1. Moderators of the disapproval of peer ‘punishment’ Kimmo Eriksson, Per Andersson, Pontus Strimling To appear in Group Processes & Intergroup Relations

2. Personality and morality Social dilemmas Who makes an effort for the greater good? Are such efforts generally approved of? The intuitive answers have at least some truth to them.

3. Personality and morality Social dilemmas Who makes an effort for the greater good? Are such efforts generally approved of? Peer ‘punishment’ Who makes an effort to harm a peer who neglects the greater good? Are such efforts generally approved of? The intuitive answers have at least some truth to them. No clear intuitive answers!

4. Answers suggested by prior research Who uses peer ’punishment’ is –not related to prosociality –correlated across strategic situations and targets Peer ’punishment’ tends to be disapproved of –as measured by experiments on second-order punishment in economic games –as measured by judgments of vignettes on everyday social dilemmas but higher approval if punishment is a collective concern Prior methods are not wholly satisfactory! Unclear what problem people have with peer ’punishers’, given that the direct effect of their actions for the group tends to be positive. Eriksson et al. (2014) Review of Behavioral Economics Strimling & Eriksson (2014) In van Lange et al. (eds.), Reward and Punishment in Social Dilemmas.

5. Hypothesis A problem people have with peer ’punishers’ is that they come across as aggressive (bullies); such people are on the whole viewed as a problem rather than an asset to have around because they will also ’punish unfairly’.

6. Hypothesis & Predictions A problem people have with peer ’punishers’ is that they come across as aggressive (bullies); such people are on the whole viewed as a problem rather than an asset to have around because they will also ’punish unfairly’. P1: Collectively supported ’punishment’ – indicating that it is less driven by the punisher’s personality – should be disapproved of less. P2: More severe ’punishment’ - although potentially more effective - should be disapproved of more. P3: More aggressive people should identify more with the ’punisher’ and therefore disapprove less of peer punishment.

7. Our method: abstract animations (inspired by Heider & Simmel, 1944) Weak – Individual – Physical

8. Example of how one participant described his/her judgment of the situation “blue triangle was quite aggressive, 'pushing' and 'shoving' the purple triangle... the behavior of the purple triangle was less than exemplary but there were other ways to deal with this situation”

9. Study 1: Variations of ”physical punishment” Severity : Strong / Weak Responsibility: Individual / Collective as well as no punishment at all 2 × 2 + 1 = 5 variations

10. Strong instead of Weak

11. Example quote ”Blue had some serious anger issues!!”

12. Collective instead of Individual

13. Approval scale 1.I think the BLUE triangle’s behavior was appropriate 2.I would like to spend time with a person who behaves like the BLUE triangle 3.If a person who behaves like the BLUE triangle belonged to my group I would consider that person to be a problem (rather than an asset) for the group 4.I think BLUE is someone who is generally trustworthy 5.I think BLUE is someone who is generally angry 6.I think BLUE is someone who takes others’ interests into account 7.I think BLUE is someone who would punish others unfairly 8.I think BLUE is someone who generally follows standard norms of behavior Cronbach’s alpha =.92

14. N = 500 respondents (100 per condition) G: All versions of punishment were less approved of than no punishment at all.

15. N = 500 respondents (100 per condition) G: All versions of punishment were less approved of than no punishment at all. P1: Collective → less disapproval

16. N = 500 respondents (100 per condition) G: All versions of punishment were less approved of than no punishment at all. P1: Collective → less disapproval P2: Severe → much greater disapproval

17. G: All versions of punishment were less approved of than no punishment at all. P1: Collective → less disapproval P2: Severe → much greater disapproval P3: High aggression respondent → less disapproval

18. Economic instead of Physical

19. N = 500 respondents (100 per condition) Similar results! G: All versions of punishment were less approved of than no punishment at all. P1: Collective → less disapproval P2: Severe → much greater disapproval

20. N = 500 respondents (100 per condition) Similar results! G: All versions of punishment were less approved of than no punishment at all. P1: Collective → less disapproval P2: Severe → much greater disapproval P3: High aggression respondent → less disapproval

21. Summary of findings Main effect of peer punishment compared to no punishment: Across physical and economic kinds of ’punishment’ we found general moral disapproval of animated peer punishers Three moderators were identified: More disapproval of individually deployed punishment More disapproval of more severe punishment More disapproval expressed by low aggression individuals

22. Quick preview of new data I decide you get 25 % Costly 2nd party ’punishment’ after receiving an unfair split in the dictator game Spend my share on reducing his payoff to zero? After choice: Why did you make this choice?  to be fair  it’s the morally right thing  to earn as much as possible  to defy the other  to punish the other  to protect myself

26. Conclusions Consistent with the previously found tendency to morally disapprove of peer ’punishment’, there is a common moral motive to refrain from using it. Consistent with the previously found moderating role of aggression, punitively motivated punishment was associated with high trait aggression and morally motivated restraint was associated with low trait aggression.