1. The Logic of Politics

2. Let’s assume people are: 1. self interested 2. rational

3. Based on those assumptions, what can we deduce about the kinds of problems that people are going to run into when trying to govern themselves (and each other)? Based on those assumptions, what can we deduce about the kinds of problems that people are going to run into when trying to govern themselves (and each other)?

4. Collective Action Problems Definition: Problems that arise when a group of people tries to reach and implement agreements. Definition: Problems that arise when a group of people tries to reach and implement agreements. Two types: Coordination problems Coordination problems Prisoners’ Dilemmas Prisoners’ Dilemmas

5. Coordination Problems Group members have to decide what they want, what they will contribute to get it, and how to coordinate to achieve their goal Group members have to decide what they want, what they will contribute to get it, and how to coordinate to achieve their goal Why is this hard to do? Why is this hard to do? How can we solve these problems? How can we solve these problems?

6. What are some costs individuals must pay to achieve collective ends? Transaction costs Transaction costs Conformity costs Conformity costs Why is there a tradeoff between them? Why is there a tradeoff between them?

7. Solve coordination problems through: Rules (majority rule) Rules (majority rule) Delegation Delegation Shared focal points Shared focal points

8. How does Congress face collective action problems? How does it solve them?

9. Congress’ collective action solutions Coordination problems Coordination problems –Designate a “traffic cop” (committee chairs, Rules committee/Majority leader) Resolving conflict Resolving conflict –Delegate authority to negotiate to party leaders Transaction costs of legislating Transaction costs of legislating –Following established rules House and Senate solve these problems differently! House and Senate solve these problems differently! –House: higher conformity costs, low transaction costs –Senate: high transaction costs, lower conformity costs

10. Public Goods Private goods: things people buy and consume themselves Private goods: things people buy and consume themselves –Available in a marketplace that supplies goods according to demand Public goods: anyone can freely consume once they are provided, no one can be excluded from their benefits Public goods: anyone can freely consume once they are provided, no one can be excluded from their benefits –Generally must be supplied through collective action; costs of provision borne collectively

11. The Prisoner’s Dilemma There is a collective good that benefits everyone in a group There is a collective good that benefits everyone in a group It is not in any one person’s private interest to help provide it It is not in any one person’s private interest to help provide it

12. Prisoner’s Dilemma Each prisoner given this choice: Each prisoner given this choice: –If your buddy rats on you, –You get 15 years if you keep quiet –You get 8 years if you rat him out. –If your buddy does not rat you out, –You both get 1 year if you keep quiet –You get off scot free if you rat him out

13. Prisoners’ Dilemmas Free rider problem Free rider problem Individual contribution small Individual contribution small Get benefits whether or not you contribute Get benefits whether or not you contribute Private incentive to shirk Private incentive to shirk

14. Prisoners’ Dilemmas Tragedy of the commons Tragedy of the commons Collective good exists but can be depleted or destroyed by overuse Collective good exists but can be depleted or destroyed by overuse It is in everyone’s private interest to overuse It is in everyone’s private interest to overuse

15. Solutions to prisoners’ dilemmas Rules, rewards, and punishments that link private incentive to public good Rules, rewards, and punishments that link private incentive to public good

16. The Logic of Politics Assume political actors are rational and self- interested. Assume political actors are rational and self- interested. If you understand the incentives faced by a political actor, you can understand his behavior. If you understand the incentives faced by a political actor, you can understand his behavior. Therefore, by manipulating his or her private incentives, you can thereby change his or her behavior. Therefore, by manipulating his or her private incentives, you can thereby change his or her behavior. Institutions, laws, and rules change individuals’ private incentives. Institutions, laws, and rules change individuals’ private incentives.

17. The Logic of Nationalization

18. Veto Games