1. Maritime Homeland Defense / Security Mine Countermeasures
Navy Mine and Anti-Submarine Warfare Command A Warfare Center of Excellence
Maritime Homeland Defense / Security Mine Countermeasures
Presented to the 2011 Spring Regional Conference
of the Mine Warfare Association
11 May 2011
Mr. Marvin Heinze
NMAWC Maritime Homeland Defense
This brief is Unclassified

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Our Discussion Today
Mission / Requirements
Capability / Capacity
Exercises
Preparation
Related efforts
This slide is Unclassified

3. Mine Warfare in the United States …It happens…
Lake Ponchartrain, 2004
Floating IED discovered ivo visiting dignitary
Sacramento River, 1980
“Patriotic Scuba diver’ closes the shipping channel
Chesapeake Bay, June 1942
U-701 lays 15 magnetic mines
3 ships sunk
2 ships damaged

4. MHD MCM Policy / Mission
DoD is the lead MOTR agency for mine countermeasures in the Maritime Domain (NSPD41/MOTR)
Navy has DoD maritime mine countermeasure capability, implying
MCMRON and MCM forces will be needed to counter mine and UWIED threats
No civil authority MCM capability
Specific domestic MCM Mission not defined
Interagency equities and priorities
CONPLANs have general mission
DHS will plan for the prevention and detection of sea mining…(MOTR)

5. USN MIW Operational Framework
COMTHIRDFLT
COMSIXTHFLT
COMSEVENTHFLT
COMSECONDFLT
COMFOURTHFLT
COMFIFTHFLT
VCOM NMAWC +
MIW Battle Staff
COM NMAWC
VCOM NMAWC
USW COE
(ASW + MIW)
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
CTF xx
SMCM
Class Advocate
COMCMRON FIVE
COMCMRON SEVEN
COMCMRON TWO
Deployable staff supports NCC MIW operations and training

6. MHD/S MCM Response Capability
Command and Control
MIWC in San Diego
MCM CDR in San Diego
Rapidly deployable
AMCM
MH-53E in NORVA
Limited capability
Confined water
Deployable - -
UMCM
UUVs, Divers, MMS
EOD PLT, MMS PLT
Neutralization
UUV PLT
Rapidly deployed
Confined water Capable
SMCM
Ships in San Diego
Long response times
Limited capability
Confined water
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7. Today’s MHD/S MCM Response Capacity
Initial
Leadership
MIWC LNOs
COMCMRON staff
UUVs
2 X UUV PLT
Mk 18 UUVs
Divers
2 X EOD MCM PLT
1 X VSW Dive PLT
Follow on
Leadership
NMAWC VCOM and staff
Aircraft
4 - 6 MH 53E
Various MCM equip
Ships
2 - 4 Avenger class SMCM
Marine Mammals
MK 7/8 MMS
6+ dolphins

8. Experimentation / Exercises in MHD/S MCM
4 events in 2 years
Change detection
Experimentation
Low Frequency Broad Band
Synthetic Aperture Sonar
2010
Bay Shield 10
MCM CDR Training (MHS)
Frontier Sentinel 10
MCM CDR Training (MHD)
Experimentation
High clutter limits current mine hunting effectiveness
Improving change detection techniques and procedures
Use of data fusion center
Advanced new sonar technologies
LFBB Sonar for detection of buried mines
Synthetic aperture sonar for improved target discrimination
MHD MCM CDR training

9. Exercise Bay Shield 10 Quick Look
2 Mines Found
NMAWC OBJECTIVES
Integrated training for MCMRON 2/DIV
MCM planning and execution using Port Folder and “change detect” tactics
Exercise MCM Force in MHS Mission
Conduct MCM Ops within a multi-agency Unified Command structure
Areas of MCM ops
Goods
USCG/USN interaction and integration
MCMRON 2/NMAWC engagement with the COTP/UCP
Valuable CONUS MCMC training for MCMRON 2/ DIV 31
Preparations for Frontier Sentinel
Others
Large number of contacts overwhelm mine hunting capacity
Incident Command System proficiency needed
Limited UCP secure comms

10. Frontier Sentinel 10 Overview 25 May – 11 Jun 2010
PURPOSE
Bilateral homeland defense/ security exercise to conduct information / intelligence sharing, conduct mine countermeasures operations, conduct sea trial experimentation, conduct bilateral maritime defense planning and response to synchronize the operational planning process.

11. Frontier Sentinel 10 Participants
US Navy:
COMSECONDFLT NMAWC
COMCMRON TWO ONR
HM14 DET NOMWC
EODMU ONE & SIX
US Coast Guard:
SECTOR Hampton Roads
DOG (MSRT, MSST)
Canadian Navy:
JTF Atlantic
2 x MCDV
Fleet Diving Unit
NMAWC OBJECTIVES
Exercise TF 25 in MHD mission
Train MCMRON TWO
Conduct Sea Trial Experiments
Improve confined waterways TTP

12. Trident Fury 2011 Esquimalt, Canada
Overview
What: TF11 is a Bi-Lateral exercise involving US and Canadian Forces.
Where: Esquimalt Harbor, Esquimalt Approaches and Constance Banks
- When: May 2011
Objectives
- Conduct Bi-Lateral MCM operations
- Conduct integrated MCM operations
- Exercise interagency interoperability
Improve confined waters MCM tactics
Evaluate MCMRON2 as MCMC
Assess MCM capability and capacity
Participating Forces

13. Homeland Defense Port Surveys and MIW Port Folders
Baseline Survey Port Folders
Quick response guide for MCMC
Port folders cover 17 DoD ports
all complete as of Dec 2010
bi annual updates started
Posted on Enterprise Knowledge Management (eKM)
Bottom Roughness
Bottom Sediments
Clutter Density
Doctrinal Bottom
Change Detection Results
Baseline imagery
New imagery
Port Folders accelerate port opening
Change Detection reduces the number of contacts requiring identification
Change detection results:
Eliminates 35-55% of mine-like objects
Reduces clearance time by ~30%
Contact in new imagery needs to be prosecuted

14. Related MHD MCM efforts
Naval Postgraduate School
2008 -“A Systems Approach to Defeating MIEDS in US Ports”
Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee
2009 -“MIEDs in Ports and Harbors” study
Center for Naval Analysis
2008 -“Mine Warfare Homeland Defense and Security”
“Mine Clearance in support of Homeland Security”
NORTHCOM Capabilities Requirements Division
2011 – “Maritime Mine Countermeasures Study”
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MHD MCM way ahead
Better define specific requirements
Defense
Whole of government
Improve confined waters equipment
Neutralization UUV
One pass Detect to Engage
Determine best MHD employment of MCM Mission package
Assist DHS efforts to prevent mining
Better threat awareness
Effective surveillance
Cooperative efforts with port entities
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16. Questions?

17. Mine Warfare Direct Costs
USS SAMUEL B ROBERTS
SADAF 02- Moored Contact
USS TRIPOLI
LUGM I- Moored Contact
Mine Cost Ship Damage
$1,000 $57 Million
Mine Cost Ship Damage
$1,000 $10 Million
USS PRINCETON
MANTA- Bottom Influence
Mine Cost Ship Damage
$10,000 $100 Million
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18. Mine Warfare Indirect Costs
Economic/Political Effects
90%+ US trade transits US ports
Significant cost
Global Commerce Effects
~33% World trade transits US ports
Significant effect on trade
Power projection
90% of military sustainment by sea
Significant effect on defense operations