1. Schooling, Income, Marriage, and Pregnancy: Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment Berk Özler Development Research Group, World Bank December 1, 2009.

2. Early marriage, teenage pregnancy, and future outcomes As the invitation to this event suggested, evidence on the consequences of teen pregnancy and early marriage is scant in the developing world. In terms health, for the mother, early childbearing is suggested to be risky due to a variety of factors: obstructed labor, unsafe abortions, anaemia/malaria, hypertensive disease, etc. Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 2

3. Early marriage, teenage pregnancy, and future outcomes Similarly, for the child, biological immaturity may lead to low birth weight, preterm births, and higher rate of infant mortality. Field and Ambrus (2008) find that each additional year that marriage is delayed is associated with 0.22 additional years of schooling and higher literacy. They suggest minimum age laws for marriage. Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 3

4. If we believe these findings, what action should we take? Consent laws Invest in life skills, knowledge of reproductive health and HIV, empowerment of young women Job training, improved access to markets and services Transfers to parents conditional on keeping daughters unmarried. Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 4

5. Cash transfers and sexual behavior Of course, there is already a tool that many governments are utilizing that can produce these desired outcomes as a ‘direct’ or a ‘side’ effect: conditional cash transfer programs for schooling:  In a country like Malawi, marriage and schooling are practically mutually exclusive (unlike child labor and schooling in other settings)mutually exclusive  Incentives to attend school are aligned with those to avoid pregnancy (Duflo et al., 2006; Baird et al., 2009) Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 5

6. Cash transfers and sexual behavior Nonetheless, even if we have faith in the ability of these programs to generate the desired outcomes in marriage, pregnancy, and sexual behavior, there are at least two questions we should ask: 1. Could unconditional transfers work equally well when it comes to improving these outcomes? 2. To whom should we be making the transfers? Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 6

7. 7 Evidence from a randomized cash transfer experiment Zomba Cash Transfer Program (ZCTP) is a two-year randomized intervention that provides cash transfers (and school fees) to young women to stay in or return to school. Program has multifaceted research design with contract variation in various dimensions.  Schoolgirls in randomly selected villages receive unconditional transfers.  Transfers split between parents and girls: Parents’ transfer randomized at village level between $4-10. Girls’ transfer randomized at individual level between $1-5.

8. Cash transfers and sexual behavior Nonetheless, even if we believe in the ability of these programs to generate the desired outcomes in marriage, pregnancy, and sexual behavior, there are at least two questions we should ask: 1. Could unconditional transfers work equally well when it comes to improving these outcomes? 2. To whom should we be making the transfers? Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 8

9. Marriage and schooling status by treatment status after one year Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 9

10. CCT had no effect on marriage rates Girls who got married between baseline and one-year follow-up in the control group or in the CCT have the baseline characteristics.  This implies that there was no movement between the marriage and the schooling cell for CCT recipients. Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 10

11. UCT had a significant effect on marriage rates. That entire effect is due to girls moving from the ‘marriage’ cell to the ‘home’ cell.  Had the UCT had the effect of moving girls from the ‘marriage’ to ‘school’ cell, the CCT would have had to have the same effect.  But, we know that marriage rates did not change under CCT. Results are similar for pregnancy. Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 11

12. Treatment effects on marriage and pregnancy Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 12

13. Treatment effects on marriage and pregnancy Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 13

14. Cash transfers and sexual behavior Nonetheless, even if we believe in the ability of these programs to generate the desired outcomes in marriage, pregnancy, and sexual behavior, there are at least two questions we should ask: 1. Could unconditional transfers work equally well when it comes to improving these outcomes? 2. To whom should we be making the transfers? Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 14

15. Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 15

16. Conclusions Cash transfer programs for schooling can significantly affect sexual behavior, age at first marriage, and teenage pregnancy. At least in SSA, unconditional cash transfer programs may be equally (if not more) effective in improving these particular outcomes. If programs are conditional, it may make sense to make the transfer directly to the target beneficiary, i.e. the young women. Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 16

17. Conclusions Given that, after one year, the effects from conditional transfers on schooling and risk of HIV (and HSV-2) infection are similar to those from unconditional ones, we don’t have a good reason to recommend a CCT program over a UCT.HIV Are we just delaying the inevitable ?inevitable  It remains to be seen whether the longer-term impacts of the program will be as strong as the short-term impacts described in this paper. Not for citation without explicit permission from the authors. 17

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20. Time HIV prevalence T=0T=2 (end of CCT)T=4 0.05 0.08 0.10 Hypothetical HIV incidence by treatment status Treatment Control