Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Models for comparing social policy Fly-In Session #1: Part 2.

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Models for comparing social policy Fly-In Session #1: Part 2."— Presentation transcript:

1 Models for comparing social policy Fly-In Session #1: Part 2

2 2 Marshall’s model of the development of citizenship rights Civil Rights Political Rights Social Rights Characteristic period18thcentury19thcentury 20th century Defining principle Individual freedom Political freedom Social welfare Typical measures Freedom of speech, thought & faith Right to vote, parliamentary reform, MPs paid Free education, pensions – ‘the welfare state’ ------> Cumulative development -----> ( Sociology at the Crossroads, 1963 )

3 3 Titmuss’ models of social policy 1The Residual welfare state: ‘based on the premise that there are two “natural” (or socially given) channels through which an individual’s needs are properly met; the private market and the family. Only when these break down should social welfare institutions come into play and then only temporarily’. 2The Industrial achievement-performance model: ‘ incorporates a significant role for s.w. institutions as adjuncts of the economy. It holds that social needs hould be met on the basis of merit, work performance and productivity.’ 3The Institutional redistributive model: ‘sees s w as a major integrated institution in society, providing universalist services outside the market on the principle of need.’ ( 1974 ) ( Social Policy, 1974 )

4 4 Esping-Andersen’s model of welfare state regimes # 1 E-A starts from the principle, espoused by Marshall, that social citizenship constitutes the ‘core idea’ of the ws But the notion of social rights as granted by the state which are inviolable and based upon citizenship rather than performance in the market are crucial if the ws is to be de-commodified, i.e. free of the market. Yet even where rights are granted, account must also be taken of the ways in which the state’s activities interlock with the operation of the market and the family’s role in social provision. E-A starts from the principle, espoused by Marshall, that social citizenship constitutes the ‘core idea’ of the ws But the notion of social rights as granted by the state which are inviolable and based upon citizenship rather than performance in the market are crucial if the ws is to be de-commodified, i.e. free of the market. Yet even where rights are granted, account must also be taken of the ways in which the state’s activities interlock with the operation of the market and the family’s role in social provision. Thus E-A identifies these three variables as crucial to any useful model of ws’s-market, state, and family. Thus E-A identifies these three variables as crucial to any useful model of ws’s-market, state, and family.

5 5 Esping-Andersen’s model of welfare state regimes # 2 E-A also sees ws’s as systems of stratification: ‘it is an active force in the ordering of social relations’p23 E-A also sees ws’s as systems of stratification: ‘it is an active force in the ordering of social relations’p23 Class is both an independent and dependent variable in the diff ws regimes Class is both an independent and dependent variable in the diff ws regimes How does E-A come to his three WS regimes? How does E-A come to his three WS regimes? On the basis of their de-commodification and the diff arrangements between state,market, and family On the basis of their de-commodification and the diff arrangements between state,market, and family

6 6 Esping-Andersen’s model of welfare state regimes # 3 The three capitalist welfare state regimes E-A identifies are: The Liberal welfare state The Liberal welfare state The Conservative(corporatist) welfare state The Conservative(corporatist) welfare state The Social-democratic welfare state The Social-democratic welfare state

7 7 Esping-Andersen’s ‘Liberal’ regime Emphasis on market-based social insurance and use of means test for benefits Levels of universal transfers and forms of social insurance ‘modest’, and welfare largely oriented to group of poor, i.e. low income ‘working class’, dependent on the state Emphasis on market-based social insurance and use of means test for benefits Levels of universal transfers and forms of social insurance ‘modest’, and welfare largely oriented to group of poor, i.e. low income ‘working class’, dependent on the state Benefits limited and stigmatised because assumption that high benefits reduce incentives to work Benefits limited and stigmatised because assumption that high benefits reduce incentives to work Private schemes encouraged for those wanting more than minimum cover, and sometimes actively subsidised Private schemes encouraged for those wanting more than minimum cover, and sometimes actively subsidised Such regimes are thus highly stratified and differentiated-minimisation of de-commodification effects. Such regimes are thus highly stratified and differentiated-minimisation of de-commodification effects. e.g. USA, Canada, Australia (UK?) e.g. USA, Canada, Australia (UK?)

8 8 Esping-Andersen’s Conservative/Corporatist regime Corporatist arrangements prominent. State welfare used to maintain and even reinforce existing class and status differentials to encourage social and political stability and continued loyalty to the state (nb earlier Bismarckian strategy in 19C) Corporatist arrangements prominent. State welfare used to maintain and even reinforce existing class and status differentials to encourage social and political stability and continued loyalty to the state (nb earlier Bismarckian strategy in 19C) State, rather than the market as main provider of welfare, but not to increase redistribution or equalisation. State, rather than the market as main provider of welfare, but not to increase redistribution or equalisation. Typically shaped by the (Catholic) church and commitment to traditional family patterns. Political parties with religious links. Typically shaped by the (Catholic) church and commitment to traditional family patterns. Political parties with religious links. State intervenes where welfare problems not otherwise unresolved State intervenes where welfare problems not otherwise unresolved Women discouraged from labour market, and non-working wives excluded from benefits. Day care, family services etc underdeveloped Women discouraged from labour market, and non-working wives excluded from benefits. Day care, family services etc underdeveloped ‘Subsidiarity’ principle for state intervention ‘Subsidiarity’ principle for state intervention e.g. Austria, Germany, France & Italy e.g. Austria, Germany, France & Italy

9 9 Esping-Andersen’s Social Democratic regime Principles of universalism and de-commodification extended to ‘middle-classes’ not just poor, working class Principles of universalism and de-commodification extended to ‘middle-classes’ not just poor, working class S-D because s-d was dominant force in past social reform Tendency to encourage equality across classes based on high standards rather than minima. Thus services and benefits provided which were acceptable to m/c groups whilst w/c get access to same benefits. S-D because s-d was dominant force in past social reform Tendency to encourage equality across classes based on high standards rather than minima. Thus services and benefits provided which were acceptable to m/c groups whilst w/c get access to same benefits. Attitude to family contrasts with other two regimes: state takes on and socialises many traditional family responsibilities such as support for children and old. Attitude to family contrasts with other two regimes: state takes on and socialises many traditional family responsibilities such as support for children and old. Full employment is central to this regime because it provides income support and makes it possible to pay the costs of welfare via taxation. Full employment is central to this regime because it provides income support and makes it possible to pay the costs of welfare via taxation. e.g. Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark e.g. Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark

10 10 Critiques of the E-A model # 1 Model too limited to labour market areas? Concerns himself only with certain benefits/provision: pensions, sickness and unemployment benefit. What about other provisions? Would they lead to the same conclusions re regimes? What is consequence of focusing in links between labour market and welfare? What about health, education, personal social services etc…?

11 11 Critiques of the E-A model # 2 Too few regimes? What about ‘southern welfare states’ : Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece (Ferrera etc.)? What about ‘southern welfare states’ : Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece (Ferrera etc.)? What about Australia and New Zealand (Castles etc.); What about Australia and New Zealand (Castles etc.); What about Japan and other Asian welfare states? What about Japan and other Asian welfare states? (See E-A’s response to these questions in his Social foundations of postindustrial economies )

12 12 Critiques of the E-A model # 3 Gender See Langan & Ostner article (1991) Treatment by E-A of women and welfare fails to acknowledge role of women in the ‘decommodified’ domestic sphere which is necessary basis for the ‘commodification’ of labour See Langan & Ostner article (1991) Treatment by E-A of women and welfare fails to acknowledge role of women in the ‘decommodified’ domestic sphere which is necessary basis for the ‘commodification’ of labour L&O argue that men and women are gendered commodities with different experiences of the labour market, resulting from different relationship to family life i.e. the. L&O argue that men and women are gendered commodities with different experiences of the labour market, resulting from different relationship to family life i.e. the WS is gendered. See also welfare services provided free by women - no recognition in aggregate statistics but probably crucial in making judgements about who gains and loses in diff welfare regimes. See also welfare services provided free by women - no recognition in aggregate statistics but probably crucial in making judgements about who gains and loses in diff welfare regimes. ( See E-A’s response to these questions in his Social foundations of postindustrial economies )

13 13 Critiques of the E-A model # 4 ‘Race’ Significance of ‘race’ for post-war welfare states especially in W Europe. Access and exclusion to welfare benefits based upon combination of residence and citizenship status. Significance of ‘race’ for post-war welfare states especially in W Europe. Access and exclusion to welfare benefits based upon combination of residence and citizenship status. Popular ideology, exploited both by political parties and governments re ‘immigrants’ seeking welfare benefits. Continuing attempts to define citizenship in ways which limit or exclude some groups from social and political rights. Popular ideology, exploited both by political parties and governments re ‘immigrants’ seeking welfare benefits. Continuing attempts to define citizenship in ways which limit or exclude some groups from social and political rights. High proportion of (low-paid) support and service jobs in western European welfare staesheld by etnic minorities and ‘guest-workers’. High proportion of (low-paid) support and service jobs in western European welfare staesheld by etnic minorities and ‘guest-workers’. Thus certain ‘racial’ groups at bottom of social stratification system and/or excluded from access to welfare benefits, whilst being used to finance welfare provisions (more cheaply). i.e. WS is racially structured. Thus certain ‘racial’ groups at bottom of social stratification system and/or excluded from access to welfare benefits, whilst being used to finance welfare provisions (more cheaply). i.e. WS is racially structured.


Download ppt "Models for comparing social policy Fly-In Session #1: Part 2."

Similar presentations


Ads by Google