1. Course: Game Theory and Psychology Instructors: Moshe Hoffman, Erez Yoeli TAs: Christian Ferko, Maxim Massenkoff

2. Let’s discuss some puzzles of psychology…

3. Puzzle 1: Norm against Chemical Weapons

5. Why were chemical weapons the red line? Why not 100,000 deaths? Why not wanton murder of civilians?

6. This norm reared its head many times before…

7. “These flamethrowers were used to kill Japanese holed into pillboxes, buildings and caves. “ -Wiki entry for Battle of Iwo Jima

8. Why flame throwers? “A strong military case was made for the use of gas before America’s attack on the island of Iwo Jima; Japanese defenders in caves and tunnels would have been particularly vulnerable. Franklin Roosevelt rejected the idea.” -The Economist, The History of Chemical Weapons

9. >26,000 American casualties, Iwo Jima, WWII

10. “Because all the civilians had been evacuated, there were no civilian casualties at Iwo Jima”

11. Video Clip: Japanese Soldier Burnt Alive by Flame Thrower

12. More humane than chemical weapon?

13. Thus, -Chemical weapons would have saved lives! -No civilian casualties either way! -Not obviously “more humane”

14. In general: 1)Where do such inefficient norms come from? 2)What types of norms occur?

15. Puzzle 2: Apologies

16. Salala Pakistan, Nov 26 2011: US accidentally killed 24 Pakistani Soldiers

17.  Pakistan closed supply routes, until we apologized

18.  ~$1 billion in extra shipping fees

19. Until July 3 2012 “We are sorry for the losses suffered by the Pakistani military” -Hilary Clinton

20. Immediately after… “…the ground supply lines into Afghanistan are opening”

21. Why wouldn’t US just say sorry? -mere words? -worth a billion? Why would Pakistan care? -wouldn’t US “fake it”?

22. More generally: 1) Why do mere words matter? 2) When do mere words matter? 3)What about other symbolic gestures (e.g. coronations, handshakes, etc)?

23. Puzzle 3: Why do we consider transgressions of commission worse than those of omission?

24. “I won’t kill you…but I don’t have to save you”

25. Notice: -Batman’s intention is the same -The outcome is the same -But Batman (and presumably the viewer) thinks omission less bad

26. 1) Why is omission viewed differently from commission? 2)Is this distinction something we should legally respect or overcome?

27. More generally: 1)Where do our moral intuitions come from? 2)Do they make a good basis for law?

28. Puzzle 4: Where do “rights“ come from?

29. Self evident? The creator? “We hold these truths to be self- evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights…”

30. Might?

31. The “state of nature”?

32. A “social contract”?

33. What does this mean?

34. 1)Where DO rights ACTUALLY come from? 2)What can cause them to change? 3)What kind of rights are we likely to observe?

35. Puzzle 5: Why does love “blind us”?

36. When we get married, we vow, “for better or for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness, and in health.” And sometimes, we commit acts of love that are extremely costly…

37. End of Last of the Mohicans

38. Why does love cause us to ignore the costs of the relationship, sometimes to catastrophic results? Why doesn’t it just cause us to consider their interests, while being sensitive to the costs?

39. In other classes…

40. Brooks, Alison Wood, Hengchen Dai, and Maurice E. Schweitzer. "I’m Sorry About the Rain! Superfluous Apologies Demonstrate Empathic Concern and Increase Trust." Social Psychological and Personality Science (2013): 1948550613506122.

41. Super interesting. But does not answer why apologies have this effect…

42. Acevedo, Bianca P., et al. "Neural correlates of long-term intense romantic love." Social cognitive and affective neuroscience 7.2 (2012): 145-159.

43. Important to know neural pathways. But doesn’t explain why love works this way…

44. Spranca, Mark, Elisa Minsk, and Jonathan Baron. "Omission and commission in judgment and choice." Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 27.1 (1991): 76-105.

45. Important to document. And to rule out obvious alternative explanations. But doesn’t explain why…

46. In this class… We will address these “why’s” …Using game theory

47. What is game theory?

48. 5, 6 8, 4 3, 20, -3 U D LR The simplest “game” can be represented by the following “payoff matrix”

49. 5,6 8, 4 3, 20, -3 U D LR Player 1 chooses between two actions

50. 5, 6 8, 4 3, 20, -3 U D LR Player 2 simultaneously chooses between 2 actions

51. 5, 6 8, 4 3, 20, -3 U D LR The payoffs to player 1 are determined by her action as well as the action of player 2

52. 5, 6 8, 4 3, 20, -3 U D LR The payoffs to player 2 are determined by her action as well as the action of player 2

53. 5, 6 8, 4 3, 20, -3 U D LR This game can be “solved” by finding the “Nash equilibria”

54. 5, 6 8, 4 3, 20, -3 U D LR (U, L) is a Nash Equilibrium b/c neither can benefit by unilaterally deviating

55. “Prediction” of game theory: If both “expected” (U,L), both would play (U,L)! (Nash is “self enforcing”)

56. 5, 6 8, 4 3, 20, -3 U D LR (U,R) is NOT a Nash Equilibrium b/c 2 can benefit by unilaterally deviating to L

57. Game theory “predicts”: If both expected (U,R), player 2 would deviate! (I.e. if not Nash, cannot be “stable”)

58. Nash makes sense (arguably) if… -Uber-rational -Calculating

59. Such as Auctions…

60. Or Oligopolies…

61. But why would game theory matter for our puzzles?

62. Norms/rights/morality/emotions are not chosen; rather… We believe we have rights! We feel batman would be worse if he killed Apologies matter because recipients feel nice when they hear them

63. But… From where do these feelings/beliefs come?

64. Our thesis (in a few steps):

65. Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent”

66. Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent” Because of “evolution” (people with certain beliefs or preferences die out?)

67. Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent” Because of “selective imitation” (people with certain beliefs or preferences are more likely to be imitated?)

68. Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that “do better” become “more frequent” Because of “reinforcement learning” (certain beliefs or preferences are held onto more tenaciously?)

69. Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent  behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!) (even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

70. Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent  behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!) (even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

71. Thesis: Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent  behavior ends up consistent with Nash (o.w. feelings/beliefs would change!) (even though not aware of game, or of where feelings/beliefs come from)

72. In detail…

73. What is the key assumption in evolution, imitation, reinforcement learning?

74. T=0T=1 Evolution More successful traits reproduce faster

75. T=0T=1 Selective Imitation More successful traits more likely to be imitated

76. T=0T=1 Reinforcement Learning More successful behaviors held more tenaciously

77. All 3 processes  “optimal behaviors”!

78. T=0T=1T=2T=3

79. Also true in a game…

80. T=0T=1 L L L L L L L R R R R R R R L L More successful strategies become more frequent

81. T=0T=1T=2T=3 L L L L L L L L R R R R R R R L L L L L L L L R R L R R L L L L And eventually take over…

82. What if beliefs/feelings are being learned/evolving instead of “strategies”?

83. Suppose B L is belief that causes action L to be taken

84. T=0T=1 BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BRBR BRBR BRBR BRBR BRBR BRBR BRBR BLBL Feelings/beliefs that do better become more frequent

85. T=0T=1T=2T=3 BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BRBR BRBR BRBR BRBR BRBR BRBR BRBR BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL BRBR BLBL BRBR BRBR BLBL BLBL BLBL BLBL Behavior ends up consistent with Nash (even though not conscious of Nash, or of where feelings come from)

86. How do we know?

87. We will … -show model “fits” puzzles, and no alternative can… -develop novel predictions and validate with evidence… -show model is powerful outside of psychology … -demonstrate assumptions… -show robust

88. Who cares?

89. Novel prescriptions: e.g. Should our legal system treat omission and commission differently? (NO!) Should we attend to our emotions like love or try to overcome them? (Falling in love pays!)

90. Novel Predictions: e.g. Is commission worse than omission for all types of judgments? (We predict don’t care for how much you trust but does matter for how much you punish)

91. Clarifies: e.g. What are rights? What is a symbolic gesture?

92. Skills you’ll gain: – Basic game theory How to solve. Including some famous models like the “prisoners’ dilemma” and “Hawk- Dove” – Basic evolutionary dynamics How to simulate Including famous models like the “replicator dynamic” – Basic experimental methods How to evaluate At the end of the class, you will design experiments to provide more evidence (or not!) And… an understanding of where preferences and ideologies come from!

93. And now, for some logistics…

94. Syllabus