Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

United States Redistricting 101 Michael McDonald Associate Professor, George Mason University Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Special.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "United States Redistricting 101 Michael McDonald Associate Professor, George Mason University Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Special."— Presentation transcript:

1 United States Redistricting 101 Michael McDonald Associate Professor, George Mason University Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Special Thanks to Justin Levitt

2 Today’s conversation What? Who? Where? Why? How?

3 Today’s conversation What? Who? Where? Why? How?

4 What is “redistricting”? Draw (and re-draw) lines that determine which voters are represented by each legislative seat Federal State Local

5 Why re-draw district lines?                                           Population moves, creating lopsided districts where some votes are worth more than others

6 Constitutional mandate to redraw lines Districts must have roughly equal population Baker v. Carr, 1962 “One person, one vote”

7 2000― 2001― 2010― 2011 ― 2020― 2021 ― And so… Census Day Redistricting Census Day Redistricting Census Day Redistricting

8 Key redistricting dates April 1, 2010― December 31, 2010― January 10, 2011― April 1, 2011― End of session 2011 ― or early 2012 Census Day Census count to President Apportionment to U.S. House Redistricting data to states Most redistricting complete

9 Today’s conversation What? Who? Where? Why? How?

10 Who draws the lines In most states, the legislature has primary control State legislative districts: 37 states Congressional districts: 38 states (and 7 states with 1 Congressional district)

11 Other redistricting institutions AdvisoryPrimary control in the legislature Primary control outside legislature Politician Backup State legislative districts Congressional districts * *

12 2000 cycle judicial action State leg.Congress * Courts asked to step in3221 Court drew lines itself109 … and if that should fail * 7 states had only one congressional district in the 2000 cycle

13 Today’s conversation What? Who? Where? Why? How?

14 “Where” starts with federal protections Equal population Race/ethnicity and the Voting Rights Act

15 Equal population Congress: as equal as possible State legislature: 10% spread, if there’s a good reason Baker v. Carr, 1962 “One person, one vote”

16 “Where” starts with federal protections Equal population Race/ethnicity and the Voting Rights Act

17 Minority representation Cracking Packing

18 The Voting Rights Act Do minorities represent most of the voters in a concentrated area? Do white voters vote for different candidates than minorities? Section 2

19 The Voting Rights Act Section 2 Do minorities represent most of the voters in a concentrated area? Do whites tend to vote for different candidates than minorities? Is the minority population otherwise protected given the “totality of the circumstances”? Do Not Dilute

20 Complying with the Voting Rights Act Latino/Hispanic African-American Chicago suburbs

21 The Voting Rights Act Section 5 “Preclearance” for certain jurisdictions Is the new map intended to dilute minority votes? Does the new map leave minority voters worse off?

22 Race and ethnicity beyond the VRA Voting Rights Act protects minorities who are more than half of the voters in an area With smaller groups of minorities, it is OK to consider race and ethnicity, among other factors Race and ethnicity just can’t “predominate” without a really good reason

23 Warning signs when race or ethnicity “predominates,” outside of a VRA district Legislative testimony with sole focus on race Population data much more detailed for race Shape explained by race, but not by “traditional districting factors” Race and ethnicity beyond the VRA

24 After federal law, add state limitations Contiguity Political boundaries Compactness Communities of interest Partisanship/competition Nesting State leg.Congress 4822 4218 3617 2413 107 14 n/a

25 After federal law, add state limitations Contiguity Political boundaries Compactness Communities of interest Partisanship/competition Nesting State leg.Congress 4822 4218 3617 2413 107 14 n/a

26 Contiguity All parts of the district are adjacent to each other

27 After federal law, add state limitations Contiguity Political boundaries Compactness Communities of interest Partisanship/competition Nesting State leg.Congress 4822 4218 3617 2413 107 14 n/a

28 Political boundaries Follow county / city / town / ward lines But may split populations in strange ways

29 After federal law, add state limitations Contiguity Political boundaries Compactness Communities of interest Partisanship/competition Nesting State leg.Congress 4822 4218 3617 2413 107 14 n/a

30 Compactness Usually concerns the appearance of the district (or how close people live to each other)

31 After federal law, add state limitations Contiguity Political boundaries Compactness Communities of interest Partisanship/competition Nesting State leg.Congress 4822 4218 3617 2413 107 14 n/a

32 Communities of interest Kansas -- “Social, cultural, racial, ethnic, and economic interests common to the population of the area, which are probable subjects of legislation... should be considered. [S]ome communities of interest lend themselves more readily than others to being embodied in legislative districts...” Can and should be different in different parts of the state

33 Communities of interest Social interests Cultural interests Racial / ethnic interests Economic / trade interests Geographic interests Communication and transportation networks Media markets Urban and rural interests Occupations and lifestyles

34 After federal law, add state limitations Contiguity Political boundaries Compactness Communities of interest Partisanship/competition Nesting State leg.Congress 4822 4218 3617 2413 107 14 n/a

35 Partisanship and competition Two primary models: Prohibition on undue favoritism Affirmatively encourage competition

36 After federal law, add state limitations Contiguity Political boundaries Compactness Communities of interest Partisanship/competition Nesting State leg.Congress 4822 4218 3617 2413 107 14 n/a

37 Nesting Senate Assembly Not nested Nested

38 State legislatureCongress (or local) Who?Legislature or commission (+ courts) Where?Equal populationEqual population Voting Rights ActVoting Rights Act Contiguity Political boundaries Compactness Communities of interest Partisanship Nesting A quick review

39 Today’s conversation What? Who? Where? Why? How?

40 Why does redistricting matter? If you care about representation, and you care about political power, then you care about redistricting should

41 ~ 27 % of Congressional districts were drawn to be competitive ~ 9 %of Congressional races were competitive ~ 19 %of Congressional races had no major party opponent ~ 25 %of state House races were competitive * ~ 40 %of state House races had no major party opponent * Blunt measure #1: voter choice * 37 states measured Source:Gary C. Jacobson, Competition in U.S. Congressional Elections David Lublin & Michael McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?

42 District Partisanship Incumbent Situation Election Outcome Candidate Type Money Raised National Mood Demographic Change Campaign Finance Term Limits Redistricting Source: Michael McDonald & John Samples, The Marketplace of Democracy 14 But redistricting is only part of the process

43 Blunt measure #2: shape

44 Is this a good district? You can’t know if a district is “good,” unless you know what it’s trying to achieve Is she a good singer?

45 And pretty shapes are not neutral Source:Michael McDonald, Midwest Mapping Project

46 Why does redistricting matter? Politicians choosing their voters Eliminating incumbents or challengers

47 Conflating public, partisan, personal interests Barack Obama’s house Barack Obama: strong challenge for Congress in 2000 2002 district

48 Conflating public, partisan, personal interests Lorraine Koppell’s house Lorraine Koppell: strong challenge for state Senate in 2000 2002 district

49 Conflating public, partisan, personal interests Hakeem Jeffries’s house Hakeem Jeffries: strong challenge for state Assembly in 2000 2002 district

50 Why does redistricting matter? Politicians choosing their voters Eliminating incumbents or challengers Diluting minority votes Splitting up communities

51 Today’s conversation What? Who? Where? Why? How?

52 How to make sure districts are drawn in the public interest?

53 Principles for effective redistricting 1.Meaningful transparency 2.Meaningful independence 3.Meaningful diversity 4.Meaningful guidance

54 Principles for effective redistricting 1.Meaningful transparency 2.Meaningful independence 3.Meaningful diversity 4.Meaningful guidance

55 Meaningful transparency Multiple opportunities for meaningful public input -Before drafts -After drafts Data and tools to facilitate response Some explanation from redistricting body

56 Principles for effective redistricting 1.Meaningful transparency 2.Meaningful independence 3.Meaningful diversity 4.Meaningful guidance

57 Meaningful independence One of the players shouldn’t also be the umpire This is not the same as taking politics out of redistricting Legislature can still have a role -Select those who draw the lines -Review lines afterward

58 Principles for effective redistricting 1.Meaningful transparency 2.Meaningful independence 3.Meaningful diversity 4.Meaningful guidance

59 Meaningful diversity Those who draw the lines should reflect the state Need redistricting body of sufficient size Need rules/incentives to choose diverse membership

60 Principles for effective redistricting 1.Meaningful transparency 2.Meaningful independence 3.Meaningful diversity 4.Meaningful guidance

61 Meaningful guidance Criteria that reflect basic goals Enough flexibility to accommodate local exceptions Communities of interest Statewide majority is legislative majority

62 Public Participation This round of redistricting will be different than the past. The public will have new tools that will enable them to be more active participants in the redistricting process. These tools may be used for local redistricting.

63 Public Mapping Project Michael McDonald George Mason University Brookings Institution Michael McDonald George Mason University Brookings Institution Micah Altman Harvard University Brookings Institution Micah Altman Harvard University Brookings Institution Robert Cheetham Azavea Robert Cheetham Azavea Supported by The Sloan Foundation Joyce Foundation Amazon Corporation Judy Ford Wason Center at Christopher Newport Univ. Supported by The Sloan Foundation Joyce Foundation Amazon Corporation Judy Ford Wason Center at Christopher Newport Univ.


Download ppt "United States Redistricting 101 Michael McDonald Associate Professor, George Mason University Non-Resident Senior Fellow, Brookings Institution Special."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google