We use emotions, passions, self interest, … Since we have incompatible desires our politics has become Since we have incompatible desires our politics has become civil war carried on by other means’

25. MacIntyre on the Moral Order Bring back virtue! Bring back virtue! The Aristotelian version of ethics with an end towards which we can aim makes sense of ‘ought’ statements. The Aristotelian version of ethics with an end towards which we can aim makes sense of ‘ought’ statements. ‘We ought to do X to achieve this end’ is understandable ‘We ought to do X to achieve this end’ is understandable ‘We ought to do X … just because’ is not ‘We ought to do X … just because’ is not Absent any conception of what human beings are supposed to become if they realized their telos, there can be no ethical theory, because it simply has no purpose. For people with no destination, a road map has no value