1. On Consciousness as Higher-Order Thought Charles Siewert Rice University

2. Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Against the background of the threefold conception of consciousness introduced in the last presentation, ask: How is a state’s being conscious related to state self-consciousness? (“consciousness of consciousness”) How is a state’s being conscious related to subject self-consciousness? (“consciousness of self”)

3. How is a state’s being conscious related to state self-consciousness? First step—critique of higher-order thought theories. Is having thoughts directed at your own states of mind (that sort of state self-consciousness) essential to (or even explanatory of) their being conscious states?

4. Consciousness as higher-order thought Rosenthal“…a mental state is conscious just in case it is accompanied by a noninferential, nondispositional, assertoric thought to the effect that one is in that very state.” (410) This is said not to be an attempt at analyzing the concept of state consciousness. It is “a hypothesis about the nature of state consciousness.” It purports to explain consciousness.

5. Rosenthal’s HOT theory what makes you have a phenomenally conscious state is that you: Are in a mental state M such that: being an M state is not by itself sufficient for being a conscious state, and You (assertorically, occurrently) think that you are in M (in a suitably non- inferential way). Why Rosenthal is committed to this. o If being an M state were by itself sufficient for being a P-conscious state, R’s explanation of what makes conscious states conscious would be trivial. o And it’s clearly phenomenal consciousness that’s at issue, because: o he says the HOT theory explains the fact that there’s something it’s like for you to have a state. o his “sensory qualities” are clearly not sufficient for phenomenal consciousness (since he says they would be found with unfelt pain, and blindsight).

6. What is the case for the HOT theory of consciousness? 1. From commonsense adherence to “conscious of” principle. “Commonsense” tells us that if a given mental state one has is conscious, one is “transitively” conscious (or aware) of it. (To be transitively conscious of something is to be “either in an intentional or a sensory state whose content is directed upon that thing.” (407) So, R claims, according to common sense, it’s at least a necessary condition of one’s state being conscious that one be in a (“higher order”) intentional or sensory state directed upon that state. At most an argument that some kind of intentional or referential, concommittant “consciousness” must target every conscious state. But why should we believe this is an “occurrent” “thinking”? Why should we believe it is sufficient to make an otherwise unconscious state (phenomenally) conscious?

7. the case for HOT, cont’d 2. Why the essential “consciousness of” must be a thinking. If we are transitively conscious of our own mental states, this may be either by: (a) sensing it in some way, or (b) having a thought of some sort about it. It’s not (a). For if the higher order mental states necessary for a state’s being conscious were sensory states (as distinct from thought) they would have to have “sensory qualities” distinct from but similar to the qualities had by visual, aural sensations. But they don’t. Therefore, the essential, intentional “consciousness of” is (b)—a thinking.

8. the case for HOT, cont’d 3. This also must be an actual occurrence of higher order thought (HOT), not merely a disposition to think that one is in a certain mental state. For a mere disposition to think that one is in a state is not sufficient to make one conscious of being in that state. And the higher order state that is necessary for state consciousness must be one sufficient to make one (referentially) conscious of being in that state.

9. the case for HOT, cont’d 4. Reportablity argument. Our conscious states are ones we are able to report that we have. When we do report them, we express higher order thoughts that we have the states reported. Why are conscious states reportable? The best explanation is: we always think higher order thoughts about them, and this is just what makes them conscious at all.

10. the case for HOT, cont’d 5. The “conceptualization-changes-‘what it’s like’” argument. Consider wine tasting: acquiring the connoisseur’s concepts can change what conscious sensations one has of wine (it can change what it’s like to taste wine). If so then either (a)acquiring such concepts can change what “distinguishing properties” our sensory states non-consciously have, or else (b)the sensory states already have all the distinguishing properties, and the acquisition of concepts just allows us to have higher order thoughts about them, which changes what it’s like to have them, i.e., what conscious sensations we have. (a) is “highly implausible.” Therefore, (b). Now (?) if (b) is so, then what it’s like to have sensations consists in having higher-order thoughts about them.

11. Consciousness as higher-order thought Rosenthal’s responses to two common sources of objection: Objection: “This overintellectualizes consciousness. Babies and dogs feel pain but they don’t have higher-order thoughts.” Reply: yes they do, they have very primitive sorts of thoughts about their own sensory states. Objection: “This leads to an unacceptable infinite regress of higher-order thoughts for every conscious state.” Reply: no, it doesn’t lead to a regress, because the essential intentional “consciousness of” every conscious state can itself be– and typically is— unconscious. What makes your sensory states conscious, typically, is that you concurrently unconsciously think you are in them.

12. Some of my objections to HOT theory

13. Objection 1: Wrong or superfluous reflection dilemma What HOT + M does the theory say I have when I am visually conscious of a red circle? Either: 1.That looks round and red to me, and I think it does. 2.I have a visual quality of red roundness (where visual qualities are features by which we differentiate our sensations, and could occur in blindsight), and I think I have such a quality.) Problem: (1) is the reflection I actually normally have. But the fact that something looks round and red to me already guarantees visual consciousness. The reflection is superfluous. If the HOT theorist then opts for two, he attributes to me HO thoughts other than the ones I actually have—he attributes to me the wrong reflections. So they can’t be what makes my vision conscious.

14. Objection 2: Overintellectualize or lose distinctions 1. Controversial whether young children and nonhuman animals have beliefs about mental states. Not controversial: they have sense perception. Because more is required for the former than the latter. 2. Specifically, more is required for having thoughts attributing states of sensory perception to oneself or others than is required merely for having these states. 3. Do you say HOT is required for conscious perception, and admit (2)? Then you need to say: it follows from the hypothesis that babies don’t have thoughts attributing sensory states to themselves that nothing looks any way to them and that they are incapable of feeling pain. But this clearly doesn’t follow. 4. If you don’t admit (2), you lose the contrast between perception that is thought of, and perception that is not thought of, and along with this the contrast between conscious and unconscious perception.

15. Objection 3: Oblivious-or-arbitrary dilemma Higher-order thought theory either: obliterates the subjective difference between world- absorbed and reflective experience, or counter-intuitively dismisses the intuition that that you can’t be unconsciously conscious of something (while arbitrarily insisting on the intuition that one must be conscious of every conscious state one is in).

16. Objection 4: Regress (CO) every conscious state is a state one is conscious of (HOT theory: one thinks one has it). (IC) every state of being conscious of something is conscious—you can’t be unconsciously conscious of something. (HOT theory: every higher- order thought is conscious, since it is a “consciousness of” something) This seems to imply that every conscious state is accompanied by an infinite number of concurrent conscious higher-order thoughts. The standard respond is to dismiss (IC) and maintain (CO) is a necessary truth of universal scope. But this dismissal is arbitrary: IC is at least as intuitive as CO.

17. Objection 5: the improved description problem According to HOT theory, differences in what it’s like for you to taste the wine are differences in how you conceptualize the taste in HOT. So (according to this theory) if you assertorically think the wine tastes chalky to you, that is what it’s like for you to taste it, that is how it tastes to you. And, if after the next sip, you judge the wine tastes not chalky, but flinty, this must makes the wine taste different to you. But then, the later judgment cannot improve on the earlier judgment about how the wine tastes to you. This is wrong; You can improve your description of how the wine tastes to you. This plays a role in becoming a wine connoisseur.

18. Objection 6: the positive support for the theory is illusory RE use of a “Conscious-Of” principle (CO). Universal, strongly necessary, intentionalist, occurrent-thought reading is required here. But other readings (and not just inner sense ones) are possible. And the principle itself is not beyond doubt. No argument for why we should embrace CO on an HOT reading over alternatives. There are many good reasons not to do so. (see objections 1-5).

19. Objection 6: the positive support for the theory is illusory RE HOT’s reportability argument. It’s dubious that all conscious states are reportable (consider pre or non- verbal creatures). Even for reportable conscious states, you don’t provide a good (let alone “best”) explanation of this by positing the ubiquitous occurrence of higher-order thoughts. For you don’t explain an ability, by saying that it’s always being partly exercised. (What explains my ability to tie my shoes? That I am always doing part of what’s involved in actually tying my shoes? No.)

20. Objection 6: the positive support for the theory is illusory RE argument from: “conceptualization-changes-what it’s like”. HOT theory can’t explain how new conceptualization changes what it’s like to have an experience. For you acquire the new conceptualization by attending to how something tastes, feels, looks, sounds to you. But if HOT is true, attending to that is just having third-order thoughts about primitive second-order thoughts about (potentially unconscious) sensory states. It can provide you no new concepts or content. (And there are alternative ways to understand how conceptualization of experience can change subjective character.)

21. Conclusion: re relation of consciousness and state self-consciousness The fact that that you have a conscious state does not entail, and it is not explained by, your thinking you are in that state. HOT theory should be decisively rejected. We need an understanding of the consciousness/state self- consciousness relation that accounts for how we can attend to our own experience (as in wine tasting)—that avoids the failures of HOT theory-- Might this be provided by a theory of inner sense? And might it still be the case that consciousness entails (or is even explained by) this—inner perceptual—sort of state self-consciousness?