1. Maryville CSX Train Derailment
August 2015
Oak Ridge Emergency Management Forum
Oak Ridge, TN

2. Federal On-Scene Coordinators
The OSC (NCP §300.5) is the lead Federal official pre-designated by EPA or the USCG to coordinate and direct responses to discharges of oil, or the government official designated by the lead agency to coordinate and direct removal actions for releases of hazardous substances.
There are only about 250 EPA OSCs nation-wide
Currently Region 4 has 23 OSCs based out of Regional Office in Atlanta
Four (5) OSCs stations at outpost locations:
Tallahassee, Florida
Louisville, Kentucky
Raleigh, North Carolina
Jackson, Tennessee
Mobile, Alabama

3. Federal On-Scene Coordinators

4. Response Notification
Receives all reports of releases involving hazardous substances and oil that trigger federal notification requirements
Over 30,000 reports per year
Including terrorist threats
Notifies Federal On-scene Coordinator and other federal agencies
Links caller to chemical, biological, radiological, and terrorism experts
National Response Center

5. Unified Command Structure
Generalized Emergency Response Process
Incident Occurs
Notification
National Response
Center
Initial Assessment/First Response
Federal/State/Local/RP
Notification/Response Measures
as per section
Notification
Natural Resource
Trustees
Phone Duty Office
Evaluation
Federal
Assistance
Required? No
State/Local/RP2
Response
Yes
NRT
section
RRT
section
Special Forces
section
NSF
ERT
RERT
SSC
NPFC
DRG
SUPSALV
FOSC
State/ RP
Local
Unified Command Structure
1. Includes local representation as well.
2. Resources available to support OSC/RPM upon request.

6. OSC Resources
Immediate access to technical assistance and clean up contractors if the RP cannot adequately handle the problem;
Immediate access to Superfund and the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF);
EPA OSCs are individually authorized up to $250,000 for emergency responses with reach-back for additional funds;
Technical expertise;
Special equipment;
Trained and experienced
Type 1 and 2 Incident
Management Team

7. OSC Resources: Contractor Support
ERRS - Emergency and Rapid Response Services (ERRS) is the primary vehicle for labor, equipment, and materials. This contract is comprised of four separate contractors.
Unknown cylinder sampling
Contaminated soil excavation
Emergency Response

8. OSC Resources: Contractor Support
START - Superfund Technical Assessment and Response Team (START) provides site documentation, ERRS oversight, health and safety, air monitoring, multi-media sampling, technical support, and other services.
Emergency Response
Field Haz-Cat
Air Monitoring

9. EPA Region 4 Regional Readiness Center
Air Monitoring Equipment
Area RAEs
Multi-RAE Pros
PPB RAEs
TVA 1000’s (PID/FID)
DATARAMS
Single Point Monitors
LUMEX Hg Monitors
Draeger CMS Units
Ludlum Radiation Dose and Survey Meters
Field Screening Tools
HAZMAT ID
SAM 9000s
HAZCAT Kits
APD2000s and AP2CEs

10. EPA Region 4 Regional Readiness Center
Air Sampling Media
PPE Cache (all levels)
SCBA/SAR Cache
Mobile Command Post
Portable Satellites and 800mhtz Tower/Repeater System
Mobile Breathing Air System Trailer
32’ Foot Gooseneck Mobile Warehouse
125 KW Mobile Generator
DECON Tents and Equipment
BIOWatch Response Trailer
ATVs and UTVs
Multiple response vehicles

11. CSX Maryville Derailment
Around 11:00 p.m. a train derailment, and fire, occurred in Maryville, TN.
Authorities issued an evacuation in a 0.5 mile radius of the site.
During initial evacuation activities, the radius was increased to 1.5 miles. Including ~5,000 people.

12. Derailment Information
Rail car carrying ~26,000 gallons of Acrylonitrile was breached and partially derailed.
Acrylonitrile, highly flammable, caught fire as the railcar was leaking, providing a constant source of fuel and making extinguishing the fire dangerous and difficult.

13. Incident Management

14. Firefighting Operations
Firefighters utilized water spray to cool adjacent Acrylonitrile cars.
Two buffer cars were between the Acrylonitrile cars and the LPG cars.

15. Evacuation Operations
Residents were evacuated the morning of July 2 within 1.5 miles of the derailment
Businesses were also shut down within the evacuation zone.
Over 5,000 people were evacuated.
Evacuation was lifted on July 3 at 12:00 pm, based on air monitoring results and response progress.

16. Air Monitoring Operations
EPA and 45th CST focused their air monitoring efforts on the community, through mobile air monitoring.
CSX focused on monitoring in the exclusion zone.

17. Acrylonitrile Transfer
A second unbreached car, carrying Acrylonitrile was damaged by the fire but the contents were not lost.
Acrylonitrile was transferred to a new car for shipment, via a closed-loop system.
Community and worker air monitoring was carefully planned and conducted during the transfer to ensure no exposure.

18. Acrylonitrile Flaring
Some residual remained in the breached car.
Prior to being shipped off-site, all contents had to be purged. To limit possible exposure, CSX flared the volatiles.
Note the rippling on the rail car and that the flare picture is small because the flare was small. Not as much fun, or awe inspiring, as it sounded like it would be.

19. Acrylonitrile Flaring

20. Rail Car Decontamination
Following flaring, the rail car was further decontaminated prior to being shipped off-site.

21. Surface Water Sampling
Following initial firefighting efforts, it was unclear if nearby Culton Creek was impacted by the release.
Surface water samples revealed elevated levels of Acrylonitrile in the creek.
Samples were collected daily from the same locations to monitor the concentrations and aid in decision making within Unified Command.

22. Results indicating contamination and discovery of a fish kill caused:
Additional water samples from further downstream
Installation of bubbling system at 3 points near the site
Issuance of a public advisory
Inventory of dead fish/animals

23. Surface Water Remediation
Bubblers catalyze the natural breakdown of Acrylonitrile through additional volatilization and agitation.
Acrylonitrile supposedly has a half life in the environment of approximately 3 days.

24. Soil Removal
Soil under the railway was determined to be contaminated with Acrylonitrile and had to be removed prior to opening the rail line.

25. Soil Stockpiles
Two soil stockpiles were established near the derailment site.
Air monitoring was conducted at each stockpile during response activities

26. Ground Water Contamination
On the final day of the response, groundwater sample results from an on-site well, indicated elevated concentrations of Acrylonitrile in the groundwater.
Acrylonitrile is notorious for it’s ability to pass through soil and get into groundwater. It does not wet things very easily so a majority will pass through. During the fire, it was hoped/supposed that the fire was consuming most of the leaked acrylonitrile. It is still unclear how true that is.

27. Ground Water Contamination
Private well testing was initiated immediately
One private well at the derailment site was contaminated
Completed a door to door survey to identify all wells.
Established a private well advisory.
Installed groundwater monitoring wells
TDEC provided oversight of the remediation.

29. Community Involvement Center
The community was informed throughout the response and when the evacuation was lifted, residents were encouraged to come to the Community Involvement Center to better understand what happened

30. Questions