1. MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE: The Case of Chile Rodrigo Fuentes Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Maputo March 25, 2009

2. Motivation NR: curse or blessing? Still open question –Fiscal response is one of the key elements –After a boom there is always a bust Why Chile? –Chile supplies 43% of world copper exports –CODELCO produced 16.4% of Gov. revenues in 2007 –Pressures for higher government expenditures Main goal of my presentation: show how government ‘s copper revenues are managed to avoid undesired outcomes

3. Are resources well managed? Yes! Transparency in the public finance Fiscal rule determines the timing of spending copper revenues Fiscal rule + stabilization fund avoid appreciation of the local currency Natural resources’ privatization Institutions and property rights are essential to make the above policies work

4. This presentation The role of copper in the Chilean economy Early reforms on fiscal discipline and how they survived over time The role of contracts with the private sector Government saving, intergenerational transfers and financial crisis Policy lessons

5. The role of copper in the Chilean economy

6. Price of Copper: Recent booming episode (*) Deflated by USA Wholesale Price Index, basis July 2008=100. Source: Chilean Copper Commission.

7. Copper production by CODELCO versus private producers Source: Chilean Copper Commission. (thousands tons of fine copper)

8. Foreign direct investment Source: Foreign Investment Committee. (nominal millions US$)

9. Mining investment in Chile Source: CODELCO, ENAMI and Foreign Investment Committee. Data for 1974- 1975 was not available for public investment. (nominal millions US$)

10. Government's revenues Source: The Budget Office of the Ministry of Finance (DIPRES). (million Chilean $ of 2007)

11. Early reforms on fiscal discipline and how they survived over time

12. Fiscal reforms: Initial conditions How was a responsible fiscal rule shaped over time? How and when did it start? Long history of failure: WWII to1970 Nationalization of large copper mines, 1971 Budget deficit (12%) financed by the Central Bank: 1973 High barriers to trade, financial repression, price control: 1973

13. Balancing fiscal accounts The Military government after 1973 –moved toward market economy –liberalized prices and interest rates –introduced a drastic trade reform –privatized SOEs – established a new pension fund system and – enforced fiscal and monetary responsibility

14. Some of the principles behind the reforms Secured property rights Fiscal consolidation and orthodox management of monetary and foreign exchange policies Favoring rules instead of public discretion Institutionalization of “rules of the game”

15. New environment Drastic reduction of public spending, tax reforms and privatization of SOE New fiscal institutionalism. 1975: State Financial Administration Law New constitution to shape political structure: –preserve continuity of policies –strong presidential system: President controls budget and legislative agenda

16. Democratic government: 1990 - Keeps fiscal austerity: surplus in the 90s 2000: Explicit fiscal rule –structural surplus of 1% –recently cut to 0.5% Structural balance –tax revenues estimated at long-term trend GDP –prices of copper and molybdenum at their long- run level Structural balance isolates cyclical effects

17. Fiscal deficit of central government 1960-2007 Source: The Budget Office of the Minister of Finance (DIPRES), Jofré, Lüders and Wagner (2000). (percentage of GDP)

19. Contracts with the private sector

20. Private sector is important in harnessing the revenues from NR Provides required capital Faces risks of expropriation Shares NR rents with the State → Government needs to provide right incentives to promote investment

21. Chilean policies for FDI and copper Decree Law 600 for FDI, 1974 –guarantees rights to transfer capital and benefits –establishes non-discrimination principle between foreign and domestic investors –tax treatment invariability of tax system accelerated depreciation, cumulative losses and interest payment deducted for tax purpose Organic Constitution Law of Mining Concessions, 1982 –compensation in case of expropriation=NPV of verified reserves

22. Chilean policies for FDI and copper Chilean Mining Code, 1983 –State is absolute owner of all mines –Can grant concessions for exploitation and exploration Before 2005, fiscal regime targeted profits rather than revenues Problem: government did not collect much taxes from mining activities Is there rents in copper mining? Royalty on mining from 2006 and on

23. Royalty tax according to the annual sales of a mining operator Source: Foreign Investment Committee.

24. Government savings, intergenerational transfers and financial crisis

25. Planned uses of copper resources Revenues from royalty → Fund for Innovation and Competitiveness Fund for Social and Economic Stabilization, FESS –smoothes effects of copper’s price Pension Reserve Fund, PRF –minimum and solidarity pensions –must be increased by 0.2% (min) to 0.5% (max) of previous year’s GDP

26. Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) Ministry of Finance decides: –Investments of and withdrawals from funds Central Bank intermediates both funds –delivers daily, monthly and quarterly reports –FESS: 12% of GDP (08/2008) –PRF: 1.5% of GDP (08/2008) According to Walsh et al. (2008) –management of the SWF is transparent and according to best practice

27. Chile’s sovereign wealth funds allocation *As of August 2008. Sources: Ministry of Finance (2008 a, b) and Walsh et al. (2008). (percent of total assets ) Current* End-2008 target Sovereign Bonds (Nominal) 69 45 Sovereign Bonds (Inflation-Indexed) 1 15 Money Market Assets 30 5 Corporate Bonds 0 20 Equities 0 15 Total 100

28. Fiscal policy may worsen the crisis Evidence –Deliberate ‘countercyclical’ discretionary policy has not contributed to economic stability (Feldstein, 2002) –Let the automatic stabilizers work (Taylor, 2009) Carefully financial assistance to financial sector and new regulation scheme Role for monetary policy Chile: fiscal rule is an automatic stabilizer

29. Concluding remarks and policy lessons

30. Main lessons from the Chilean case Private sector involvement is crucial for extracting NR under financial capital scarcity –How to share NR rents –How to ensure property rights Fiscal rule SWF smooth government expenditures Government reputation, good institutions and policy improvements → save in good times for bad times

31. MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES REVENUE: The Case of Chile Rodrigo Fuentes Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Maputo March 25, 2009