1. 1 Meta-ethics Section 5 Naturalism & Non-naturalism

2. 2 Theories that aspire to supply the basis for the moral truths claimed by moral realism & the moral knowledge claimed to be possible by moral cognitivism.

3. 3 Non-naturalism Moral truths can be known not by reasoning from definitions or experience but intuitively. Hard to see how such truths could be learned.

4. 4 Ethical Naturalism Moral truths result from & are underpinned by natural facts, & the relevant facts are necessarily connected to the corresponding ethical truths & constitute them.

5. 5 Distinct From… Ontological naturalism: general metaphysical thesis about the nature of facts. Methodological naturalism: concerns how we may properly investigate them.

6. 6 Ontological & Methodological Naturalism Both are consistent with ethical naturalism where they grant that moral propositions can be underpinned by natural facts (supervenience).

7. 7 Restrictive Versions Restrictive versions of both these kinds of naturalism hold that there are no facts about desirability, rightness or reasons for action. Conflict with ethical naturalism. Moral realists need to reject these versions.

8. 8 Can Natural Facts Constitute Ethical Ones? Non-naturalism: regards the supervenience of ethical truths on natural ones as mysterious. Naturalism: (certain) natural truths constitute ethical ones. Necessarily related.

9. 9 What Kind of Facts are Relevant? Philippa Foot — facts about causing harm are necessarily related to ethical conclusions. Other examples include facts about animal suffering & welfare.

10. 10 Further Examples John Searle — facts about words spoken can generate obligations, in the context of human institutions. Obligations to keep promises. Implicit benefits to human welfare of (some) institutions make the related obligations moral ones.

11. 11 Think About… ways of reasoning from empirical facts to moral conclusions.

12. 12 Non-naturalism V Restrictive Forms Non-naturalism is attractive when naturalism is interpreted in restrictive forms (since the latter preclude ethical truths). But ethical naturalists need not endorse restrictive interpretations.

13. 13 Ethical Naturalism Coheres with the accounts of ‘oughts’, moral motivation & moral goodness presented in the other Sections of this Chapter. Coheres with the accounts of intrinsic value, rightness & moral obligation presented elsewhere in the book.