1. 1 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Particles and Fields Package (PFP) Instrument Preliminary Design Review Safety and Mission Assurance Jorg Fischer, PFP SMA Manager

2. 2 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 PFP QA Organization Quality Assurance Build Configuration Verification Build Configuration Verification ESD Control PFP SMA Manager PFP SMA Manager Safety Configuration Management Configuration Management Documentation and Records Documentation and Records PMPCB, FRB, MRB Training and Certification Training and Certification Personnel Safety Personnel Safety Flight Hardware Safety Flight Hardware Safety Lab Inspections Contamination Control Contamination Control Support Flight H/W & S/W QA Testing Support Flight H/W & S/W QA Testing Quality Assurance Engineer Team Quality Assurance Engineer Team PFP Project Manager LASP SMA Manager CESR SMA Manager CESR SMA Manager GSFC SMA Manager GSFC SMA Manager Inspections, Audits Support lessons Learned

3. 3 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Responsibilities of Mission Assurance Non-Conformance Control – PFR Reporting and Review Material: Selection, Procurement, Traceability Controls Calibration Control ESD Control Configuration Management and Data Control Manufacturing and Test Control Internal and External Auditing Contamination Control Software Assurance In-process Inspections, Test Monitoring Integration Test Readiness Review / Test Witness Verification and Environmental Test Review Final Acceptance Data Package Training and Lessons Learned

4. 4 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Mission Assurance Implementation Plans  Mission Assurance Implementation Plans (MAIP) Status SSL, LASP, CESR have submitted a MAIP indicating how SSL will implement the MAVEN Mission Assurance Requirements –SSL: MAVEN_PF_QA_002 –LASP/LPW: MAVEN-RSS-PLAN-0038 –CESR/SWEA: SWEA-PL-32100-CESR-001-GEN –GSFC/MAG: pending –Result of many iterations between Project SMA & PFP –In review at Project –Includes a compliance verification matrix, deliverables list

5. 5 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 SMA Requirements and Documentation 1.GENERAL 1.1.Basis and Scope of the Plan 1.1.1.CESR 1.2.General Requirements 1.3.Use of Previously Designed, Fabricated, or Flown Hardware 1.4.Flow-Down of MA Requirements 1.5.Surveillance 1.6.SR&QA Verification 1.7.Status Reporting 1.8.Applicable Documents (Appendix A) 2.ASSURANCE REVIEW REQUIREMENTS 2.1.General Requirements 2.2.GSFC Flight Assurance Review Requirements 2.3.Flight Assurance Review Program 3.PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION REQUIREMENTS 3.1.General Requirements 3.2.Documentation Requirements 3.2.1.Verification Matrix 3.2.2.Verification Test Plan 3.2.3.Verification Test Procedures 3.2.4.Verification Test Report 3.3.Demonstration of Failure-Free Operation 3.4.Comprehensive Performance Test 4.SAFETY 4.1.General 4.2.System Description and Safety Assessment Report 4.2.1.Preliminary Safety Assessment 4.3.Procedure Approval 4.4.Safety Noncompliance Requests 4.5.Safety Working Group Meetings 4.6.Safety Data Package, Launch Site Safety Plan, and Orbital Debris Assessment 4.7.Mishaps 4.8.Assessments 5.1.PARTS SELECTION 5.1.1.EEE Parts Identification List 5.2.Other Parts 5.2.1.Magnetic Devices 5.2.2.Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs) 5.2.3.Units and Subassemblies 5.2.4.Field Programmable Devices 5.2.5.PIND Testing 5.2.6.Destructive Physical Analyses (DPA) 5.3.Ceramic Capacitors 5.4.Derating 5.5.Radiation Tolerance 5.6.Alerts 5.7.Parts Age Control 5.8.Parts Control Board 6.MATERIALS AND PROCESSES CONTROL REQUIREMENTS 6.1.Selection Requirements 6.1.1.Compliant Materials 6.1.2.Noncompliant Materials 6.1.3.Conventional Applications 6.1.4.Nonconventional Applications 6.1.5.Inorganic and Metallic Materials 6.1.6.Non-metallic Materials 6.1.7.Fasteners 6.1.8.Lubricants 6.1.9.Consideration in Process Selection 6.1.10.Shelf Life Controlled Items 6.1.11.Magnetics Compatibility 6.2.Documentation 6.3.GIDEP Alerts 6.4.Materials and Process Control Board 7.DESIGN ASSURANCE AND RELIABILITY 7.1.Requirements 7.2.Implementation 7.3.Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 7.4.Limited Life Items 7.5.Trending 7.6.Parts Stress Analysis 7.7.Worst Case Analyses 8.QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS 8.1.Support of Design Reviews 8.2.Configuration Management 8.3.Identification and Traceability 8.4.Procurement Controls 8.4.1.Purchased Raw Materials 8.4.2.Age Control and Limited-Life Products 8.4.3.Inspection and Test Records 8.4.4.Purchase Order Review 8.4.5.Re-submission of Non-conforming Materials 8.5.Receiving Inspection 8.6.Fabrication Control 8.6.1.Manufacturing Certification Log 8.6.2.Workmanship 8.6.3.Process Control 8.6.4.Reuse of Parts and Materials 8.6.5.Retention of Test Samples and Removed Parts 8.7.ESD Control 8.8.Non-conformance Control 8.8.1.Discrepancies 8.8.2.Failures 8.8.3.Alert Information 8.9.Inspections and Tests 8.9.1.Inspection and Test Records 8.9.2.Printed Wiring Boards Inspections and Tests 8.10.Metrology 8.11.Handling, Storage, Marking, Shipping... 8.11.1.Handling 8.11.2.Shipping 8.12.Government Property Control 8.13.End Item Acceptance 8.14.Ground Support Equipment 9.CONTAMINATION CONTROL 9.1.Project Requirements 9.2.PFP Concerns 9.3.Control Plan 9.4.PFP Requirements on S/C I&T and Ops 10.SOFTWARE ASSURANCE General, Software Development, Documentation, Software Design Reviews, Configuration Management

6. 6 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 PFP MAR Checklist  MAR compliance checked and approved MAVEN_PF_QA_001

7. 7 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Requirements and Safety Flow-Down of MAIP Requirements –SSL, LASP, CESR, GSFC Deviations – Materials and Processes requirements, Section 6 of MAIP – Compliance deviations are documented in the MAR checklist System Safety – Personnel, facility, and mission safety have been considered. –The Safety Plan has been generated and is in review MAVEN_PF_QA_005B_Safety Plan and MAIP section 4 –The safety plan identifies all requirements, planned tailoring approaches, intended non-compliances, and safety data submittals have been identified. –There are no safety compliance issues.

8. 8 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Suppliers and Alerts Suppliers –SSL procures all active EEE flight parts from GSFC –SSL procures passive EEE parts directly from the manufacturer or through authorized distributors. –SSL requires full traceability on all flight procurements. –Program requirements are flowed through procurement documentation. Where necessary, procurement documentation may include source control documents (SCDs) and engineering documentation. GIDEP Status –SSL will respond to GSFC GIDEP evaluation requests –There are no current GIDEP impacts – no parts on MAVEN are currently impacted by any Alert or Advisory. –Other Memos and Alerts will be Incorporated, for example: “The use of brominated polyimide is unacceptable” (Polyimide board material)

9. 9 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Alerts Status DB  Alerts Status DB

10. 10 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Contamination and ESD Control  Contamination Control –Class 100,00 cleanrooms available –Contamination requirements and preliminary control plans have been defined, MAIP section 9. –Laminar Flow Benches available –Nitrogen available (Oxygen Sensors fixed and portable)  ESD Control –ESD Control Procedure meets ANSI/ESD S20.20 requirements –SSL_QA_0003 ESD Control Plan –All applicable personnel trained and certified by RMV Technology: Robert J. Vermillion, CPP-Lifetime Fellow, Certified ESD & Product Safety Engineer. –Training certifications required for flight work

11. 11 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Calibration, Parts and Materials Control  Calibration Control –Calibration Data base –All tools used for PFP flight are under Calibration Control –Blanket PO for the MAVEN –ANSI/NCSL Z540  Receiving Inspection and EEE parts storage SMA implements parts and materials control –Incoming Inspections (two) –Bonded Flight parts storage –All Flight parts are in a data base –Packaging and shipping provisions to maintain low contamination exposure and ESD control during transport.

12. 12 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Workmanship  Manufacturing, Assembly, and Quality Control of Electronic System will be in compliance to the most recent version of the following technical standards: NASA-STD-8739.1 Workmanship Standards for Staking and Conformal Coating of Printed Wiring Boards and Electronic Assemblies NASA-STD-8739.2 Workmanship Standard for Surface Mount Technology NASA-STD-8739.3 Soldered Electrical Connections NASA-STD-8739.4 Crimping, Interconnecting Cables, Harness, and Wiring ANSI/ESD 20.20 Electrostatic Discharge Control

13. 13 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Training and Certification  Training and Certification DB

14. 14 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 EEE parts and Materials Parts selection, de-rating, screening, and qualification test criteria are defined EEE Parts per GSFC-311-INST-002 add1, Level 2 –Parts derating, Parts age control, Parts control board –Radiation tolerance per MAIP section 5.5 –Alerts –Tests, Test Data & EIDP –Photos Materials and Processes Controls –Hazardous materials requirements –Vacuum outgassing requirements –Approved Materials & Processes lists –Limited Life items List –Alerts, Shelf Life Controls –Material Certs

15. 15 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 EEE parts and Materials EEE Parts DB

16. 16 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 EEE parts and Materials  Materials List DB

17. 17 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Inspections and Audits  Audits and Mandatory Inspection Points  Audits Vendor Audits, Compliance Audits (Safety, ESD, Configuration Control, Traceability, Non-Conformance, Calibration), Interface with External Audits, Assembly Traveler data package at each inspection point  Inspections Incoming/Receiving, Flight Kits, Pre-cap, Calibration, Acceptance and Environmental Test, Software, Interface with External Inspections, Printed Wiring Assemblies, Polymerics, Cables, Harnesses, and Wirinig.

18. 18 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Non-conformance Control  Non-conformance Reporting Methods -Non-Conformance – Problem Failure Report (PFR) -Dispositions include: scrap, rework, return to supplier, refer to MRB - Processing of Repair or Rework -Material Review Board (MRB) -PFP MRB -Customer participation and approval required -Dispositions include scrap, rework, return to supplier, repair by standard or non-standard procedures, use-as-is, request for waiver

19. 19 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 PFP PFR Process

20. 20 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Fault Tree Analysis MAVEN_PF_QA_004 Fault Tree Analysis submitted to Project Fault Tree based on ‘Instrument Resiliency’ analysis by PI (which flows out of Level 1 requirements) Mixture of redundancy (PFDPU, MAG) and the ability to meet mission objectives with backup measurements from other instruments leads to few critical faults STATIC is the only component whose failure would result in loss of a mission objective

21. 21 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 PFP Fault Tree

22. 22 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 PFP FMEA MAVEN_PF_QA_007 FMEA / CIL/ CICP submitted to Project Component-level FMEA performed on PFP, concentrating on the interfaces A total of 78 failure mechanisms were analyzed No Criticality 1 failure modes found Several criticality level 2R failure modes Only STATIC had 2 critical failures modes –STATIC was analyzed down to the subsystem level –An additional 22 failure modes were analyzed –Puts STATIC is on the Critical Items List for PFP A second STATIC was considered, but there were insufficient project resources to accommodate it

23. 23 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 FMEA Criticality Definitions

24. 24 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 FMEA Worksheet MAVEN_PF_QA_006A_FEMA

25. 25 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) MAVEN_PF_QA_009, PFP Preliminary Hazard Analysis submitted to Project High Voltage Hazard –SWEA, SWIA, STATIC have significant HV (up to 15kV) –Not a personnel safety issue (no exposed HV) –Can damage the instrument if HV powered on in Air –Green-tag enable plugs prevent accidental power-on Radiation Sources –Used for SEP CPT –Small hand-help low activity sources –Handled by trained and qualified personnel –Not used at launch site Non-explosive Actuators (NEA) –Use spacecraft pyro system to limit risk of accidental actuation –SWEA, SWIA, STATIC covers – risk of instrument contamination if opened inadvertently on the ground –LPW – risk of damage to instrument, some small risk of harm to personnel if deployed inadvertently on the ground –Red-tag safety pin prevents accidental deployment

26. 26 PFP IPDR 2010/6/14 - 16 Mission Assurance Summary  Experienced Personnel provide oversight and technical support across all elements of PFP Project  Mission Assurance Requirements are well defined and comprehensive.  These are traditional requirements for SSL Missions and they are understood.  Systems with experienced personnel are in place and operating. The Mission Assurance team is ready to support MAVEN PFP