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Michael Schapira Yale and UC Berkeley Joint work with P. Brighten Godfrey, Aviv Zohar and Scott Shenker.

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Presentation on theme: "Michael Schapira Yale and UC Berkeley Joint work with P. Brighten Godfrey, Aviv Zohar and Scott Shenker."— Presentation transcript:

1 Michael Schapira Yale and UC Berkeley Joint work with P. Brighten Godfrey, Aviv Zohar and Scott Shenker

2 Incentives and Protocols for Congestion Control Our Model Convergence Results Incentive Compatibility Results Conclusions and Open Questions

3 Congestion collapse  Sometimes several orders of magnitude lower!  Observed in the mid-1980’s The solution:TCP  Additive Increase Multiplicative Decrease (AIMD) time transmission rate

4 Routers use FIFO queuing. 2 TCP connections C e =1 S1S1 T1T1 S2S2 T2T2 edge e

5 Can this really happen? Yes!  Why not?  Manipulation observed in other protocols (e.g., P2P).  Tweaking browsers to open more connections.  Download accelerators/patches: commercial and free software that promises to speed up downloads.

6 In a distributed environment, protocols are just a suggestion. Participants will not follow the protocol if they can gain by deviating. Economic mechanism design: Use Game Theory and Economics to analyze and design incentives.  Algorithmic mechanism design [Nisan-Ronen 99]

7 Incentive compatibility and convergence often go hand in hand  Both are standard requirements (e.g., the Border Gateway Protocol)  Easier to talk about an “outcome” when things converge  Similar phenomena. We analyze convergence first, then incentives.

8 We present a simple model for congestion control. Simplistic!  constant number of connections…  unchanging demands…  fluid model… … but captures  interplay: end-host protocols and queuing policies  asynchronous interactions  convergence properties in complex topologies  incentives

9 The network is a directed graph G(V,E).  V = routers  E = links Each edge e has capacity c(e). 2 3 2 1 1 4 3

10 Connection C i is the source-target pair (s i,t i ) and a fixed route between them. Each connection C i has a maximum transmission rate  i and wishes to maximize its throughput. 2 3 2 1 1 4 3 S1S1 T2T2 S2S2 T1T1

11 Connection C i ‘s flow on edge e is If the flow entering an edge e exceeds its capacity, then traffic is dropped according the edge’s queuing policy 9 2 7 C e =9 ? ? ? edge e

12 FIFO: Strict Priority Queuing (SPQ): 9 2 7 C e =9 3.5 4.5 1 9 2 7 C e =9 7 2 0

13 Weighted Fair Queueing (WFQ):  Connection C i has weight w i and gets capacity share  Unused capacity is redistributed similarly 9 2 7 C e =9 3.5 2 w 1 =1 w 2 =1 w 3 =1

14 Infinite sequence of discrete time steps t=1,2,… At each time step, an adversarial “scheduler” activates some subset of the connections and edges.  An activated connection uses a congestion control protocol to adjust transmission rate.  An activated edge adjusts the flow rates according to its queuing policy.  No connection or edge is starved indefinitely.

15 S1S1 T2T2 S2S2 T1T1 S3S3 T3T3 6 *all edge capacities = 6 *all routers use FIFO Queuing 6 6 6 6 6 0 0 6 3 3 2 4 2

16 When do the network dynamics converge to a stable flow pattern?  for what combinations of congestion control protocols and queuing policies? When are connections incentivized to follow the protocol?  for what combinations of congestion control protocols and queuing policies?

17 Bad news: If weights/priorities are not consistent across routers, Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ) and Strict Priority Queuing (SPQ) might not converge even for fixed senders! 3 4 2 1 > > *capacities = transmission rates = 1 *uncoordinated priorities *infinitely many equilibrium points *oscillation!

18 Bad news: If weights/priorities are not consistent across routers, Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ) and Strict Priority Queuing (SPQ) might not converge even for fixed senders! *capacities = transmission rates = 100mbps

19 Bad news: If weights/priorities are not consistent across routers, Weighted Fair Queuing (WFQ) and Strict Priority Queuing (SPQ) might not converge even for fixed senders! *capacities = transmission rates = 1 *uncoordinated priorities *a single equilibrium points *oscillations almost from all initial states! 3 2 1 > > >

20 Thm: If all routers use WFQ or SPQ with consistent weights/priorities then, for fixed senders, convergence is guaranteed. Thm: If all routers use FIFO, there is always an equilibrium flow pattern for fixed senders.  Shown using a fixed-point argument.  Open questions: (1) Is this equilibrium unique? (2) Is convergence guaranteed?  We give partial answers. Still wide open.

21 A family of congestion control protocols  Increase transmission rate, until experiencing a small amount of packet loss.  If losing packets, lower transmission rate to match reported throughput rate. Like TCP: Increase-Decrease Unlike TCP: General increase. Specific decrease

22 Thm: When all connections use PIED, and all routers use WFQ or SPQ with coordinated weights/priorities, then the flow pattern converges.  The equilibrium point is efficient: (1) capacity is not wasted; (2) packets are not dropped needlessly.  If routers use WFQ, with all weights equal (Fair Queuing), then the equilibrium point optimizes max- min fairness.  Open Question: What about FIFO?

23 Thm: When all routers use WFQ or SPQ with coordinated weights/priorities, then PIED is incentive compatible.  That is, the end-host’s throughput at the stable state is as good as or better than anything it can get by not executing PIED.  In fact, even a coalition of end-hosts cannot gain by deviating from PIED!

24 SPQ and WFQ are hard to implement in routers.  Per-flow processing! Defn: An edge’s queuing policy is called “local” if it does not distinguish between two flows that have the same incoming and outgoing links. Thm: If all routers use local and efficient queuing policies then PIED is not incentive compatible.  Generalization of our example for FIFO

25 New perspective on congestion control. 3 desiderata: convergence, efficiency and incentives. FIFO! Improve the model!  coming and going connections…  changing demands…  traffic bursts…

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